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Financial intermediaries interact across different markets in order to diversify 
risk exposure and to get funding from alternative sources. While this can increase bank 
efficiency and alleviate financial intermediation costs, it makes more difficult the effective 
regulation and supervision of banks and can expose them to liquidity shocks and contagion risk 
(Allen and Gale, 2000; Upper and Worms, 2004; Laeven and Levine, 2009). During the global 
financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-08 the interaction of banks across different markets was 
insufficient to assure the necessary liquidity for the normal operation of the banking system. 
Financial intermediaries operating in the U.S. exhibited fire-sales and liquidity 
hoarding (Brunnermaier 2009, Shleifer and Vishny, 2010), as evidence of the rational 
uncertainty that dominated the behavior of markets’ participants (King, 2016).1 In particular, 
the availability of short-term liquidity from the unsecured interbank market was severely 
affected (i.e. via credit rationing and higher loan rates) due to an external shock that took place 
in another market—the sub-prime market of mortgage back securities (MBS)—(Angelini et at. 
2011; Afonso et al. 2011). In order to alleviate liquidity tensions in the interbank markets, the 
Fed had to create new liquidity facilities and grant liquidity throughout large-scale purchases 
of assets (i.e. the quantitative easing). 
  
However, the unconventional monetary policy adopted in the U.S—and since 2010 in the 
Eurozone—had spillover effects on emerging markets. Recent evidence suggests that the large 
liquidity provided by the Fed and ECB increased global liquidity and lead to search-for-yield in 
emerging economies (Morais et al. 2017; Rey, 2016; Fratzscher, et al. 2016; Demirgüç-Kunt, et 
al. 2017). Furthermore, the monetary policy normalization—initiated in May 2013 with the 
U.S. tapering—motivated a flight-to-home effect that resulted in capital outflows, exchange rate 
depreciation, and increased funding costs in emerging economies (Eichengreen and Gupta, 
2015; Bouwman et al. 2015; Aizenman et al. 2016). As a result, emerging economies have been 
                                                 
1 King (2016) highlights the weakness of the financial industry’ risk assessment and its consequences 
over the financial markets based on the concep of radical uncertainty. In particular, he argues that: 
“radical uncertainty makes it likely that from time to time there is a revision in the narrative guiding 
investor behavior, or in the coping strategy as a whole, leading to sharp changes in traders’ perception 
of values and willingness to buy or sell financial assets”. 




forced to implement macroprudential measures—including capital controls—to limit the 
exposition of the banking sector to the international monetary policy shocks, and to gain 
monetary policy autonomy  (Forbes et al. 2016; Dias et al. 2018). 
 
This dissertation evaluates the behavior of banks across the financial markets and proposes 
alternative methods to identify the way interconnectedness, risk taking, regulation, and 
liquidity shocks can affect their behavior, and performance. Additional elements for the 
implementation of monetary policy and for and for enhancing financial stability and access to 
finance are provided.  
  
1.2. Contributions  
 
In Chapter 2 we propose an alternative approach to study the allocation of central bank 
liquidity among the participants of the unsecured interbank market. Using network topology 
metrics and micro-data on repo and unsecured interbank loans from the central bank of 
Colombia during 2010-2013, we identify the super-spreaders of the central bank liquidity 
within the unsecured interbank market.2 We find an inhomogeneous and hierarchical 
connective (core-periphery) structure, in which a few financial institutions fulfill the role of 
super-spreaders of central bank’s liquidity within the interbank funds market; that is, we 
identify those financial institutions that excel as global borrowers and lenders.  
 
This chapter contributes with new tools to examine and understand the structure and dynamics 
of interbank funds’ networks. The resulting insights are important for the implementation of 
monetary policy and safeguarding financial stability. One the one hand, we find evidence 
supporting the key role of some financial institutions as super-spreaders of the central bank’s 
liquidity, which improves the implementation of monetary policy. On the other hand, testing 
that the probability of being a super-spreader in the Colombian case is determined by financial 
institutions’ size further supports some of the most salient findings of interbank relationships 
literature (see, Cocco et al. 2009, Fecht et al. 2011; Afonso et al. 2013). That is, lending 
                                                 
2 Under our analytical framework, a financial institution may be considered a super-spreader for central bank’s 
liquidity if it simultaneously excels at distributing liquidity to other participants (i.e. it is a good hub) and it excels at 
receiving liquidity from good hubs (i.e. it is a good authority), with the central bank being among the best hubs. 




relationships are motivated by too-big-to-fail implicit guarantees. Thus, the larger the bank is, 
the more interconnected and central it is in the interbank network. This result implies greater 
concentration in the network of financial connections that can amplify contagion effects.  
 
In Chapter 3, we employ a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency parameters to 
identify the heterogeneous effects of risk taking on bank efficiency. The proposed approach 
contributes to the recent literature devoted to model the role of risk taking in explaining bank 
efficiency (Hughes and Mester, 2013; Pessarossi and Weill, 2015). We use bank-level data of 
the Colombian banking system for the period 2002 to 2012, a period in which several 
regulatory measures to promote the foreign entry of banks and to limit bank risk-taking—prior 
to the GFC—were implemented.  
The results highlight the importance of accounting for size, affiliation and risk exposure in the 
estimation of bank efficiency. We find that cost and profit efficiency are over-underestimated 
when risk measures are not properly modeled. Interestingly, we observe that size and foreign 
ownership are key determinants of efficiency, and also crucial characteristics determining the 
way changes in risk exposures affect bank efficiency. We identify that an ex-ante measure of 
credit risk captures better risk-taking incentives of banks than an ex-post measure such as 
nonperforming loans, and may provide regulators with a more suitable indicator for setting 
bank provisions for loan losses. This contributes to the recent debate on the role of bank loan 
losses provisions based on expected losses rather on incurred losses  (see, Morais et al, 2018; 
Laeven and Huizinga, 2019). The results also support the hypothesis that capital requirements 
can contribute to enhance banking efficiency, especially for small and domestic banks (Berger 
and Bouwman, 2013).  
Chapter 4 examines the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks on the access and pricing of funds 
in the unsecured interbank market. The main contribution consists in to evaluate the effects of 
both idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks in the unsecured interbank market, a market 
traditionally used for banks to cope liquidity shocks (Freixas et al. 2000) and that is highly 
influenced by peer monitoring (Rochet and Tirole, 1996). We use banks’ deposits outflow as an 
approximation of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, and the U.S. tapering—observed between May 
and September of 2013—as an aggregate liquidity shock. We employ a unique data set 




composed by non-publicly available data on daily overnight-unsecured bilateral loans among 
the financial institutions participating in the Colombian interbank market, which is matched 
with banks’ daily liquidity reports (including access to CB repo operations) and monthly banks’ 
balance sheet information to compute bank specific-characteristics related to liquidity, credit 
risk, size, and capitalization. The detailed information at the borrower, lender and loan level 
allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, isolate aggregate changes in liquidity, and 
disentangle supply from demand effects. 
 
The results indicate that both liquidity shocks are associated with higher interbank loan prices, 
albeit the magnitude on the spread and the impact on the access to interbank liquidity differ 
depending on the borrower-specific characteristics. We observe that more capitalized and 
liquid banks not only tend to pay less for liquidity—evidencing the role of market discipline 
(Furfine, 2001; King, 2008)—, but also that they can absorb better the impact of exogenous 
liquidity shocks. Our results suggest that lending relationships can alleviate funding costs 
during idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (Afonso, et al. 2014), but are less effective during 
aggregate liquidity shocks, implying that hard information tends to overcome the benefits from 
private information during systemic liquidity shocks (Bednarek et al. 2015).  We observe that 
the U.S. tapering had a significant effect on the prices of interbank funds in Colombia, consistent 
with the transmission of international monetary policy shocks (Rey, 2016; Fratzscher, et al, 
2016), and that the central bank liquidity— which increased by 25% during the U.S tapering—
contributed to mitigate the impact of this liquidity shock on funding costs in the interbank 
market.  The mitigating role of central bank liquidity is consistent with the evidence observed 
during the GFC (Allen et al, 2009; Abbassi and Linzert, 2012), and can be related to the role of 
super-spreaders of central bank liquidity in Colombia (as shown in Chapter 2).  
 
Chapter 5 examines the potential de-risking role of multilateral development banks (MDBs) in 
the cross-border syndicated lending market. Although there is an emerging empirical literature 
on the pricing of syndicated loans, the effect of MDBs' participation on loan pricing remains 
unexplored. This market is an important—and growing—source of external finance in many 
emerging and developing countries. Syndicated loans account for about one third of total cross-
border lending between 1995 and 2012, on average (Cerutti et al., 2015), and the size of the 
market is comparable to that of the bond market (World Bank, 2015). However, long-term 




financial flows to developing countries have been partly limited by high-risk perception and the 
resulting high cost of borrowing (Collier and Mayer, 2014). We use deal-level data on a large 
sample of about 17,000 syndicated loans granted to borrowers from 107 emerging and 
developing countries during the period 1994-2015. We investigate whether the presence of an 
MDB in the pool of lenders affect loan terms, especially loan pricing, and then check if MDB’ 
participation mitigates borrower's riskiness, that can be translated into lower loan spreads.  
We find that MDBs' participation is associated with higher borrowing costs and longer loan 
maturities. This finding indicates MDBs' higher capacity to lend at longer tenure than the 
private sector and—as long as spreads reflect borrower risk—the higher propensity of MDBs 
to finance risky projects—especially those in infrastructure—which may not be financed by the 
private sector. We also identify that the presence of an MDB in a syndicate is associated with a 
reduction of the effect of borrower riskiness on loan spreads by about one third. This suggests 
that MDBs’ participation can lower borrowing costs for risky firms in emerging and developing 
countries, which could be the result of better information and monitoring of MDBs and the 
extension of their preferred creditor status (Arezki et al., 2017). We also find evidence on a 
countercyclical role of MDB participation, which can alleviate the flight-to-home effects 
observed after 2008. 
1.3. Policy implications 
 
This dissertation provides insights for the implementation of monetary policy, safeguarding of 
financial stability, and access to finance. First, it shows that a core-periphery structure of the 
central bank and interbank market network improves the implementation of monetary policy, 
but, at the same time, the greater concentration in the network of financial connections can 
amplify contagion effects.  
 
Second, our findings suggest that capitalization can enhance bank efficiency. However, the gains 
from capitalization diminish as the benefits from bank size, and higher credit and market risk 
arise. Moreover, we show that large banks have higher incentives to engage on more credit and 
market risk, and benefit from lower funding costs—associated to too-big-to-fail implicit 
guarantees—, which contribute to explain why systemic risk can increase with bank size 




(Laeven et al., 2016). These findings support the use of additional capital requirements for 
systemically important financial institutions.   
Third, understanding the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks on the interbank market is 
crucial for identifying potential disruptions in the allocation of liquidity that could affect not 
only short-term funding, but also bank lending and monetary policy transmission. We observe 
that international monetary policy shocks have repercussions on the access and pricing in the 
interbank market in emerging economies. Our results suggest that capital and liquidity ratios 
contribute to increase the access to interbank liquidity during idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, 
while central bank liquidity contributes to alleviate funding costs during aggregate liquidity 
shocks. Thus, enhancing capital and liquidity regulation may contribute to monetary policy 
transmission a financial stability in emerging markets.  
Fourth, we observe that cross-border syndicated lending allows financial intermediaries to 
diversity risks by increasing lending for borrowers located in emerging and developing 
countries. Our results suggest that MDBs play an important role in this market by lowering 
spreads to risky borrowers. Thus, risk mitigation can be a channel through which MDBs—
thanks to better information and monitoring and the extension of their preferred creditor 
status—can crowd in private investment from advanced economies to emerging and 
developing countries.  
The financial intermediation is subject to uncertainty from the depositors’ and borrowers 
behavior. Financial markets are the scenario where such uncertainty takes place. The 
traditional risk measures employed until the GFC confirmed their lower efficacy in mitigating 
large financial shocks. Ten years after the GFC, banks have demonstrated that they can adjust 
their levels of liquidity, capitalization and loan provisions to their level of exposure (i.e. 
uncertainty). Recent prudential and financial regulation based on counter-cyclical capital 
requirements, long-term liquidity (i.e. net stable funding ratio) and loan provisions using 
expected losses (rather than incurred losses) are intended to limit bank risk taking and to 
account for the effects of domestic and global financial cycles. Evaluating how this new 
regulation can improve the resilience of the banking sector to domestic and external shocks—
without affecting the benefits from the financial intermediation to the real sector—should be 
part of the future agenda of academics and policy makers.  
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2. Identifying Central Bank Liquidity Super-Spreaders in Interbank 
Funds Networks  
 
Abstract 
We model the allocation of central bank liquidity among the participants of the interbank 
market by using network analysis’ metrics. Our analytical framework considers that a super-
spreader simultaneously excels at borrowing and lending central bank’s liquidity for the whole 
network, as measured by financial institutions’ hub centrality and authority centrality, 
respectively. Evidence suggests that the Colombian interbank funds market exhibits an 
inhomogeneous and hierarchical network structure, akin to a core-periphery organization, in 
which a few financial institutions fulfill the role of central bank’s liquidity super-spreaders. Our 
results concur with evidence from other interbank markets and other financial networks 
regarding the flaws of traditional direct financial contagion models based on homogeneous and 
non-hierarchical networks. Also, concurrent with literature on lending relationships in 
interbank markets, we confirm that the probability of being a super-spreader is mainly 
determined by financial institutions’ size, but leverage and lending concentration as well. We 
provide additional elements for the implementation of monetary policy and for safeguarding 
financial stability. 
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The interbank funds market plays a central role in monetary policy transmission: it allows 
banks to exchange central bank money in order to share liquidity risks (Fricke and Lux, 2014). 
For that reason, they are the focus of central banks’ implementation of monetary policy and have 
a significant effect on the whole economy (Allen et al. 2009; p.639), whereas the interbank rate 
is commonly regarded as central bank’s main target for assessing the effectiveness of monetary 
policy transmission. In addition, as there are powerful incentives for participants to monitor 
each other, the interbank funds market also plays a key role as a source of market discipline 
(Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Furfine, 2001). However, the higher degree of interconnectedness in 
the interbank market makes it a potential source of bank contagion (Furfine, 2003; Upper and 
Worms, 2004). Thus, modeling the interaction among participants of the interbank market 
contributes to understand some of the recent disruptions that affected both the monetary 
policy transmission and the financial stability.  
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) the interbank funds market exhibited a liquidity 
freezing in which money market primary dealers exerted market power and did not fulfill their 
role as liquidity conduits (Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013; Acharya et al. 2012). Moreover, increases 
in counterparty and liquidity risk were also associated with reduced lending activity within the 
interbank market (Beltran et al. 2015). Thus, identifying key players in the interbank funds 
market is important because their behavior contributes to determine the most effective set of 
policy instruments to achieve an efficient interest rate transmission. For instance, as suggested 
in Acharya et al. (2012), the presence of liquidity abundant financial institutions with market 
power could support central bank’s virtuous role in the efficiency and stability of the interbank 
market as credible provider of liquidity to a broad spectrum of financial institutions. Also, 
characterizing the actual topology of interbank funds networks is essential for policymakers 
because of the relation between their structures and their resilience, robustness, contagion, and 
efficiency (see Memmel and Sachs (2013)). In our context, the existence of super-spreaders that 
provide efficient liquidity short-cuts between financial institutions may alleviate the 
inefficiencies resulting from the under-provision of liquidity cross-insurance in interbank 
markets (see Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013)). 






This paper proposes an alternative approach to the analysis of the interbank funds market and 
its role for monetary policy transmission and financial stability. The suggested approach 
consists of using network analysis and an information retrieval algorithm for studying the 
connective and hierarchical structure of the Colombian interbank funds market. As suggested 
by Georg and Poschmann (2010), our approach includes central bank’s monetary policy 
transactions (i.e. open market operations via repos) in the interbank funds network. Hence, 
based on a unique dataset, our approach enhances the scope of the traditional network analysis 
on interbank data. We model interbank market participants’ linkages and identify how the 
liquidity provided by the central bank is allocated throughout the interbank market. In 
particular, we propose a model to identify the most important super-spreaders of the central 
banks liquidity in the interbank market. We employ several measures of network importance 
(i.e. centrality) as an alternative method to gauge lending relationships in the interbank market 
following recent approaches in the literature (see Craig, et al. 2015). Under our analytical 
framework, a financial institution may be considered a super-spreader for central bank’s 
liquidity if it simultaneously excels at distributing liquidity to other participants (i.e. it is a good 
hub) and it excels at receiving liquidity from good hubs (i.e. it is a good authority), with the 
central bank being among the best hubs. 
Our main findings come in the form of the identification of an inhomogeneous and hierarchical 
connective (core-periphery) structure, in which a few financial institutions fulfill the role of 
super-spreaders of central bank’s liquidity within the interbank funds market; that is, we 
identify those financial institutions that excel as global borrowers and lenders. The main results 
concur with those of Inaoka et al. (2004), Soramäki et al. (2007), Fricke and Lux (2014), in’t 
Veld and van Lelyveld (2014), and Craig and von Peter (2014) for the Japanese, U.S., Italian, 
Dutch and German interbank funds markets, respectively. Hence, we find further evidence 
against traditional assumptions of homogeneity in interbank direct contagion models (á la 
Allen and Gale, 2000), whereas the similarities across different interbank funds markets’ 
topology support what Fricke and Lux (2014) allege might be classified as a new “stylized fact” 
of modern interbank networks.  
Our research work contributes with new tools to examine and understand the structure and 
dynamics of interbank funds’ networks. The resulting insights are important for the 
implementation of monetary policy and safeguarding financial stability. One the one hand, we 






find evidence supporting the key role of some financial institutions as super-spreaders of the 
central bank’s liquidity, which improves the implementation of monetary policy. On the other 
hand, testing that the probability of being a super-spreader in the Colombian case is determined 
by financial institutions’ size further supports some of the most salient findings of interbank 
relationships literature, as those reported in Cocco et al. (2009), Afonso et al. (2013), Fecht et 
al. (2011). That is, lending relationships are motivated by too-big-to-fail implicit guarantees. 
Thus, the larger the bank is, the more interconnected and central it is in the interbank network. 
This result implies greater concentration in the network of financial connections that can 
amplify contagion effects (see Gai and Kapadia (2010); Battiston et al. (2012)). Also, based on 
our tests, leverage and lending concentration are good determinants of the likelihood of being 
a super-spreader.  
This paper is organized in five sections. The second presents the review of existing related 
literature. The third section introduces the methodological approach, and presents the dataset 
and its main topological features from the network analysis perspective. The fourth section 
presents the main results. The fifth presents a random effects probit regression model that 
explores the determinants of the probability of being a super-spreader in the Colombian 
interbank funds market, and the sixth section concludes. 
2.2. Literature review 
The recent GFC evidenced a significant reduction in the intermediation of funds in the interbank 
market in most industrialized economies. In the case of the U.S., the fragile liquidity conditions 
forced the Federal Reserve (Fed) into a rapid reduction of its policy rate, and to implement 
several unconventional measures to bring liquidity directly to the money market primary 
dealers (i.e. the group of financial institutions that help the Fed implement monetary policy) in 
order to assure the intermediation of funds among financial institutions. However, instead of 
serving as liquidity conduits, primary dealers avoided counterparty risk and hoarded, thus 
aggravating the adverse liquidity conditions (Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013; Afonso et al. 2011).1 
Beltran et al. (2015) document that many small lenders began reducing their lending to larger 
                                                          
1 Avoiding counterparty risk and hoarding are unrelated (Gale and Yorulmazer, 2013). In the first case not supplying 
liquidity to other financial institutions follows concerns on the credit quality of its counterparties, whereas hoarding 
is due to concerns on its own access to liquidity in the future. 






institutions in the core of the network starting in mid-2007. But an abrupt change occurred in 
the fall of 2008, when small lenders left the federal funds market en masse, and those that 
remained lent smaller amounts. They find that this behavior is associated with concerns on 
counterparty and liquidity risk among participants of the interbank market. Accordingly, the 
Fed had to implement additional measures to grant liquidity to other participants of the 
interbank funds market and to participants of other markets as well (see Fleming (2012); 
Campbell et al. (2011); Christensen et al. (2009); Duygan-Bump et al. (2013)). A similar strategy 
was implemented by most central banks from industrialized economies. In spite of the liquidity 
facilities partially alleviated tensions in the financial markets evidence suggests that the 
interbank market is extremely sensible to liquidity shocks. 
One of the main lessons from the GFC is that policy makers have to properly identify the role of 
the key players in the interbank funds markets. As stated by Yellen (2013), “more-complex 
network structures are likely to be more opaque than less complex ones. For example, as the 
number of intermediaries standing between borrowers and lenders grows, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to understand how one member of the network fits into the overall 
system”. Thus, these financial institutions may be considered the driving forces behind the 
supply and demand for funds in the interbank market, i.e. the liquidity super-spreaders.  
However, not only super-spreaders may be regarded as those contributing to liquidity 
transmission the most, but also as those that may distort the distribution of central banks’ 
liquidity the greatest, as was the case of primary dealers in the U.S. interbank funds market 
during the GFC of 2008 or of credit institutions in the Colombian money market in 2002. The 
Central Bank of Colombia faced a similar stance back in 2002. By mid-2002 a regional market 
crisis triggered by political stress in Brazil led to the disruption of external credit lines and to a 
sudden stop that weakened the liquidity position of financial institutions, particularly that of 
brokerage firms (Vargas and Varela, 2008). These financial institutions were confronted with 
local credit institutions’ reluctance to supply liquidity amidst volatile and uncertain market 
conditions; as was the case during the GFC, by mid-2002 Colombian credit institutions (i.e. 
banking firms) with access to central bank’s liquidity feared counterparty risk and hoarded. 
Under these circumstances, the Central Bank decided to move up its standing purchases of local 
sovereign securities (i.e. TES – Títulos de Tesorería) on the secondary market and to authorize 
brokerage firms and investment funds to conduct temporary expansion operations with the 






central bank (BDBR, 2003). Thus, after August 2002 credit institutions, brokerage firms and 
trust companies have been allowed to access central bank’s temporary monetary expansion 
operations (e.g. open market operations via repos) in the Colombian financial market 
As documented by Acharya et al. (2012), the GFC provides evidence on how banks with excess 
liquidity in the interbank markets (i.e. surplus banks) exerted their market power by rationing 
liquidity to financial institutions in need of liquidity.2 This underscores the importance of 
identifying super-spreaders because of their role for financial stability (drivers of contagion 
risk) and for monetary policy transmission (conduits of central bank money). 
Several studies on the topology of interbank funds market networks had been conducted, 
mainly to identify their properties, such as Inaoka et al. (2004) for Japan (BoJ-NET); Bech and 
Atalay (2010) and Soramäki et al. (2007) for the U.S. (Fedwire); Boss et al. (2004) for Austria; 
in’t Veld and van Lelyveld (2014) and Pröpper et al. (2008) for the Netherlands; Craig and von 
Peter (2014) for Germany; Fricke and Lux (2014) for Italy; Cajueiro and Tabak (2008) and 
Tabak et al. (2013) for Brazil; and Martínez-Jaramillo et al. (2012) for Mexico.3 Some of these 
studies also implement network metrics (e.g. centrality) for analytical purposes related to 
financial stability and contagion. Only Boss et al. (2004) includes the central bank as a 
participant in the interbank funds’ network, but does not address its particular role. Similarly, 
Craig et al. (2015) find that when the network position of the bank is taken into account, central 
lenders in the money market bid more aggressively in the central bank’ auctions. They match 
the data from the ECB repo auctions with the interbank market operations, but they do not 
incorporate how the liquidity obtained from the central bank is allocated in the interbank 
network.  
In order to identify the topology of the Colombian interbank funds network, our model 
implements standard network analysis’ metrics on a network resulting from merging the 
                                                          
2 Acharya et al. (2012) document how the market power of J.P. Morgan may have resulted in the liquidity rationing 
that affected non-depositary institutions as Bear Sterns amid the GFC. Likewise, Acharya et al. also report that 
liquidity rationing by super-spreaders may have occurred in several episodes before the GFC, such as the collapse of 
Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 and of Amaranth Advisors in 2006.  
3 There are few studies worth mentioning in the Colombian case. Cardozo et al. (2011) and González et al. (2013) 
describe the functioning of the local money market. Estrada and Morales (2008) and Capera-Romero et al. (2013) 
study the link between the local interbank funds market structure and financial stability; however, both studies’ 
quantitative and analytical results are limited by their choice of datasets. 






Colombian interbank funds market and the central bank’s open market operations. That is, we 
merge two networks, one comprising non-collateralized lending among financial institutions at 
all available maturities (i.e. intraday, overnight, term lending), the other containing central 
bank’s lending by means of repos. Unlike most literature, our networks are observed, and no 
Furfine-type algorithm is required for their construction. 
Afterwards, we introduce an information retrieval algorithm to estimate authority centrality 
and hub centrality (Kleinberg, 1998), and to identify interbank funds market’s super-spreaders. 
Under our analytical framework a financial institution may be considered a super-spreader for 
central bank’s liquidity if it simultaneously excels at distributing liquidity to other participants 
(i.e. it is a good hub) and it excels at receiving liquidity from good hubs (i.e. it is a good 
authority), with the central bank being among the best hubs. To the best of our knowledge, 
implementing an information retrieval algorithm for identifying super-spreaders in an 
interbank network that comprises central bank’s liquidity provision has not been documented 
in related literature. 
The closest research work is that of Craig and von Peter (2014), Fricke and Lux (2014), and in’t 
Veld and van Lelyveld (2014), who document the existence of core-periphery structures in the 
German, Italian and Dutch interbank funds markets, respectively. Such tiered hierarchical 
structure not only concurs with our results, but also verifies the importance of a limited number 
of financial institutions for the transmission of liquidity within the money market; in this sense, 
the so-called top-tier or money center banks of Craig and von Peter (2014) are analogous to our 
liquidity super-spreaders. However, because their main objective is different from ours, none 
of those articles include the direct liquidity provision by the central bank in their models, nor 
do they implement network analysis metrics and an information retrieval algorithm to pinpoint 
liquidity super-spreaders. Therefore, our work makes a contribution to the identification of 
central bank’s liquidity super-spreaders in interbank funds. 
Identifying central bank’s money super-spreaders is not only critical for the implementation of 
monetary policy, but it also coincides with the robust-yet-fragile characterization of financial 
networks by Haldane (2009). This characterization poses major challenges from the financial 
stability perspective, including the revision of traditional interbank contagion models of Allen 






and Gale (2000) and of most interbank direct contagion models that followed (e.g. Cifuentes et 
al. (2005); Gai and Kapadia (2010); Battiston et al. (2012)).  
Our results concur with recent literature on the inhomogeneous and core-periphery features of 
interbank funds networks, and further support that these are stylized facts of interbank funds 
markets, as claimed by Fricke and Lux (2014). Moreover, an overlooked feature common to the 
U.S., Austrian, Dutch and Colombian interbank funds market is revealed: they are ultra-small 
networks in the sense of Cohen and Havlin (2003). This feature is consistent with the existence 
of a core that provides an efficient short-cut for most peripheral participants in the network, 
and points out that the structure of these interbank funds networks favors an efficient spread 
of liquidity, but also of contagion effects.  
As tested by Craig and von Peter (2014) for the German interbank market, the probability of 
being a super-spreader in the Colombian case is determined by financial institutions’ size. This 
result is robust and overlaps with alternative measures of importance (i.e. centrality) within 
the interbank funds network. Accordingly, concurrent with literature on lending relationships 
in interbank markets (Cocco et al. (2009); Afonso et al. (2013)), size may be the main factor 
behind the interbank funds connective and hierarchical architecture. In this sense, we provide 
evidence that financial institutions do not connect to each other randomly, but they interact 
based on a size-related preferential attachment process, presumably driven by too-big-to-fail 
implicit subsidies or market power. Also, we find evidence of leverage and lending 
concentration as good determinants of the likelihood of being a super-spreader.  
2.3. Methodological approach 
Three methodological steps are necessary for assessing financial institutions’ central bank 
liquidity spreading capabilities in the local interbank funds market. First, the corresponding 
network merging interbank funds and monetary policy transactions has to be built from 
available data. Second, network analysis’ basic statistics have to estimated and interpreted. 
Third, appropriate metrics for assessing the spreading capabilities of financial institutions have 
to be chosen. These three steps are introduced next. 
 






2.3.1. The interbank funds and central bank’s repo network 
Data from the local large-value payment system (CUD – Cuentas de Depósito) was used to filter 
two types of transactions: interbank funds and central bank’s repos. We use quarterly data from 
2010 to 2013. Unlike most literature on interbank networks, the Colombian large-value 
payment system allows for identifying transactions in a direct manner, thus no Furfine-type 
algorithm for inferring transactions is required. 4  
In the Colombian case the interbank funds market is not limited to credit institutions. As 
defined by local regulation, it corresponds to funds provided (acquired) by a financial institution 
to (from) other financial institution without any agreement to transfer investments or credit 
portfolios; this is, the interbank funds market consists of all non-collateralized 
borrowing/lending between all types of financial institutions. For comprehensiveness, we 
work with all maturities available in the interbank funds market, namely intraday, overnight, 
and term lending.5 
The interbank funds market is the second contributor to the exchange of liquidity between 
financial institutions in the Colombian money market. As of 2013, the interbank funds market 
represents about 15.4% of financial institutions’ exchange of liquidity, below sell/buy backs on 
sovereign local securities (84.4%), but above repos between financial institutions (0.2%).6 
Despite the fact that the use of sell/buy backs between financial institutions exceeds that of the 
interbank funds market, analyzing the former for monetary purposes may be inconvenient 
because its interest rate may be affected by the presence of securities-demanding financial 
institutions (instead of cash-demanding), and by the absence of mobility restrictions on 
                                                          
4 The database was extracted from the large-value payment system (CUD) by means of filtering the corresponding 
transaction codes; the Colombian Central Bank (i.e. the owner and operator of CUD) assigns transaction codes, and 
financial institutions and financial infrastructures are obliged to use them to report their transactions.  
5 It is important to mention that there is no direct interconnection with other unsecured interbank markets in the 
region. Banks’ interaction with banks in other jurisdictions takes place via cross-border lending market, which is a 
credit market used for term loans and credit lines with maturities between 3 months to 5 years. 
6 Only sell/buy backs and repos with sovereign local securities as collateral are considered. Sovereign local securities 
acting as collaterals for borrowing between financial institutions in the money market usually account for about 80% 
of the total; if repos with the central bank are included, sovereign local securities represent about 90% of all 
collateralized liquidity sources.  






collateral (Cardozo et al. 2011). Hence, as the interbank funds market is the focus of central 
bank’s implementation of monetary policy (Allen et al. 2009), it is also the focus of our analysis. 
Central bank’s repos correspond to the liquidity granted to financial institutions on behalf of 
monetary policy considerations by means of standard open market operations, in which the 
eligible collateral is mainly local sovereign securities. Access to liquidity by means of central 
bank’s repos is open to different types of financial institutions (i.e. banking and non-banking), 
but is limited to those that fulfill some financial and legal prerequisites. For instance, as of 
December 2013, 87 financial institutions were eligible for taking part in central bank’s repo 
auctions: 42 credit institutions (CIs), 20 investment funds (IFs), 18 brokerage firms (BKs), 4 
pension funds (PFs) and 3 other financial institutions (Xs). As of 2013, the value of Colombian 
central bank’s repo facilities was about six times that of interbank funds transactions. 
Merging the interbank funds market and the central bank’s repos into a single network follows 
several reasons. First, by construction, the central bank is the most important participant of the 
interbank funds market, in which its intervention determines the efficient allocation of money 
among financial institutions, as underscored by Allen et al. (2009) and Freixas et al. (2011). 
Second, as in Acharya et al. (2012), the liquidity provision by the central bank is an important 
factor that may improve the private allocation of liquidity among banks in presence of frictions 
in the interbank market (i.e. market power by surplus banks). Third, merging both networks 
allows for comprehensively assessing how central bank’s liquidity spreads across financial 
institutions in the interbank funds market; therefore, as in Georg and Poschmann (2010; p.2), 
a realistic model of interbank markets has to take the central bank into account. Fourth, as the 
access to central bank’s repos is open to all types of financial institutions, identifying which 
institutions effectively access the central bank’s open market operations facilities and excel as 
distributors of liquidity may provide useful information for designing liquidity facilities and 
implementing monetary policy. 
Accordingly, based on data corresponding to the fourth quarter 2013, Figure 1 displays the 
actual network resulting from merging the interbank funds market and the central bank’s repo 
facilities. The direction of the arrow or arc corresponds to the direction of the funds transfer 
(i.e. towards the borrower), whereas its width and color represents its contribution to the total 
value of transactions with respect to the color scale on the right. Only the original transaction 






(i.e. from the lender to the borrower) is considered; transactions consisting of borrowers 
paying back for interbank or repo funds are omitted, as are intraday (i.e. non-monetary) repos.  
Some salient features of Figure 1 are worth mentioning. First, due to the open (i.e. non-tiered) 
access to central bank’s liquidity, all types of financial institutions are connected to the central 
bank via repos. Second, the widest links correspond to funds from the central bank to some 
credit institutions, which corresponds to the role of the central bank as liquidity provider 
within 2013’s expansionary monetary policy framework. Third, there is a noticeable 
concentration of interbank links in credit institutions receiving funds from the central bank; the 
estimated correlation coefficient (0.75) provides evidence of the linear dependence between 
the liquidity granted by the central bank via repos to financial institutions and their number of 
links during 2013. Fourth, most weakly connected institutions correspond to non-credit 
institutions.  
 
2.3.2. Network analysis 
A network, or graph, represents patterns of connections between the parts of a system. The 
most common representation of a network is the adjacency matrix. In the case of a directed 
network or digraph, in which the direction of the connection is meaningful (i.e. no reciprocity 
is guaranteed), let 𝓃 represent the number of vertexes or participants, the adjacency matrix 𝐴 
is a square matrix of dimensions 𝓃 × 𝓃 with elements 𝐴𝑖𝑗  such that  
             𝐴𝑖𝑗 = {
1 if there is an edge from 𝑖 to 𝑗,
 0 otherwise.                                   
} (1) 
It may be useful to assign real numbers to the edges. These numbers may represent distance, 
frequency or value, in what is called a weighted network and its corresponding weighted 
adjacency matrix (𝑊𝑖𝑗). For a financial network, the weights could be the monetary value of the 
transaction or of the exposure. 
Regarding the characteristics of the system and its elements, a set of concepts is commonly 
used. The simplest concept is the vertex degree (𝓀𝑖), which corresponds to the number of edges 
connected to it. In directed graphs, where the adjacency matrix is non-symmetrical, in degree 







𝑖𝑛) and out degree (𝓀𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡) quantifies the number of incoming and outgoing edges, respectively 
(see Table 2.A4). In the weighted graph case the degree may be informative, yet inadequate for 
analyzing the network. Strength (𝓈𝑖) measures the total weight of connections for a given 
vertex, which provides an assessment of the intensity of the interaction between participants. 
In strength (𝓈𝑖
𝑖𝑛) and out strength (𝓈𝑖
𝑜𝑢𝑡) sum the weight of incoming and outgoing edges, 
respectively. 
Some metrics enable us to determine the connective pattern of the graph. The simplest metric 
for approximating the connective pattern is density (𝒹), which measures the cohesion of the 
network. The density of a graph with no self-edges is the ratio of the number of actual edges 
(𝓂) to the maximum possible number of edges (see Table 2.A4). By construction, density is 
restricted to the 0 < 𝒹 ≤ 1 range. Networks are commonly labeled as sparse when the density 
is much smaller than the upper limit (𝒹 ≪ 1), and as dense when the density approximates the 
upper limit (𝒹 ≅ 1).  
An informative alternative measure for density is the degree probability distribution (𝒫𝓀). This 
distribution provides a natural summary of the connectivity in the graph (Kolaczyk, 2009). Akin 
to density, the first moment of the distribution of degree (𝜇𝓀) measures the cohesion of the 
network, and is usually restricted to the 0 < 𝜇𝓀 < 𝑛 − 1 range. A sparse graph has an average 
degree that is much smaller than the size of the graph (𝜇𝓀 ≪ 𝓃 − 1).  
Most real-world networks display right-skewed distributions, in which the majority of vertexes 
are of very low degree, and few vertexes are of very high degree, hence the network is 
inhomogeneous. Such right-skewness of degree distributions of real-world networks has been 
documented to approximate a power-law distribution (Barabási and Albert, 1999). In 
traditional random networks, in contrast, all vertexes have approximately the same number of 
edges.7 The power-law (or Pareto-law) distribution suggests that the probability of observing 
                                                          
7 Random networks correspond to those originally studied by Erdös and Rényi (1960), in which connections are 
homogeneously distributed between participants due to the assumption of exponentially decaying tail processes for 
the distribution of links –such as the Poisson distribution. This type of network, also labeled as “random” or 
“Poisson”, was –explicitly or implicitly- the main assumption of most literature on networks before the seminal work 
of Barabási and Albert (1999) on scale-free networks. 






a vertex with 𝓀 edges obeys the potential functional form in (2), where 𝑧 is an arbitrary 
constant, and 𝛾 is known as the exponent of the power-law. 
𝒫𝓀 ∝ 𝑧𝓀
−𝛾 (2) 
Besides degree distributions approximating a power-law, other features have been identified 
as characteristic of real-world networks: (i) low mean geodesic distances; (ii) high clustering 
coefficients; and (iii) significant degree correlation, which we explain next.  
Let ℊ𝑖𝑗  be the geodesic distance (i.e. the shortest path in terms of number of edges) from vertex 
𝑖 to 𝑗. The mean geodesic distance for vertex 𝑖 (ℓ𝑖) corresponds to the mean of ℊ𝑖𝑗 , averaged 
over all reachable vertexes 𝑗 in the network (Newman, 2010), as in Table 2.A4. Respectively, 
the mean geodesic distance or average path length of a network (i.e. for all pairs of vertexes) is 
denoted as ℓ (without the subscript), and corresponds to the mean of ℓ𝑖 over all vertexes. 
Consequently, the mean geodesic distance (ℓ) reflects the global structure; it measures how big 
the network is, it depends on the way the entire network is connected, and cannot be inferred 
from any local measurement (Strogatz, 2003). 
The mean geodesic distance (ℓ) of random or Poisson networks is small, and increases slowly 
with the size of the network; therefore, as stressed by Albert and Barabási (2002), random 
graphs are small-world because in spite of their often large size, in most networks there is 
relatively a short path between any two vertexes. For random networks: ℓ~ ln 𝓃 (Newman et 
al. 2006). This slow logarithmic increase with the size of the network coincides with the small-
world effect (i.e. short average path lengths). 
However, the mean geodesic distance for scale-free networks is smaller than ℓ~ ln 𝓃. As 
reported by Cohen and Havlin (2003), scale-free networks with 2 < 𝛾 < 3 tend to have a mean 
geodesic distance that behaves as ℓ~ lnln 𝓃, whereas networks with 𝛾 = 3 yield 
ℓ~ln 𝓃 (ln ln 𝓃)⁄ , and ℓ~ ln 𝓃 when 𝛾 > 3. For that reason, Cohen and Havlin (2003) state that 
scale-free networks can be regarded as a generalization of random networks with respect to 
the mean average geodesic distance, in which scale-free networks with 2 < 𝛾 < 3 are “ultra-
small”. 






Table 2.1 presents the average statistics estimated for the interbank funds and central bank’s 
repo network, estimated on the 16 quarters in the sample. Figure 2.A4 exhibits the evolution 
of these statistics throughout the period. Evidence advocates that the network is (i) sparse, with 
low density resulting from the number of observed links being much smaller than the potential 
number of links, and with an average degree (i.e. mean of links per institution) much smaller 
than the number of participants; (ii) ultra-small in the sense of Cohen and Havlin (2003), in 
which the average minimal number of links required to connect any two financial institutions 
(i.e. the mean geodesic distance) is particularly low (i.e. ~2) with respect to the number of 
participants; (iii) inhomogeneous, in which the dispersion, asymmetry, kurtosis and the order 
of the power-law exponent for the distribution of links and their monetary values suggest the 
presence of a few financial institutions that are heavily connected and large contributors to the 
system, whereas most institutions are weakly connected and minor contributors, with the 
distribution of degree and strength presumably approximating a scale-free distribution;8 (v) 
assortative mixing by degree, which means that heavily (weakly) connected financial 
institutions tend to be connected with other heavily (weakly) connected, especially for the in-
degree case. 
Altogether, these features concur with the scale-free and assortative mixing by degree 
connective structure of social networks reported by Newman (2010), and suggest the presence 
of a structure similar to a core-periphery within the network under analysis. Moreover, as the 
interbank funds network is ultra-small in the sense of Cohen and Havlin (2003), with 
participants being one financial institution away from the others, the process of liquidity 
spreading within the interbank funds network is highly efficient; likewise, contagion spreads 
within the network with ease. Most of these main features are robust to the exclusion of the 
central bank, and tend to be consistent throughout the quarters under analysis (see Figure 
2.A4). 
A remarkable but overlooked feature in Table 2.1 is worth noting. A mean geodesic distance 
around 2 not only agrees with ultra-small networks (Cohen and Havlin, 2003), but also suggests 
                                                          
8 The estimation of the power-law exponent was based on the maximum likelihood method proposed by Clauset et 
al. (2009); this method is preferred to the traditional ordinary least-squares due to documented issues regarding the 
latter (as in Clauset et al. 2009, Stumpf and Porter, 2012). The power-law distribution of links is an asymptotic 
property, thus a strict match between observed and expected theoretical properties for determining the scale-free 
properties of non-large networks may be impractical. 






that the bulk of financial institutions require about two links (i.e. circa one financial institution 
in-between) to connect to any other financial institution in the interbank funds network, 
meaning that the core provides an efficient short-cut for most peripheral participants in the 
network; again, the spreading capabilities of the network are particularly high. Interestingly, 
mean geodesic distances reported by Boss et al. (2004), Soramäki et al. (2007), Bech and Atalay 
(2010), and Pröpper et al. (2008), for the Austrian, U.S. and Dutch interbank funds networks 
are about 2, consistent with ultra-small networks and with the role of a core providing an 
effective short-cut for the network; likewise, mean geodesic distances reported by León and 
Berndsen (2014) for the Colombian large-value payment system (CUD) and the main local 
sovereign securities settlement system (DCV – Depósito Central de Valores) are also about 2. 
All in all, these findings concur with those of Craig and von Peter (2014) about the presence of 
tiering in the interbank funds market in the German banking system, and with the 
corresponding money center banks. Moreover, as also highlighted by Craig and von Peter 
(2014), these features verify that the connective structure of financial networks departs from 
traditional assumptions of homogeneity and representative agents (as in Allen and Gale (2000); 
Freixas et al. (2000); Cifuentes et al. (2005); Gai and Kapadia (2010)), and further supports the 
need to achieve the main goal of this paper: identifying which financial institutions are 
particularly relevant for the network. 
2.3.3. Identifying super-spreaders in financial networks 
Whenever financial networks’ observed connectedness structure is inhomogeneous the 
underlying system’s fragility issue arises. In those networks the extraction or failure of a 
participant will have significantly different outcomes depending on how the participant is 
selected. When randomly selected, the effect will be negligible, and the network may withstand 
the removal of several randomly selected participants without significant structural changes. 
However, if selected because of their high connectivity, extracting a small number of 
participants may significantly affect the network’s structure. In this sense, a rising amount of 
financial literature is encouraging the usage of network metrics of importance (e.g. centrality) 
for identifying super-spreaders (Markose et al. (2012); Markose (2012); León et al. (2012); 
Haldane and May (2011); Haldane (2009)).  






Most literature on financial super-spreaders seeks to identify those institutions that may lead 
contagion effects due to their network connectivity, high-infection individuals (Haldane, 2009), 
or those that dominate in terms of network centrality and connectivity (Markose et al. 2012). 
Despite the traditional negative connotation of super-spreaders in financial networks, in the 
present case the super-spreader financial institution is considered a good conduit for monetary 
policy as well.  
There are many approaches for assessing the importance of individuals or institutions within a 
network. However, centrality is the most common concept, with many definitions and measures 
available. The simplest measures are related to local metrics of centrality, such as degree (i.e. 
number of links, 𝓀𝑖) or strength (i.e. weight of links, 𝓈𝑖), but they fall short to take into account 
the global properties of the network; this is, the centrality of the counterparties is not taken 
into account as a source of centrality. Moreover, they do not capture the in-between or 
intermediation role of vertexes. 
An alternative to degree and strength centrality is betweenness centrality (𝒷𝑖). As presented in 
Table 2.A4, it measures the extent to which a vertex lies on paths of other vertexes (Newman, 
2010). It is based on the role of the 𝑖-vertex in the geodesic (i.e. the shortest) path between two 
other (𝑝 and 𝑞) vertexes (ℊ𝑝𝑞). In the case at hand, betweenness centrality is appealing. A 
central intermediary in the interbank funds market should fulfill an in-between role for the 
network: it should stand in the interbank funds’ path of other financial institutions. Yet, as it is 
a path-dependent centrality measure, it does not consider linkages’ intensity or value, and it 
does not consider the centrality of adjacent vertexes as a source of centrality. 
The simplest global and non-path-based measure of centrality is eigenvector centrality, 
whereby the centrality of a vertex is proportional to the sum of the centrality of its adjacent 
vertexes; accordingly, the centrality of a vertex is the weighted sum of centrality at all possible 
order adjacencies. Hence, in this case centrality arises from (i) being connected to many 
vertexes; (ii) being connected to central vertexes; (iii) or both.9 Alternatively, as put forward by 
                                                          
9 For instance, Markose et al. (2012) use eigenvector centrality to determine the most dominant financial institutions 
in the U.S. credit default swap market, and to design a super-spreader tax that mitigates potential socialized losses. 






Soramäki and Cook (2012), eigenvector centrality may be thought of as the proportion of time 
spent visiting each participant in an infinite random walk through the network. 
Eigenvector centrality is based on the spectral decomposition of a matrix. Let Ω be an adjacency 
matrix (weighted or non-weighted), Λ a diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues of Ω, and Γ 
an orthogonal matrix satisfying ΓΓ′ = ΓΓ = I𝑛, whose columns are eigenvectors of Ω, such that 
Ω = ΓΛΓ′ (3) 
If the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues (Λ) is ordered so that  𝜆1 ≥ 𝜆2 ⋯ 𝜆𝑛, the first column in Γ 
corresponds to the principal eigenvector of Ω. The principal eigenvector (Γ1) may be considered 
as the leading vector of the system, the one that is able to explain the most of the underlying 
system, in which the positive 𝓃-scaled scores corresponding to each element may be 
considered as their weights within an index.  
Because the largest eigenvalue and its corresponding eigenvector provide the highest accuracy 
(i.e. explanatory power) for reproducing the original matrix and capturing the main features of 
networks (see Straffin, 1980), Bonacich (1972) envisaged Γ1 as a global measure of popularity 
or centrality within a social network. 
However, eigenvector centrality has some drawbacks. As stated by Bonacich (1972), 
eigenvector centrality works for symmetric structures only (i.e. undirected graphs); however, 
it is possible to work with the right (or left) eigenvector (as in Markose et al. 2012), but this 
may entail some information loss. Yet, the most severe inconvenience from estimating 
eigenvector centrality on asymmetric matrices arises from vertexes with only outgoing or 
incoming edges, which will always result in zero eigenvector centrality, and may cause some 
other non-strongly connected vertexes to have zero eigenvector centrality as well (Newman, 
2010). In the case of acyclic graphs, such as financial market infrastructures’ networks (León 
and Pérez, 2014), this may turn eigenvector centrality useless; this is also our case because the 
central bank has no incoming links, and because some peripheral financial institutions are 
weakly connected. 
Among some alternatives to surmount the drawbacks of eigenvector centrality (e.g. PageRank, 
Katz centrality), the HITS (Hypertext Induced Topic Search) information retrieval algorithm by 






Kleinberg (1998) is convenient for several reasons. There are four main advantages in our case: 
(i) unlike eigenvector centrality, it is designed for directed networks, in which the adjacency 
matrix may be non-symmetrical; (ii) it provides two separate centrality measures, authority 
centrality and hub centrality, which correspond to the eigenvector centrality as recipient and as 
originator of links, respectively; (iii) when dealing with weakly connected vertexes, it avoids 
introducing stochastic or arbitrary adjustments (as in PageRank and Katz centrality) that may 
be undesirable from an analytical point of view, and (iv) because the authority (hub) centrality 
of each vertex is defined to be proportional to the sum of the hub (authority) centrality of the 
vertexes that point to it (it points to), the importance of vertexes fulfilling an in-between role 
for the network tends to be captured.10 
The estimation of authority centrality (𝒶𝑖) and hub centrality (𝒽𝑖) results from estimating 
standard eigenvector centrality (3) on two modified versions of the weighted adjacency matrix, 
𝒜 and ℋ (4).  
Multiplying the adjacency matrix with a transposed version of itself allows identifying directed 
(in or out) second order adjacencies. Regarding 𝒜, multiplying Ω𝑇with Ω sends weights 
backwards –against the arrows, towards the pointing vertex-, whereas multiplying Ω with Ω𝑇 
(as in ℋ) sends scores forwards –with the arrows, towards the pointed-to vertex (Bjelland et 
al. 2008). Thus, the HITS algorithm works on a circular thesis: the authority centrality (𝒶𝑖) of 
each participant is defined to be proportional to the sum of the hub centrality (𝒽𝑖) of the 
participants that point to it, and the hub centrality of each participant is defined to be 
proportional to the sum of the authority centrality of the participant it points-to.  
The circularity of the HITS algorithm is most convenient for identifying super-spreaders of 
central bank’s liquidity. An institution may be considered a good conduit for central bank’s 
liquidity if it simultaneously is a good hub (i.e. it excels at distributing liquidity within the 
interbank funds market) and a good authority (i.e. it excels at receiving liquidity from good 
                                                          
10 The relevance of the in-between role of a vertex has an inverse relation with the existence of other vertexes 
providing the same connective role. Thus, a vertex being the sole provider of a connective role will concentrate all 
the weighted average centrality of the vertexes it connects. Thus, in this sense, the HITS algorithm captures the in-
between role of vertexes.  
𝒜 = Ω𝑇Ω ℋ = ΩΩ𝑇  (4) 






hubs, with the central bank being among the best hubs). On the other hand, if an institution is a 
good authority but a meager hub it may be regarded as a poor conduit for central bank’s 
liquidity; likewise, if an institution is a good hub but a modest authority its central bank’s 
liquidity transmission capabilities may be regarded as low.  
The eigenvector centrality framework behind the estimation of authority centrality and hub 
centrality allows both metrics to capture the impact of liquidity on a global scale. Accordingly, 
all financial institutions that are connected to the central bank and the most important hubs, 
either directly or indirectly, inherit some degree of authority centrality depending on the 
intensity of the links to those providers of liquidity. Likewise, all financial institutions that 
distribute liquidity in the system inherit some degree of hub centrality depending on the 
intensity of the links to all those receiving liquidity.  
In this sense, an institution simultaneously displaying a high score in both authority (𝒶𝑖) and 
hub centrality (𝒽𝑖) is expected to be a dominant participant in the transmission of funds from 
the central bank to the interbank funds market and within the interbank funds market. 
Therefore, the liquidity spreading index of an 𝑖-financial institution (𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖) corresponds to the 
product of both normalized centrality measures, as in (5). The choice of the product operator 
is consistent with the aim of identifying institutions that simultaneously are a good hub and a 
good authority.11 
                                                          
11 Other conjunction operators may be chosen, such as 𝑚𝑖𝑛(∙). Using the average of hub centrality and authority 


























Where, by construction  
0 ≤ 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖 ≤ 1  
And  






Since 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖 is a measure of the contribution of an individual financial institution to the product 
of all financial institutions’ hub and authority centrality, super-spreaders may be defined as 
those contributing the most to 𝐿𝑆𝐼. Super-spreaders are those financial institutions that 
simultaneously excel as global borrowers and lenders of central bank’s money in the interbank 
funds network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use a global and non-
path dependent centrality measure to identify super-spreaders in an interbank network 
comprising the central bank. 
 
2.4. Main results 
We evaluated the 2010Q1-2013Q4 period, in which the stance of the monetary policy had cycles 
of tightening and easing of the liquidity conditions. This period allows to evaluate the behavior 
of interbank market’ participants under regular stances of the monetary policy. Based on the 
methodological approach described in the previous section, the 16-quarter average liquidity-
spreading index (𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖) was estimated on the corresponding interbank funds and central bank’s 
repo networks. Figure 2 presents the top-15 financial institutions by their estimated 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖.12 
The top-15 financial institutions by average 𝐿𝑆𝐼 are credit institutions (CIs), which together 
contribute with 93.91% of 𝐿𝑆𝐼. The concentration in the top-ranked financial institutions is 
clear, with the first (CI3) contributing with about 25% of the 𝐿𝑆𝐼, and the top-five (CI3, CI22, 
CI1, CI23, C20) contributing with about 75%. Hence, results suggest that CIs provide the main 
conduit for central bank’s liquidity within the Colombian financial system.  
Figure 3 displays how liquidity spreads from the central bank throughout the interbank funds 
market in the last quarter of 2013; Figure 2.A5 exhibits the network for each quarter in the 
sample. Again, the direction of the arrow or arc corresponds to the direction of the funds 
                                                          
12 The central bank’s 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖  is neither reported, nor analyzed. After estimating 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖  the central bank’s score is excluded, 
and the remaining scores are standardized accordingly. This follows our focus on identifying super-spreader 
financial institutions different from the central bank. The same procedure applies for other centrality measures here 
implemented. 











transfer (i.e. towards the borrower), whereas its width and color represents its contribution to 
the total value of transactions with respect to the color scale on the right. The size of the 
vertexes corresponds to the contribution to 𝐿𝑆𝐼 in the corresponding period. The central bank, 
and the top-5 financial institutions by 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖 for this quarter (i.e. CI22, CI20, CI3, CI1, CI5) are 
tagged for illustrative purposes.  
It is noticeable that those financial institutions that display larger vertexes are credit 
institutions only. Although all types of financial institutions receive liquidity from the central 
bank, it is evident that only a few credit institutions concentrate most of open market 
operations borrowing. It is also clear that some credit institutions (e.g. CI22) fulfill an 
intermediary role for several other financial institutions, whereas intermediation by non-credit 
institutions appears to be absent. 
Figure 4 displays the graph corresponding to interbank funds transactions between 
institutions that contribute the 99th percentile of the 𝐿𝑆𝐼 in the last quarter of 2013; that is, the 
supers-spreaders of central bank liquidity. Again, the direction of the arrow or arc corresponds 
to the direction of the funds transfer (i.e. towards the borrower), whereas its width and color 
represents its contribution to the value of transactions within this 10-credit institution core. 
The size of the vertexes corresponds to the contribution to 𝐿𝑆𝐼 in the corresponding period. 
As expected from Figures 2 and Figure 3, all financial institutions in Figure 4 all are credit 
institutions. Also, as expected from the core in a core-periphery hierarchical structure, these 
ten credit institutions constitute a particularly dense network, in which almost all vertexes 
connect to each other (i.e. 94.44% of the potential connections are observed). Likewise, the 
mean geodesic distance is approximately 1. The sum of transactions’ value within this core 
represents 31.86% of the interbank funds network.  
Figure 5 displays the graph corresponding to interbank funds transactions occurring between 
financial institutions not considered in Figure 4; that is, those that may be considered the 
periphery of the network. Unlike Figure 4, there are all types of financial institutions. As 
expected from the periphery in a core-periphery structure, most of them do not connect to each 
other, degree and strength is unevenly distributed, and the network is particularly sparse (i.e. 
1.26% of the potential connections are observed). And most interbank funds transactions and 






their value are among credit institutions; transactions involving non-credit institutions are 
rare, which means that most of them connect to credit institutions in the core only. 
The sum of transactions’ value within this periphery network represents 16.70% of the whole 
interbank funds network, whereas transactions between the core and the periphery represent 
about 51.44%. Such preference of peripheral financial institutions to maintain relationships 
with the core overlaps with evidence reported by Cocco et al. (2009), Fricke and Lux (2014) 
and Craig and von Peter (2014) and Craig et al. (2015). 
2.4.1. What makes a super-spreader in the Colombian interbank funds market?  
The size of institutions in financial markets is known to be inhomogeneous, with a few that may 
be regarded as “too-large” and many “too-small”, presumably approximating a power-law 
distribution (Gabaix et al. (2003); Fiaschi et al. (2013)), even in the Colombian case (León, 
2014). Craig and von Peter (2014), Fricke and Lux (2014), in’t Veld and van Lelyveld (2014), 
and Cajueiro and Tabak (2008) confirm that there is a significant relation between financial 
institutions’ size and their position in the interbank funds’ hierarchy in the respective German, 
Italian, Dutch, and Brazilian interbank markets. In these markets large banks tend to be in the 
core, whereas small banks are found in the periphery. This is consistent with Cocco et al. (2009), 
who report that size is an important determinant of interbank lending relationships, with 
smaller banks being less likely to act as intermediaries.  
Regarding the Colombian case the relation between size and the role as super-spreader in the 
interbank funds market is evident. Figure 6 exhibits the double logarithmic scale plot for 
Colombian financial institutions’ 2013 average assets value, in which the horizontal axis 
corresponds to the logarithm of assets value, the vertical axis to the logarithm of the cumulative 
frequency for each asset value, and each circle represents a single financial institution. As also 
reported by Fiaschi et al. (2013) for the U.S. financial market, such double logarithmic plot 
exhibits an interesting feature: it is an “interrupted” plot. Such interruption, also reported for 
the Colombian case (León, 2014), yields two different size regimes with two different 
distributional forms. It verifies that in the Colombian financial market there are large (i.e. above 
COP 8.8 Trillion) and small (i.e. below COP 2.5 Trillion) financial institutions, and that they may 
be pinpointed rather objectively. 






Filling (in black) the circles corresponding to the super-spreaders (i.e. financial institutions in 
the 99th percentile of 𝐿𝑆𝐼 during 2013) yields an obvious observation: in the Colombian 
interbank funds market all super-spreaders pertain to the largest financial institutions regime 
(i.e. assets above COP 8.8 trillion); four large financial institutions do not classify as super-
spreaders under the arbitrarily-chosen 99th percentile threshold. The average size of super-
spreaders is about 33 times that of other financial institutions; this agrees with evidence 
reported by Craig and von Peter (2014) for the German interbank funds market (i.e. about 51 
times). Therefore, two distinctive features may determine super-spreading capabilities of 
financial institutions in the Colombian interbank funds market, namely being a credit 
institution and being large. 
In order to provide further evidence on the characteristics of the financial institutions that may 
be considered as super-spreaders, we exploit the panel data structure by implementing a 
random effects probit model on a set of institution-specific variables that are standard in the 
literature: size, leverage, financial performance, and the concentration of borrowing and 
lending counterparties. These variables serve as regressors in the model, in which the 
dependent variable (𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡) is binary according to financial institution’s super-spreader 
features: 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1 if it pertains to the 99th percentile (i.e. it is a super-spreader), and 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 0 
otherwise.  
Regarding the choice of the independent variables, not only size (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) is a leading determinant 
of the position within a core-periphery structure for the German, Italian, and Dutch interbank 
markets, but graphical inspection of Figure 6 also points out the relevance of size in the 
Colombian case. Leverage (𝑙𝑒𝑣) corresponds to the traditional debt to assets ratio, which is 
intended to test whether super-spreaders may be predicted by the capital structure of financial 
institutions. Financial performance corresponds to the return over assets ratio (𝑟𝑜𝑎), which is 
intended to test whether super-spreaders may be predicted by their profitability. Finally, the 
borrowing concentration (𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟) and lending concentration (𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑) correspond to the 
calculation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) on the contribution of borrowing and 
lending counterparties for each financial institution, respectively. Including these two variables 






aim at examining whether concentrating (or diversifying) counterparties may serve to predict 
super-spreaders. 13  
Accordingly, based on the choice of percentile for the dataset under analysis (i.e. 99th), the 
probit model serves as a test of the significance of the selected institution-centric variables for 
predicting the membership to the super-spreader class. Let 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represent the set of institution-
specific variables (i.e. 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑙𝑒𝑣, 𝑟𝑜𝑎, 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟, 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑); 𝑝𝑟 denote probability; and Φ the Cumulative 
Distribution Function of the standard normal distribution, the probit model is as in (6). 










All independent variables are standard scores (i.e. number of standard deviations above the 
estimated mean) computed using quarterly information from 2010Q1 to 2013Q4. The  𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 is 
computed for each quarter and the super-spreaders are selected at the 99th percentile. Standard 
descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 2.A1. 
However, because the functional form of 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 in (5) seeks to filter out those financial 
institutions that simultaneously display both authority centrality (𝒶𝑖𝑡) and hub centrality (𝒽𝑖𝑡), 
the same probit regression model is implemented in two alternate models with authority and 
hub centrality as dependent variables. Using authority centrality and hub centrality as 
alternative dependent variables helps us to examine if the selected independent variables differ 
                                                          
13 Financial institutions’ access to central bank’s liquidity –an intuitive variable- would predict super-spreaders 
perfectly; hence, despite its consideration in the probit model makes its estimation unfeasible, it should be 
considered for analytical purposes. Some institution-centric variables (e.g. equity, return over equity) were 
discarded due to their lack of significance or redundancy with those presented, whereas others (e.g. non-performing 
loans) were excluded because they are available for credit institutions only. Initial liquidity balance in central bank’s 
accounts, cash, and proprietary investments, were discarded due to potential multicollinearity with size; the cross-
correlation between the three variables is high, and asset size encompasses them all. Likewise, the value of repos 
with the central bank is also discarded for potential multicollinearity with size. 






in their explanatory power because of the potentially distinct role of financial institutions as 
global receivers or distributors of liquidity. Simple local centrality measures, namely degree 
(i.e. number of links, 𝓀𝑖𝑡) and strength (i.e. weight of links, 𝓈𝑖𝑡), and betweenness centrality (i.e. 
role as connector between vertexes, 𝒷𝑖𝑡) are also reported for robustness and comparison 
purposes. Besides, to check the robustness of the model we also estimate the probit model using 
95th and 90th percentile thresholds for determining super-spreaders.  
Overall, concurrent with the literature, we expect a strong and positive dependence between 
size and the probability of being a super-spreader. One would expect that the more leveraged a 
financial institution is, the cheaper its cost of capital, and consequently the cheaper the liquidity 
it may lend. Therefore, we expect a positive relation between leverage and the probability of 
being a super-spreader and a good hub, but we do not have a clear expectation on the relation 
with the probability of being a good authority. Moreover, as the average credit institution in the 
Colombian case displays leverage levels about 2.5 times that of the average non-credit 
institution, we expect a positive and significant relation between leverage and super-spreaders. 
Regarding financial performance, as larger banks are reported to be more cost and profit 
efficient than their smaller peers in the intermediation of funds in the Colombian financial 
system (Sarmiento and Galán, 2017), we expect a positive dependence between financial 
performance and the probability of being super-spreader, good hub, and good authority. About 
the concentration of borrowing and lending, we expect an inverse relation between 
concentration of counterparties and the probability of being a super-spreader; on the other 
hand, the probability of not being a super-spreader is expected to be high for peripheral 
financial institutions, which have been documented to concentrate their borrowing 
relationships (see Afonso et al. (2013) and Cocco et al. (2009), who analyze small financial 
institutions in the periphery of the U.S. and Portuguese interbank markets, respectively). 
Regarding alternative centrality measures, we expect financial institutions’ degree (𝓀𝑖𝑡), 
strength (𝓈𝑖𝑡), and betweenness (𝒷𝑡𝑖) to coincide with their 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡. As 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a global measure 
of centrality that incorporates the number of linked neighbors, the intensity of the linkages at 
all possible order adjacencies, and the in-between role of vertexes, we expect to observe 
consistency with degree, strength, and betweenness. The linear dependence (i.e. correlation) 
between the selected dependent variables supports such expectation (in Figure 7). 






To select our model we first analyze the between variation (across individuals) and within 
variation (for a given individual) of the independent and dependent variables –as suggested by 
Baltagi (2013). For the dependent variables, we find that within variation is very low: financial 
institutions with high 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 are stable over time; that is, super-spreaders tend to be the same 
throughout the quarters under examination. Using the 99th percentile for the 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 the share of 
financial institutions that are super-spreaders along the sample is 70.3%, whereas those who 
are not super-spreaders account for 97.4%. We also identify that between variation is greater 
than within variation for the alternative independent variables and for dependent variables. 
For instance, in the case of 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, our main variable of interest, the between variation is 1.04 
whereas the within variation is only 0.06. Similarly, for leverage the between variation values 
are 1.04 and 0.28, respectively (see Table 2.A1).  
The second step was to perform a Hausman Specification Test comparing the estimates from 
the random effects probit model against a conditional fixed-effects logistic model. The test leads 
to reject the null hypothesis according to which the logit fixed-effects estimator is efficient, 
confirming our selection of the probit random effects model.14. 
Table 2.2 shows the results of estimating the probit model in (6). The overall fit of the probit 
model is adequate for predicting super-spreaders. First, the Wald test is statistically significant 
for all specifications, thus confirming the overall significance of the proposed model. Second, 
the ROC statistic (0.966) suggests that the model discriminates between super-spreaders and 
non-super-spreaders in an accurate manner15. That is, the larger the ROC statistic, the most 
accurate is the model to differentiate super-spreaders. Interestingly, we find that the ROC 
statistics ranges from 0.812 to 0.932 across the alternative independent variables, indicating 
that those specifications also have high predicting power. 
                                                          
14 This is because of logit fixed-effects estimators rely on within variation rather on between variation (as the random 
effects probit models does). As a result, the logit fixed-effects model leads to a significant loss of observations due to 
it drops all observations in which yit=0 for all t or yit is 1 for all t. In our case it drops 80.5% of the observations in 
order to fit the model. Thus, the logit fixed-effects model leads to substantially higher standard errors (i.e. efficiency 
loss) because of both the loss of observations and that only within variation of the regressors are used.   
15 ROC statistic tests the predictive accuracy of the fitted probit model by estimating the area under the 
corresponding receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. Thus, the ROC analysis provides a quantitative 
measure of the accuracy of diagnostic tests to discriminate between two states or conditions (e.g. 𝐿𝑆𝐼 or non 𝐿𝑆𝐼). It 
has been recently used in the economic literature to test the accuracy of probit and logit models (See, Minoui et al. 
2013; Comelli, 2014). Technical details on the implementation of the ROC test can be found in Cleves (2002). 






Regarding financial institutions’ characteristics, we identify that size is the key significant 
determinant of the probability of being a super-spreader. This concurs with Craig and von 
Peter’s (2014) findings of large banks that dominate wholesale activity in money markets (i.e. 
money center banks) in the German interbank market. As expected, size is the major 
determinant of the probability of being a super-spreader, a good hub, and a good authority. 
Likewise, size is the major determinant of the probability of displaying high degree, strength, 
and betweenness.  
Leverage is the second most relevant factor. There is a positive and significant relation between 
the likelihood of being a super-spreader and the leverage of financial institutions. This suggests 
that the more leveraged financial institutions are, the more likely they are central players in the 
interbank network. As expected, because credit institutions are notably more leveraged than 
non-credit institutions (i.e. about 2.5 times on average), the significance of leverage as a 
explanatory variable of the likelihood of being a super-spreader is rather intuitive: not only 
super-spreaders are large, but they are also more leveraged, consistent with the main features 
of credit institutions in the Colombian case. Also, this positive relation overlaps with the 
findings of Martínez and León (2015), who report that there is a significant spatial effect (i.e. a 
spill-over) caused by leverage on the cost of liquidity in the Colombian money market. As 
suggested by Martínez and León, this may be related to corporate finance basics: highly 
leveraged firms have a lower weighted cost of capital, which induces a lower opportunity cost 
for their liquid funds, and –therefore- they can lend at a lower rate. 
Lending concentration has a negative influence on the likelihood to be central in the network. 
Thus, the more concentrated the lending relationships in the interbank market, the lower the 
probability to be a super-spreader in the network. That is, as expected, a financial institution 
should have a diversified lending relationship in order to be a super-spreader; otherwise, its 
liquidity spreading abilities would be somewhat restricted. Borrowing concentration and 
financial performance are not significant as determinants of the likelihood of being a super-
spreader.  
In the case of alternative centrality measures, hub centrality, authority, and betweenness, the 
probability is also determined by borrowing concentration. Hub centrality and betweenness 
exhibit a negative sign, which suggests that the less concentrated the borrowing counterparties, 






the more likely it is to be an important financial institution based on those centrality measures. 
On the other hand, the sign is positive for authority centrality, which suggests that a financial 
institution that excels as global borrower (i.e. high authority) concentrates its borrowing; it is 
safe to say that as the central bank is the dominant source of liquidity lending in the network, 
those heavily concentrating their borrowing with the central bank should appear as global 
borrowers. These results and their interpretation are fairly robust to other thresholds for 
selecting super-spreaders. In Table 2.A2 we report the results for two different thresholds, 
namely 95th and 90th percentile super-spreaders. As expected, there is consistency between 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖 
and the alternative dependent variables in these two other specifications. 
In this sense, financial institutions do not connect to each other randomly, but they interact 
based on a size-, leverage-, and diversified lending-related preferential attachment process. The 
size-related preferential attachment coincides with literature about the role of market power 
and too-big-to-fail implicit subsidies (e.g. implicit or explicit access to last-resort lending) on 
the increased likelihood of large financial institutions to appear in both sides (i.e. borrowing 
and lending) of financial markets, their ability to obtain lower funding rates, and their 
willingness to engage in riskier activities by means of increasing leverage and risk-taking 
(Bertay et al. 2013; IMF, 2014). Angelini et at. (2011) find, for instance, that during the global 
financial crisis of 2008 the cheaper funding cost of larger banks in the U.S. interbank market 
was associated with the existence of moral hazard risks linked to too-big-to-fail implicit 
subsidies (see also). Likewise, the size-related preferential attachment process supports 
evidence of smaller financial institutions relying on stable borrowing and lending relationships 
with large counterparties (see Cocco et al. 2009; Fecht et al. 2011; Afonso et al. 2013; Braüning 
and Fecht, 2015). 
The leverage-related preferential attachment process may be linked to the fact that credit 
institutions, which are those that contribute the most to 𝐿𝑆𝐼, not only are larger, but are also 
more leveraged than non-credit institutions. Also, as reported by Martínez and León (2015), 
the higher leverage of credit institutions may allow them to lend at lower rates because their 
weighted cost of capital may be relatively lower than that of non-credit institutions, thus 
enjoying an advantageous position as natural lenders in the interbank funds market. Similarly, 
the diversified lending-related preferential attachment process may result from credit 






institutions enjoying the advantages of higher leverage levels, which allow them to serve as 
natural lenders for other financial institutions.  
2.5. Final remarks 
In this paper we find that the Colombian interbank funds market displays an inhomogeneous 
and hierarchical (akin to a core-periphery) connective structure, in which a few financial 
institutions fulfill the role of super-spreaders of central bank’s liquidity within the interbank 
funds market. Thus, our research work not only contributes to central banks’ efforts to analyze 
the structure and functioning of interbank funds markets, but also contributes to designing 
liquidity facilities, implementing monetary policy, and identifying those financial institutions 
with a systemic role in the corresponding market and other related ones (e.g. sovereign 
securities, foreign exchange, etc.). 
Accordingly, four particular contributions of our research work are worth stating. First, we 
propose a methodological approach that explores the connective structure of the interbank 
funds network and identifies those financial institutions that may be considered as the most 
important conduits for monetary policy transmission and for liquidity spreading among 
participating financial institutions. In this sense, our approach is able to identify interbank 
funds’ systemically important financial institutions, which should be the focus of financial 
authorities’ efforts for preserving financial stability and promoting an efficient monetary policy 
transmission. Likewise, in the sense of Acharya et al. (2012), the presence of super-spreaders –
with market power- could support central bank’s virtuous role in the efficiency and stability of 
the interbank market as credible provider of liquidity to a broad spectrum of financial 
institutions. 
Second, our results support recent findings about the existence of some stylized facts in 
financial networks, namely an inhomogeneous and hierarchical connective structure that 
contradicts traditional assumptions in interbank contagion models (i.e. homogeneity, 
symmetry, linearity, normality, static equilibrium). Confirming the robust-yet-fragile 
characterization of financial networks by Haldane (2009) entails major challenges for financial 
authorities contributing to financial stability. For instance, as argued after the crisis (e.g. 
Kambhu et al. (2007); May et al. (2008); Haldane and May (2011); León and Berndsen (2014)), 
the most evident challenge comes in the form of focusing financial authorities’ preventive 






actions on super-spreaders, which requires shifting from institution-calibrated to system-
calibrated prudential regulation. 
Third, as is the case of interbank funds networks in the U.S., Netherlands and Austria, and 
consistent with the existence of a core-periphery hierarchy, the Colombian interbank funds 
network is ultra-small, with an average geodesic distance around two. This not only means that 
the spreading capabilities of interbank funds network are particularly high, either for liquidity 
or for contagion effects, but it also suggests that the existence of super-spreaders may alleviate 
the inefficiencies resulting from the under-provision of liquidity cross-insurance in interbank 
markets documented by Castiglionesi and Wagner (2013).  
Fourth, by means of a random effects probit regression model, we confirm that in the Colombian 
case the probability of being a super-spreader is determined by financial institutions’ size, 
leverage, and lending concentration. These three features characterize credit institutions in the 
Colombian case. This concurs with evidence from other countries. Accordingly, size may be the 
main factor behind the interbank funds network’s reported scale-free connective structure and 
its core-periphery hierarchical organization. Nevertheless, as causality may not be inferred 
from the probit model, it is uncertain whether size is the driving force (i.e. the cause) behind 
the connective and hierarchical structure of the interbank funds network, or it is the result (i.e. 
the effect). Moreover, based on complex adaptive systems literature, it may be the case that size 
is –simultaneously- the driving force and the result of the interbank funds network dynamics 
by means of feedback effects. Regarding leverage and lending diversification, it is likely that 
these two features allow credit institutions to enjoy a natural advantage to lend; again, the 
causality is to be tested. 
Further related research work may come in several forms. First, it is imperative to test the 
robustness of results under stringent financial liquidity conditions, such as a disruption of local 
or external credit lines, or a contractionary monetary policy; we attempted such test, but 
available data does not cover periods that could be fair examples of such conditions –for 
instance, year 2002. Second, the causality in interbank funds networks’ dynamics should be 
explored to understand the role of size and other variables as causes and effects. Third, due to 
its contribution to money market liquidity, collateralized borrowing should also be considered 
for identifying central bank’s liquidity supers-spreaders.  






Figure 2.1. The interbank funds and central bank’s repo network 
 
Notes: The direction of the arrow corresponds to the direction of the funds transfer (i.e. towards 
the borrower), whereas its width and color represents its contribution to the total value of 
transactions with respect to the color scale on the right. Financial institutions considered are 
central bank (asterisk), credit institutions (upward-pointing triangles), brokerage firms 
(diamonds), investment funds (downward-pointing triangles), pension funds (squares), and 
other financial institution (stars). A force-directed layout (i.e. attraction between adjacent 

















Table 2.1. Standard statistics for the interbank funds and central 








Participants 74 73 
Density 0.09 0.08 
Clustering 0.14 0.19 
Mean geodesic distance 2.17 2.19 
Degree     (In | Out)    (In | Out) 
Mean 6.19 | 6.19 5.72 | 5.72 
Standard deviation  7.14 | 8.79 6.99 | 7.81 
Skewness  1.34 | 1.90 1.31 | 1.63 
Kurtosis  3.81 | 7.41 3.77 | 6.49 
Power-law exponent 1.91 | 3.13  2.53 | 3.19 
Assortativity index 0.55 | 0.18 0.59 | 0.42 
Strength    (In | Out)    (In | Out) 
Mean 1.35 | 1.35 0.29 | 0.29 
Standard deviation  3.83 | 9.14 0.63 | 0.62 
Skewness  4.53 | 3.30 8.31 | 2.75 
Kurtosis  27.29 | 70.89 17.07 | 11.76 
Power-law exponent   1.46 | 1.65  1.45 | 1.55 
Assortativity index   0.10 | -0.05  0.23 | 0.20 
 
Notes: This table suggests that the interbank funds and central bank’s repo network is an 
approximate scale-free network, akin to other social networks documented in literature, 




















Figure 2.2. Top-15 financial institutions by average 𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒊 
 
Notes: This figure presents the top-15 financial institutions by average 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖  estimated on the 16 
quarters (2010Q1 to 2013Q4). Credit institutions (CI) dominate the contribution to 𝐿𝑆𝐼. Average 
















Figure 2.3. The interbank funds and central bank’s repo network with estimated 𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒊 
 
Notes: The size of the vertexes corresponds to the contribution to 𝐿𝑆𝐼. The direction of the arrow 
corresponds to the direction of the funds transfer (i.e. towards the borrower), whereas its width 
and color represents its contribution to the total value of transactions with respect to the color 
scale on the right. Financial institutions considered are central bank (asterisk), credit institutions 
(upward-pointing triangles) brokerage firms (diamonds), investment funds (downward-pointing 
triangles), pension funds (squares), and other financial institution (stars). A force-directed layout 















Figure 2.4. The interbank funds core network 
 
Notes: The size of the vertexes corresponds to the contribution to 𝐿𝑆𝐼. The direction of the arrow 
corresponds to the direction of the funds transfer (i.e. towards the borrower), whereas its width 
and color represents its contribution to the total value of transactions with respect to the color 
















Figure 2.5. The interbank funds periphery network 
 
Notes: The size of the vertexes corresponds to the contribution to 𝐿𝑆𝐼. The direction of the arrow 
corresponds to the direction of the funds transfer (i.e. towards the borrower), whereas its width 
and color represents its contribution to the total value of transactions with respect to the color 
scale on the right. Financial institutions considered are credit institutions (upward-pointing 
triangles), brokerage firms (diamonds), investment funds (downward-pointing triangles), 
















Figure 2.6. Distribution of Colombian financial institutions’ size  
 
Notes: There are two different size regimes, in which super-spreaders (filled circles) correspond 
to large financial institutions. Note that there is a double logarithmic scale. Size corresponds to 

















Figure 2.7. Linear dependence between 𝑳𝑺𝑰 and traditional centrality measures 
𝐿𝑆𝐼 𝒽 𝒶 𝓀 𝓈 𝒷
𝐿𝑆𝐼 1
𝒽 0.60 1
𝒶 0.78 0.34 1
𝓀 0.57 0.67 0.64 1
𝓈 0.81 0.48 0.98 0.74 1
𝒷 0.46 0.35 0.55 0.66 0.62 1
 
 
Notes: Correlations among variables are computed 
for all quarters in the sample. The centrality 
measures are Liquidity Spreading Index (𝐿𝑆𝐼), 
authority (𝒶), hub centrality (𝒽), degree (𝓀), 
























Table 2.2. Likelihood to be a central bank liquidity super-spreader in the interbank 
market network (Independent variables fitted at the 99th percentile) 
 
Variable a, b 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖  𝒽𝑖  𝒶𝑖  𝓀𝑖  h 𝓈𝑖  𝒷𝑖  
Size  
(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) c 
3.229 1.637 4.866 6.557 11.335 1.236 
(2.82)** (2.70)*** (2.75)*** (1.96)** (3.15)*** (4.19)*** 
Leverage  
(𝑙𝑒𝑣)  d 
1.804 0.189 0.665 0.541 0.384 0.804 
(3.30)*** (0.89) (2.10)** (2.68)*** (1.24) (3.32)*** 
Financial performance  
(𝑟𝑜𝑎) e 
0.136 -0.098 0.359 0.154 0.331 0.087 
(0.31) (-0.54) (1.67)* (1.12) (1.55) (0.61) 
Borrowing concentration  
(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟) f 
0.857 -0.551 1.070 -0.072 0.046 -0.426 
(1.69)* (-4.23)*** (3.50)*** (-0.35) (0.24) (-3.81)*** 
Lending concentration  
(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑) g 
-2.647 -0.185 -0.011 -0.501 -0.201 -0.422 
(-4.42)*** (-1.08) (-0.08) (-3.17)*** (-1.89)* (-3.23)*** 
Constant 
-6.920 -1.450 -1.951 4.404 -1.720 -2.057 
(-3.57)*** (-4.54)*** (-3.09)*** (3.18)*** (-1.66)* (-8.11)*** 
       
Observations 1068 
Observations = 1 165 336 318 938 450 237 



























Notes: This table depicts results of a probit model (random effects) run on quarterly data from the period 2010q1 to 
2013q4 and estimated by maximum likelihood. a Dependent variables correspond to 1 when the financial institution 
contributes to the 99th percentile of the distribution of the liquidity spreading index (LSIi) or the alternative network 
metrics(i.e.  𝒽𝑖 , 𝓈𝑖 , and 𝒷𝑖), and zero otherwise. All independent variables are standard scores of the original variable 
(i.e. number of standard deviations above the estimated mean). b Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
financial institution level. t-statistics in parenthesis, significant at .10*, .05** and .01***. c Assets’ value, as reported 
by the Financial Superintendence of Colombia (SFC). d Debt to assets ratio, based on balance sheet data reported by 
SFC. e Return over assets. f Herfindahl-Hirschman index on weighted borrowing counterparties. g Herfindahl-
Hirschman index on weighted lending counterparties. h ROC statistics tests the predictive accuracy of the fitted 























𝐿𝑆𝐼 0.222 0.1032 1068 105 
𝒽 0.3006 0.1242 1068 105 
𝒶 0.2972 0.1096 1068 105 
𝓀 0.4383 0.1533 1068 105 
𝓈 0.3441 0.1499 1068 105 
𝒷 0.2545 0.1305 1068 105 
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 0.8187 0.0638 1068 105 
𝑙𝑒𝑣 1.0452 0.2826 1068 105 
𝑟𝑜𝑎 1.0278 0.4038 1068 105 
𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟 0.8386 0.3715 1068 105 
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑 0.9027 0.2612 1068 105 
Notes: This table reports between and within variation (standard deviation) of the variables used in the probit 
model computed during the period 2010Q1 to 2013Q4. T-bar = 10.17 for each variable. Liquidity Spreading Index 
(𝐿𝑆𝐼), authority (𝒶), hub centrality (𝒽), degree (𝓀), strength (𝓈), and betweenness (𝒷). 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the asset value in 
COP million, as reported by the Financial Superintendence of Colombia (SFC); 𝑙𝑒𝑣 is the debt to assets ratio, based 
on balance sheet data reported by SFC; 𝑟𝑜𝑎 is the return over assets; 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟 and 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑 are the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
indexes on weighted borrowing and lending counterparties, respectively. All statistics are estimated based on 



















Table 2.A.2. Likelihood to be a central bank liquidity super-spreader in the interbank 
market network (Independent variables fitted at the 95th percentile) 
Variable a, b 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖  𝒽𝑖  𝒶𝑖  𝓀𝑖  h 𝓈𝑖  𝒷𝑖  
Size  
(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) c 
1.463 1.837 3.716 4.605 6.607 0.933 
(4.14)*** (2.82)** (4.40)*** (2.46)** (4.28)*** (4.46)** 
Leverage  
(𝑙𝑒𝑣)  d 
1.468 0.158 0.480 0.665 0.159 0.923 
(3.01)*** (0.49) (0.90) (3.74)*** (0.61) (4.31)*** 
Financial performance  
(𝑟𝑜𝑎) e 
0.310 -0.158 0.356 -0.017 0.219 0.303 
(0.99) (-0.59) (1.36) (-0.13) (0.69) (1.81)* 
Borrowing concentration  
(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟) f 
0.377 -0.238 1.322 -0.743 0.015 -0.374 
(1.25) (-1.52) (4.05)*** (-3.82)*** (0.07) (-3.39)*** 
Lending concentration  
(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑) g 
-0.992 -0.367 -0.195 -0.094 -0.040 -0.364 
(-2.84)** (-1.47) (-0.80) (-0.82) (-1.72)* (-2.08)** 
Constant 
-4.095 -2.906 -3.572 1.545 -1.177 -2.383 
(-5.50)*** (-6.61)*** (-6.37)*** (2.09)** (-2.68)*** (-8.24)*** 
       
Observations 1068 
Observations = 1 115 218 207 595 262 170 



























Notes: This table depicts results of a probit model (random effects) run on quarterly data from the period 2010Q1 
to 2013Q4 and estimated by maximum likelihood. a Dependent variables correspond to 1 when the financial 
institution contributes to the 95th percentile of the distribution of the liquidity spreading index (LSIi) or the 
alternative network metrics(i.e.  𝒽𝑖 , 𝓈𝑖 , and 𝒷𝑖), and zero otherwise. All independent variables are standard scores 
of the original variable (i.e. number of standard deviations above the estimated mean). b Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the financial institution level. t-statistics in parenthesis, significant at .10*, .05** and .01***. c Assets’ 
value, as reported by the Financial Superintendence of Colombia (SFC). d Debt to assets ratio, based on balance sheet 
data reported by SFC. e Return over assets. f Herfindahl-Hirschman index on weighted borrowing counterparties. g 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index on weighted lending counterparties. h ROC statistics tests the predictive accuracy of the 











Table 2.A.3.Likelihood to be a central bank liquidity super-spreader in the interbank 
market network (Independent variables fitted at the 90th percentile) 
Variable a, b 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖  𝒽𝑖  𝒶𝑖  𝓀𝑖  h 𝓈𝑖  𝒷𝑖  
Size  
(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) c 
1.175 1.633 2.031 7.399 4.040 0.939 
(4.31)*** (2.88)*** (4.07)*** (3.93)*** (4.39)*** (4.53)** 
Leverage  
(𝑙𝑒𝑣)  d 
0.939 0.164 0.739 0.589 0.763 0.712 
(2.61)*** (0.43) (1.68)* (2.31)** (2.01)** (3.54)*** 
Financial performance  
(𝑟𝑜𝑎) e 
0.101 -0.587 0.200 -0.005 0.124 0.300 
(0.37) (-2.39)** (1.01) (-0.03) (0.39) (1.82)* 
Borrowing concentration  
(𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟) f 
0.227 -0.711 1.088 -0.549 0.189 -0.341 
(1.10) (-3.13)*** (4.04)*** (-4.11)*** (0.72) (-2.80)** 
Lending concentration  
(𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑) g 
-0.701 -0.697 -0.107 -0.467 -0.371 -0.406 
(-2.58)*** (-1.98)** (-0.35) (-3.08)*** (-1.68)* (-2.27)** 
Constant 
-2.344 -3.512 -3.119 0.896 -2.723 -2.537 
(-6.75)*** (-6.95)*** (-6.93)*** (1.43) (-6.04)*** (-8.18)*** 
       
Observations 1068 
Observations = 1 88 171 158 455 200 128 



























Notes: This table depicts results of a probit model (random effects) run on quarterly data from the period 2010Q1 
to 2013Q4 and estimated by maximum likelihood. a Dependent variables correspond to 1 when the financial 
institution contributes to the 90th percentile of the distribution of the liquidity spreading index (LSIi) or the 
alternative network metrics(i.e.  𝒽𝑖 , 𝓈𝑖 , and 𝒷𝑖), and zero otherwise. All independent variables are standard scores 
of the original variable (i.e. number of standard deviations above the estimated mean). b Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the financial institution level. t-statistics in parenthesis, significant at .10*, .05** and .01***. c Assets’ 
value, as reported by the Financial Superintendence of Colombia (SFC). d Debt to assets ratio, based on balance sheet 
data reported by SFC. e Return over assets. f Herfindahl-Hirschman index on weighted borrowing counterparties. g 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index on weighted lending counterparties. h ROC statistics tests the predictive accuracy of the 
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Where  𝑢𝑝𝑞,𝑖is the number of geodesic 
paths from 𝑝 to 𝑞 that pass through vertex 
𝑖, and 𝑣𝑝𝑞 the total number of geodesic 
paths from 𝑝 to 𝑞 
 








































Figure 2.A.2. Interbank and repo network per quarter 
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The Influence of Risk-Taking on Bank Efficiency: Evidence from          
Colombia  




This paper shows evidence on the influence of risk-taking on bank efficiency in emerging 
markets and identifies heterogeneity in the way risk affects banks with different characteristics. 
We fit a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency parameters to a sample of 
Colombian banks. The model provides accurate cost and profit efficiency estimates. The effects 
of risk-taking on efficiency vary with size and affiliation. Large and foreign banks benefit more 
from higher exposure to credit and market risk, while domestic and small banks from being 
more capitalized. We identify some channels explaining these differences and provide insights 
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During the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, excessive risk-taking was associated with 
banking runs, fire-sales, reduced lending and financial fragility (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). In response to this behavior, 
banking regulators have imposed higher capital and liquidity requirements, leverage ratios, 
and countercyclical provisions for loan losses, among other regulatory measures (see Basel III 
standards in BIS, 2010, 2011, 2013). This regulation is intended to discourage risk-taking by 
imposing higher costs to banks from assuming more risk. Thus, understanding how risk-taking 
and regulation influences bank performance has become an important concern in the literature 
(Chortareas et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Berger and Bouwman, 2013).  
 
The aim of this paper is to identify the influence of risk-taking on cost and profit efficiency of 
banks and to distinguish these effects between banks with different sizes and affiliations. Risk-
taking has been identified as a crucial element of the banking production process that should 
be properly modeled into efficiency measurement (Hughes et al., 2001). Recent evidence shows 
that failure to account for risk-taking may lead to biased estimations of bank efficiency and 
misleading estimates of scale economies and cost elasticities (Koetter, 2008; Hughes and 
Mester, 2013; Malikov et al., 2015).  
 
We contribute to the literature by proposing a stochastic frontier model with random 
inefficiency coefficients, which allows us to identify the influence of unobserved heterogeneity 
sources related to risk-taking on bank efficiency. Our approach is close to that in Goddard et al. 
(2014) and Williams (2012) in which random parameters are used in order to account for 
unobserved technological and inefficiency heterogeneity. However, we estimate in a single step 
heterogeneous effects of risk on bank inefficiency, filling this gap in the literature. We account 
for the influence of credit, liquidity, capital, and market risk exposures and identify differences 
in the effects that similar levels of risk have on efficiency. The inference of the model is carried 
out via Bayesian methods (as in Tabak and Tecles, 2010; Hou et al., 2015) that formally 
incorporate parameter uncertainty and allows deriving bank-specific distributions of efficiency 
and risk random coefficients.1  
                                                 
1Our sample is composed by 848 bank-level observations spanned though the period 2002-2012, which then is 
augmented by using the MCMC algorithm leading to 10,000 iterations that are used for posterior inference (see 





The model is estimated for the Colombian banking sector using quarterly bank-level data from 
2002 to 2012. We use detailed bank-specific data on liquid assets, securities, credit risk 
provisions, and core tier capital, provided by the financial regulator and the central bank, used 
to compute our risk measures. The evaluated period covers several regulatory measures that 
were implemented to limit bank risk-taking and to promote the foreign entry of banks. In 
particular, we are interested in to identify the influence of a measure of credit risk based on the 
borrowers’ credit risk ratings on both cost and profit efficiency. This ex-ante measure of credit 
risk is related to the concept of radical uncertainty of King (2016) in the sense that it tries to 
incorporate the borrower’s behavior as a component of the bank’s exposure (i.e. by increasing 
loan provisions as the borrower becomes riskier).2 The period considered also allows us to 
assess the effects of the global financial crisis on the efficiency of Colombian banks.  
 
Our findings remark the importance of accounting for size, affiliation and risk exposure in the 
estimation of bank efficiency. We find that cost and profit efficiency are over-underestimated 
when risk measures are not accurately modeled (see Hughes et al., 2001; Koetter, 2008; Radíc 
et al., 2012, for similar results). Furthermore, we identify that size and foreign ownership are 
not only important determinants of efficiency but also key characteristics defining the way 
changes in risk exposures affect cost and profit efficiency. Domestic and small banks benefit 
more from being highly capitalized, while large and foreign banks benefit from higher exposure 
to credit and market risk. We find that large banks exhibit higher efficiency than small 
institutions and that foreign and small banks were more affected by the financial crisis and the 
regulatory measures introduced after 2008. We explain the main channels supporting these 
differences in efficiency among banks with different characteristics, which are related to 
monitoring costs, diversification, information asymmetries, agency costs, and risk-taking 
incentives. We also identify that the ex-ante credit risk measure captures better risk-taking 
incentives of banks and hence, it can provide regulators with a more suitable indicator for 
setting bank provisions for loan losses. Overall, we show that risk-taking plays a crucial role in 
                                                 
section 4.3. for details). We assess the fit and predictive performance of the alternative models by using DIC and LPS, 
respectively (Griffin and Steel, 2004). In the robustness section (section 7.3), we present an exercise using an 
alternative prior distribution for the inefficiency component that confirms our baseline results. 
2 Most of the regulatory measures proposed in Basel II and III are based on traditional assumptions on the 
distribution of risk (consistent with theories of optimizing behavior), which have been criticized because of their 
lower efficacy in mitigating large financial shocks (King, 2016). 





explaining banking efficiency and the importance of allowing for heterogeneous effects among 
banks when modeling it. 
 
Our results indicate that large banks face lower costs and present higher incentives to take on 
more risk in credit and securities markets (compared to small banks). Moreover, we observe 
that large banks exhibit decreasing returns to scale, suggesting that their cost and profit 
efficiency gains can obey to external sources such as lower funding costs (i.e. deposits, 
subordinated debt or interbank loans) as a result of implicit government guarantees (Davies 
and Tracey, 2014). These findings are consistent with the view that systemic risk tends to 
increase with bank size (Laeven et al. 2016), which constitutes a signal for regulators to closely 
monitor the behavior of these banks and their potential accumulation of risk. 
 
The rest of this paper contains seven sections. The second presents related literature. The third 
describes the Colombian banking sector performance and regulation. The fourth presents the 
proposed specification, the Bayesian inference, comparison criteria and the empirical models. 
The fifth describes the data. In the sixth, we present and analyze the main results. The seventh 
shows robustness exercises. The eighth section concludes, and discusses some regulatory 
implications from our findings.  
 
3.2. Related Literature 
In their pursuit of better performance banks tend to engage on more risk-taking, which depends 
on competition, regulation and, corporate governance (Boyd and De Nicoló,  2005;  Laeven  and  
Levine,  2009;  Wagner,  2010;  Agoraki  et  al.,  2011; Anginer et al., 2013). However, risk has a 
cost that is mainly related with banking regulation and market discipline (Hughes and Mester, 
2010; Flannery, 2010). Thus, understanding how risk-taking and regulation influences bank 
performance has become an important concern in the literature.  
 
Our paper is related to studies accounting for the impact of banking regulation on banks’ 
efficiency. This literature has found that stringency of capital regulation is associated with 
higher bank efficiency, while limiting banking activities discourages efficiency (Chortareas et 
al., 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Other strand of literature has focused 
on the relationship between credit risk, capitalization and bank efficiency (see the seminal 





work of Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Most of studies exploring these relationships have found 
that highly capitalized banks are more cost efficient than banks with low capitalization levels 
(Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2007; Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Furthermore, banks 
with low cost efficiency have been found to exhibit higher proportions of bad loans and to be 
more prone to default (Williams, 2004; Podpiera and Weill, 2008; Tabak et al., 2011). 
 
Studies modeling the effects of risk on efficiency usually incorporate only proxies for credit risk 
(i.e. ex-post measures such as non- performing loans), and omit other important risks faced by 
banks such as those related to insolvency, market and liquidity, which may have relevant effects 
on bank efficiency. One exception in the paper of Radíc et al. (2012) that accounts for several 
risk measures as inefficiency determinants of investment banks in G-7 countries and find that 
insolvency and liquidity risk have significant effects on cost and profit efficiency. Evidence on 
the effects of risk-taking on bank efficiency in emerging economies is more limited.3. 
 
Our paper also contributes to the literature devoted to understand the effects of bank 
heterogeneity on banking efficiency. The omission of heterogeneity related to size and type of 
ownership has been identified as an important source of biases in the estimations of banks 
inefficiency (Bos et al. 2009; Feng and Zhang, 2012; Goddard et al. 2014). Pessarossi and Weill 
(2015) find a significant and positive influence of a higher capital ratio on cost efficiency of 
Chinese banks during 2004-2009, and observe important differences when the effect of 
capitalization is allowed to vary with the type of ownership. In particular, foreign banks are 
found to decrease their efficiency when their capital ratio increases. The effects of risk-taking 
on bank efficiency can be heterogeneous among banks with different types of ownership and 
sizes. In particular, foreign institutions in emerging countries may present different practices 
of corporate governance which jointly with specific characteristics of diversification and the 
expertise of their foreign parents make them to react in a different way than domestic banks to 
changes in risk exposures (Chen and Liao, 2011; Lensink et al., 2008). Also, small and large 
                                                 
3 Bitar et al. (2016) find that compliance with the Basel capital requirements enhances bank protection against 
risk, and improves efficiency and profitability in the Middle East and North African countries. For the same 
countries, Naceur and Omran (2011) find bank capitalization and credit risk to be positively associated with 
cost efficiency. Hou et al. (2014) evaluate the efficiency of the Chinese banking system accounting for 
measures of risk and market structure and find that risk-taking have positive effects on technical efficiency, 
which in turn has led to an accumulation of risk in the banking sector 





banks may present different elasticity of risk exposure given the differences in the incentives 
they experience when size increases (Bertay et al., 2013; Tabak et al., 2013). Thus, accounting 
for heterogeneity related to risk exposure is relevant when measuring bank efficiency. 
 
Identifying inefficiency determinants and accounting for heterogeneity is particularly 
important in the Colombian banking sector given the rapid expansion of the sector in recent 
years, the important role of foreign institutions and the several mergers and acquisition (M&A) 
processes that have been carried out. These characteristics have increased the differences in 
terms of size and capital structure  across  institutions,  which  could  affect  banks’  risk-taking  
behavior  and  performance. Furthermore, since 2002 several regulatory measures have been 
implemented by the Colombian regulators in order to enhance loan losses provisions, and to 
set adequate capital and liquidity requirements able to limit risk-taking. These measures were 
initially motivated by a profound financial crisis in 1999 that affected several emerging 
economies (e.g. Russia, South Korea, Thailand and Brazil) and that evidenced the vulnerability 
of the Colombian banking sector to external shocks. Therefore, we focus on the Colombian 
banking sector as it allows recognizing differences in the way risk affects different types of 
banks in order to get more accurate efficiency estimations and a complete understanding of the 
effects of risk and prudential regulation on bank performance. Previous studies, although 
failing to control by risk, have found gains in efficiency of Colombian banks in recent years and 
have identified that large and foreign banks are more efficient than their counterparts (Daude 
and Pascal, 2015; Galán et al. 2015; Sarmiento et al. 2018). We extend this literature by 
employing a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients, which captures 
unobserved heterogeneity related to credit, liquidity, capital, and market risk exposures. This 
is possible because of the use of a detailed bank-specific data on liquid assets, securities, credit 
risk provisions, and core tier capital, provided by the financial regulator and the central bank, 
used to compute our risk measures.   
 
3.3. The Colombian banking sector: performance and regulation 
During early 1990s the Colombian banking sector was gradually introduced into the global 
economy by a financial liberalization program following the trend of other Latin American 
economies (Carvalho et al., 2014). The program eased restrictions for foreign participation in 
the banking sector, established a kind of universal banking scheme intended to reduce 





specialization, and implemented financial regulatory measures to promote competition and 
efficiency in the financial sector.4 As a result, by 1997 most of state-owned banks were 
privatized. The share of public banks in the total assets of the financial system dropped from 
43% to 13%, the number of financial institutions increased from 91 in 1990 to 155 in 1997 and 
the ratio of credit to GDP increased from 30% to 44% (Uribe and Vargas, 2002). 
 
The financial liberalization process in Colombia had positive consequences by increasing 
competition and efficiency, lowering intermediation costs and improving loan quality. 
Nevertheless, after some years the greater competition with foreign banks resulted in higher 
risk levels and a subsequent deterioration of loans quality, especially among domestic banks 
(Barajas et al., 2002). In 1999, the Colombian banking sector was affected by local and external 
shocks that triggered the financial turmoil and led to a profound financial crisis. The external 
shock from the Asian financial crisis led to capital outflows and exchange rate deterioration. At 
local level, the economic downturn and the raise of real interest rates forced to a rapid 
deterioration of loan quality and eroded the solvency of the financial sector. Previous studies 
reveal that the financial sector deterioration was related with low loan loss provisions and tiny 
capitalization levels (Gomez-Gonzalez, 2009). Between 1998 and 2001, several banking 
institutions failed and other were merged. Banking institutions specialized in mortgage loans 
were absorbed by large commercial banks. In consequence, the number of banking institutions 
fell from 100 in 1998 to 57 in 2001 from which only 31 continued as commercial banks. Also, 
the annual rate of credit growth declined from 30% to -6% during the same period. 
 
Following the domestic financial crisis of 1999, Colombian financial authorities strengthened 
the regulatory measures intended to enhance adequate provisions for loan losses, and higher 
capital and liquidity ratios. These regulatory measures were designed under the Basel 
standards with the aim of accounting for the interaction of credit risk with liquidity and market 
risk. Since 2002, risky loans (based on internal loans ratings) were designated as the target 
measure to set banks provisions for loan losses, rather than the traditional NPL. Thus, loan 
provisions were settled on an ex-ante measure of credit risk instead of being computed using 
                                                 
4 Colombian banks are not allowed to offer some financial services that are included in the standard universal 
banking approach such as insurance and trust activities. 





an ex-post measure of credit risk (i.e NPL).5 Market risk was defined as an estimated value by 
each bank using the Value at Risk (VaR) of its securities portfolio, which was included as an 
additional component in the capital ratio since 2008 (as proposed in Basel II). Hence, the higher 
the market exposure the larger the required capital for the solvency ratio.6 New definitions of 
equity capital were also implemented to enhance capital quality (Tier 1 and Tier 2). Finally, a 
short-term liquidity ratio (LR) was required for banks to hedge from liquidity mismatches.7 
 
Overall, the above-mentioned regulatory measures have served to influence banks’ behavior 
due to the incorporation of risk-taking. These measures along with other macro-prudential 
policies implemented in 2007-2008, played an important role in limiting excessive credit 
growth, currency mismatches and thus to avoid contagion from the global financial crisis.8 For 
instance, in May 2007, the central bank established a marginal reserve requirement that 
attenuates both loan growth and leverage (Gómez et al., 2016). At the same time, the central 
bank reactivated a reserve requirement for short-term external borrowing and a limit on 
exchange rate derivatives exposure to prevent potential arbitrages and to limit a potential 
substitution from local funding to external borrowing. These measures reduced the 
transmission of the international monetary policy to domestic lending and enhanced the 
independence of domestic monetary policy (See Dias et al., 2018). Moreover, in July 2007, the 
regulator implemented a new scheme of loan provisions (based on expected losses) that 
enhanced the provision requirements on commercial loans, especially for loans granted to 
small firms and risky borrowers (see, Morais et al, 2018). Nevertheless, as we show further, an 
important decrease in both cost and profit efficiency was observed during that period, 
especially for small and foreign banks.    
 
During the period 2002-2012, the Colombian banking sector experienced an expansion that has 
been accompanied by the arrival of foreign banks. The aggregated value of loans grew 300% 
                                                 
5 Provisions vary according to borrowers rating, type of credit (i.e. consumer, corporate, mortgage, etc.) and whether 
the loan has collateral or not. 
6 Capital ratio (CR) should be greater than 9% and is defined as equity capital (CE) over risk-weighted assets (RWA) 
plus 100/9 of the (VaR). Formally, CR = CE/[RWA + (100/9)(V aR)], where CR > 9%. 
7 LR is the value of liquid assets over short-term liabilities. LR should be positive for maturities of 7 and 30 days, 
although it can be negative for 14 days maturities in order to account for the reserve requirement that banks have 
to meet every two weeks. Before LR, regulators used a ratio of liquid assets over volatile liabilities. 
8However, the decline in cross-border lending from banks in advanced economies to Colombian banks affected 
domestic lending, and especially trade finance (Ahn and Sarmiento, 2019). 





and the investments to assets ratio doubled. Banks increased their competition in the securities 
market with non-banking institutions (i.e. brokerage firms) and also their participation in the 
money market for short-term liquidity boosted. Several M&A processes were also carried out, 
concentrating financial services in a few but large institutions. As a result, increased risk 
exposure has been observed.9 This has required the regulator to closely monitor credit and 
market risk and to face the challenges of dealing with systemic financial institutions (see León 
et al., 2012; Sarmiento et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of ratios related to credit, liquidity, capital and market risk over 
the period 2002-2012 for 31 commercial banks that operated during this period. The sample is 
classified between small and large banks and foreign and domestic banks.10 Overall, Colombian 
banks exhibit a downward trend in credit and market risk along with stable levels of 
capitalization and growing liquidity. However, important differences in the level of risk 
exposure of banks with different characteristics of size and ownership are observed, which 
coincide with the aforementioned regulatory changes including those adopted in 2007-2008 to 
meet Basel II standards. We observe that the ratio of risky loans over total loans has declined 
for all banks although large and domestic banks exhibit higher levels than small and foreign 
banks. This trend may be related with the introduction of the use of risky loans as an indicator 
for loan loss provisions in 2002 and the dynamic provision scheme since 2007; even during a 
period of credit expansion and high economic growth (López et al., 2014; Morais et al, 2018).  
The ratio of liquid assets over total assets has gradually increased over time, especially for large 
and foreign banks. Capital ratio seems to be stable for large banks in Colombia while important 
increases are observed for small and foreign banks from 2008. Likewise, small banks reduced 
more than large institutions their holdings of securities after the global financial crisis. This may 
suggest that small banks were more concerned about the effects of exposures in credit and 
securities markets due to the lower probability of being saved given their size, which made 
them to highly increase their capital ratios and diminish their market risk exposures (see 
Berger and Bouwman, 2013, for similar findings in the US banking sector). 
                                                 
9 In May 2013, Colombian Treasury Bill (TES) prices decreased 20% in two weeks as a result of the uncertainty 
related to FED’s exit strategy (i.e. the US tapering). This led to bank losses of COP 2.32 billion that represented 4.87% 
of their equity capital. The impact of the US tapering on the funding costs of Colombian banks in the interbank market 
is evaluated in Sarmiento (2019).   
10 We define small and large banks as those below and above the median of the total assets level, respectively. 
Foreign banks are those for which more than 51 percent of the bank’s equity is foreign owned.  





3.3.1. Efficiency of the Colombian banking sector 
Early studies of banking efficiency have found evidence of low cost efficiency in the Colombian 
banking sector during the 90s although some improvements during the first half of 2000s in 
merged banks (Estrada and Osorio, 2004; Clavijo et al., 2006). Recent studies have provided 
evidence on improvements in technical efficiency and productivity in the sector but large 
heterogeneity among banks. Using a non-parametric frontier model, Sarmiento et al. (2018) 
found that Colombian banks improved in technical efficiency from 2000 until the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 heightened, afterwards efficiency and productivity decreased 
considerably. They also found M&A to have a significant and positive impact on bank efficiency, 
and high heterogeneity in efficiency irrespective of banks’ size and affiliation.   
 
Galán et al. (2015) estimated input-oriented technical efficiency during the period 2000-2009 
using a dynamic Bayesian SFA model. They found out that foreign ownership has positive and 
persistent effects on efficiency of Colombian banks, while the effects of size are positive but 
rapidly adjusted. They also identified high inefficiency persistence and important differences 
between institutions. In particular, merged banks were found to exhibit low costs of adjustment 
that allowed them to rapidly recover the efficiency losses derived from merging processes.  
 
Moreno and Estrada (2013) studied the role of market power in explaining efficiency gains in 
Colombian banks during the 2004-2012 period. By using SFA and non-parametric models, they 
found a positive relationship between market power and efficiency, which is explained by 
product differentiation that allows banks to gain efficiency while not charging excessive credit 
prices. Daude and Pascal (2015) documented that in spite of Colombian banks have relatively 
higher efficiency levels than other Latin American banks, both efficiency and the degree of 
market contestability are lower compared with banks from other emerging markets. The 
authors argue that both conditions are associated with the relatively higher intermediation 
costs of the Colombian banking sector. However, previous applications have not studied the 
influence of risk-taking on efficiency of Colombian banks, which has a crucial role in explaining 
bank behavior (Pessarossi and Weill, 2015), and may lead to biased estimations of bank 
efficiency and misleading estimates of scale economies and cost elasticities (Hughes and 
Mester, 2013; Koetter, 2008; Malikov et al., 2015). 
 






Frontier efficiency methods have become a very important tool to identify relevant bank 
inefficiency drivers and to provide useful indicators of performance of the sector and individual 
institutions. In particular, SFA, firstly introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van 
den Broeck (1977), presents the advantages of allowing inferences on the parameters, 
accounting for idiosyncratic errors and modeling firm characteristics that affect directly the 
inefficiency in a single stage.11 In this context, bank characteristics related to their risk 
exposures can be consistently accounted for in cost and profit efficiency estimations. 
 
3.4.1. Heterogeneity and risk in bank efficiency measurement 
Distinguishing inefficiency from heterogeneity is an important issue in the efficiency frontier 
literature. Omitting heterogeneity variables can lead to biased estimations of inefficiency. In the 
banking literature, Bos et al. (2009) identify these effects on efficiency levels and rankings when 
observed heterogeneity is omitted.  In  particular,  in  the  case  of  risk  exposure,  Radíc  et  al. 
(2012) evaluate a sample of 800 investment banks of G-7 countries during the period 2001-
2007 and find that omitting bank risk-taking from efficiency estimations leads to 
underestimating profit efficiency. The authors also document that risk exposure measures 
affect directly the inefficiency distribution. 
 
Unobserved heterogeneity has also been found to affect estimations from stochastic frontier 
models.12 In applications to the banking sector, Feng and Zhang (2012) find that failure to 
consider unobserved heterogeneity results in misleading efficiency rankings and mismeasured 
technical efficiency, productivity growth, and returns to scale. Goddard et al. (2014) compare 
different fixed effects, random effects and random parameters models in an application to Latin 
American banks between 1985 and 2010. They find that models with random parameters in 
the inefficiency distribution perform better in distinguishing heterogeneity from inefficiency as 
well as important differences on cost efficiency estimations. Williams (2012) applies a model 
                                                 
11 In contrast, the main nonparametric method of Data Envelopment Analysis is more flexible but provides, in 
general, deterministic measures for inefficiency and does not allow accounting for inefficiency heterogeneity in a 
consistent single stage. 
12 Greene (2005) proposes different methods to deal with this kind of heterogeneity both in the frontier and in the 
inefficiency distribution.  In the Bayesian context, Galán et al. (2014) propose the inclusion of a random parameter 
in the inefficiency component that can be modeled along with other observed covariates and performs well in 
capturing latent heterogeneity. 






with random parameters both in the frontier and in the inefficiency distribution in order to test 
the quiet life hypothesis in Latin American banks. However, the author follows a two-step 
procedure where cost efficiency is regressed on a market power index and other bank 
characteristics, which may lead to biased and inconsistent efficiency estimations (see Wang and 
Schmidt, 2002). 
 
In this context, our proposal is intended to model unobserved inefficiency heterogeneity 
sources related to risk exposures and to account for bank characteristics in a single stage. Our 
approach is close to that in Goddard et al. (2014) and Williams (2012) in the use of random 
parameters in the inefficiency component. However, we propose to estimate the coefficients 
associated to the observed covariates in the inefficiency distribution as random. This allows us 
to obtain in a single stage bank-specific estimates of the effects of risk exposure measures on 
cost and profit efficiency. This specification is more flexible than imposing interactions of 
observed covariates with different characteristics of banks. 
 
3.4.2. A stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency coefficients 
Since we are interested in identifying unobserved heterogeneity related to the effects of risk on 
bank inefficiency, we propose a stochastic frontier model where the coefficients of risk 
exposure measures in the inefficiency distribution are modeled as bank-specific parameters. 
The proposed specification is the following: 
yit = xitβ + vit – uit                        (1) 
vit ∼ N (0, σ2)  
uit ∼ Exp(λit)  
λit = exp(zit γi), 
 
where yit represents the output for firm i at time t, xit is a row vector that contains the input 
quantities, β is a vector of parameters, vit is an idiosyncratic error assumed to follow a normal 
distribution, and uit is the inefficiency component. The inefficiency is assumed to follow an 
exponential distribution with a firm specific and time-varying parameter λit, γi is a vector of 
firm-specific parameters intended to capture differences in the effects of covariates across 
banks on inefficiency, and zit contains a set of heterogeneity variables with bank-specific effects. 
In particular, the random coefficients are intended to capture differences in the way similar 
changes on risk exposures affect efficiency of different types of banks. This specification is also 





flexible in the sense that some covariates can be modeled with fixed coefficients just by adding 
constraints of the type γi = γ to the corresponding parameters. 
 
3.4.3. Bayesian inference 
The inference of the model is carried out using Bayesian methods. This approach was 
introduced in stochastic frontier models by van den Broeck et al. (1994) and allows us to 
formally incorporate parameter uncertainty and derive posterior densities of cost and profit 
efficiency for every individual bank. We assume proper but relatively dispersed prior 
distributions throughout. In particular, the distributions assumed for the parameters in the 
frontier are: β ∼ N(0, Σβ σ2) where Σ-1 is a precision diagonal matrix with priors set to 0.001 
for all coefficients. The variance of the idiosyncratic error term is inverse gamma, which is 
equivalent to σv-2∼ G(aσv-2, bσv-2) with priors set to 0.001 for the shape and rate parameters, 
respectively. 
 
Regarding the inefficiency component, its distribution is assumed to be exponential:                   
uit|γi, zit ∼ Exp(exp(zit γi)). For the firm-specific inefficiency heterogeneity coefficients, a 
hierarchical structure is defined, where γi ∼ N (γ, Σγ) and γ ∼ N (0, Σγ) with priors for the 
diagonal precision matrix Σ−1 equal to 0.1 for  all the coefficients. In the case we want to restrict 
the inefficiency covariates to be common to all the observations we define γ as above. 
Sensitivity analysis is performed to the use of an exponential prior distribution for γ.13 Results 
show convergence to roughly the same values after the number of iterations described below. 
Following Tabak and Tecles (2010) we also explore the sensitivity of the empirical results to 
the use of a gamma distribution for the inefficiency component, where uit|γi, zit ∼ Gamma (2, 
exp(zit γi)).  Results are robust to the use of the alternative inefficiency distribution (see 
Appendix). Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and in particular the Gibbs Sampling 
algorithm with data augmentation, as presented by Koop et al. (1995) for stochastic frontier 
models, can be used here.14 The MCMC algorithm involves 50,000 iterations where the first 
                                                 
13 In this case the inefficiency parameters are chosen to be centered in a given prior mean efficiency value r∗ 
following the procedure in Griffin and Steel (2007), where exp(γ)∼ Exp(−ln r∗). 
14 The implementation of our models is carried out using the WinBUGS package (see Griffin and Steel, 2007, 
for a general procedure). 





10,000 are discarded and a thinning equal to 4 is used to remove autocorrelations. Therefore, 
10,000 iterations are used for the posterior inference. 
 
We assess the fit and predictive performance of the different models using a version of the 
Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) called DIC3 and the Log Predictive Score (LPS) (see Griffin 
and Steel, 2004; Galán et al., 2014, for applications of these criteria to Bayesian SFA models). 
The former is a stable variant of the within sample measure of fit introduced by Spiegelhalter 
et al. (2002) commonly used in Bayesian analysis.  Defining the deviance of a model with 
parameters θ as  D(θ) = −2 log f ( y|θ ), where y is the data, then DIC = 2𝐷(𝜃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ -D(𝜃)̅̅̅̅̅. However, 
using an estimator of the density f (y|θ) instead of the posterior mean θ is more stable. This 
alternative specification presented by Celeux et al. (2006) overcomes robustness problems 
when the original DIC is implemented to random effects and mixture models. The formulation 
for this criterion is: 
                                    DIC3 = −4Eθ[log f (y|θ)|y] + 2 log ?̂?  (y)                                          (2) 
 
Regarding LPS, it is a criterion for evaluating the out-of-sample behavior of different models. 
This criterion was first introduced by Good (1952) and is intended to examine model 
performance by comparing its predictive distribution with out-of-sample observations.  For 
this purpose, we split the sample into a training and a prediction set. Our prediction set consists 
of observations corresponding to the last two observed years of every firm in the sample, and 
the training set contains all the rest. The formula is the following: 
 





𝑖=1 |previous data)                                             (3) 
 
where yi,t represents the observations in the predictive set for the k firms in the sample and ti 
represents the penultimate time point with observed data for firm i. 
 
3.4.4. Translog cost and profit models 
We use cost and profit functions for the frontier specification in (1), and we represent them 
with translog multi-product functions. The estimated model is: 
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ℎ=1 )                                       (4) 
 
where c represents the total cost, ym represent the m outputs, pr are the r input prices, and t is 
a time trend in order to account for technological change. We also allow accounting for two 
types of inefficiency covariates affecting cost and profit inefficiency: A group of h bank 
characteristics modeled in zh, which are assumed to have common effects on all banks, and a 
group of j variables in zj, capturing banks’ risk exposure in the previous period and allowed to 
have specific effects on the inefficiency of each bank. Note that risk covariates are lagged one 
period to avoid endogenous bank risk taking. In order to overcome the problem of calculations 
of logarithms of negative profits, we follow the rescaling method (Berger and Mester, 1997) 
which corrects profit values by a factor equal to the absolute value of the lowest profit plus one. 
Linear homogeneity of the cost function is achieved by normalizing total costs and input prices 
by a chosen input price. Symmetry of the cross-effects is accomplished by imposing βmn = βnm, 
δrs = δsr. In the case of the profit function the dependent variable is the total profit and the sign 
of the inefficiency component u is reversed.15 
 
From (4) cost/profit efficiency of individual banks in each period is computed as: 
                     CEit = exp(-uit).                                                                 (5) 
                                                 
15 Note that we use the alternative profit function where banks are seen as price-setters in the output  market but 
price-takers in the input market. This allows to account for imperfect com- petition, unmeasured differences in 
output quality and not completely variable outputs (Berger and Mester, 1997). 





Returns to scale (RTS) can be derived from the cost function as the sum of output elasticities as 
follows: 







                                                  (6) 
 
where a RTS measure less than 1 indicates that the production technology has decreasing 
returns to scale (DRS). On the other hand, increasing returns to scale (IRS) are observed if the 
RTS measure is larger than 1, while if it is equal to 1 it indicates constant returns to scale. 
Finally, technical change (TC) assuming constant returns to scale is given by: 
                                                                    𝑇𝐶 = (
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
)                                                   (7)  




We employ quarterly data from 31 commercial banks operating during the period 2002-2012. 
This is an unbalanced panel data set composed by 848 bank-level observations provided by the 
Colombian central bank (Banco de la República) and the FSC. We only include commercial 
banks in our sample as they employ a relatively similar technology.16 We follow the financial 
intermediation approach in which banks employ deposits, labor, and physical capital to 
produce loans, securities investments, and other financial services.17 We consider as input 
prices:  the price of deposits (p1), which is the ratio of interest expenses divided by total 
deposits; the price of labor (p2), which is personnel expenses divided by the total number of 
employees; and the price of physical capital (p3), calculated as the ratio of operating expenses 
(i.e. non-interest reduced by personnel) to total fixed assets. As outputs we consider: loans (y1) 
including consumer, commercial, mortgage, and microcredit; securities (y2), which includes 
public and private bonds holdings, and other securities investments; and off-balance-sheet 
                                                 
16 We exclude small credit institutions specialized in retail loans and leasing activities, which may operate under a 
different technology than commercial banks (Hughes et al. 2001). Moreover, those credit institutions only have 
activity in some markets while commercial banks behave in all credit markets (i.e. mortgage, commercial, consumer, 
microcredit, as well as in the money and securities markets). Therefore, our analysis focuses only on commercial 
banks. 
17 Hughes and Mester (1993) show that deposits should be treated as inputs. See, for example, Sealey and Lindley 
(1977) for a discussion on the intermediation approach. 





(OBS) activities (y3) measured as the ratio of non-interest income over total income. Non-
interest income includes securitization, brokerage services, and management of financial assets 
for clients, which represent an important source of income for banks.18 Total costs are 
considered as the sum of interest and non-interest costs and total profit as the earned net profit.  
 
We consider two bank-specific characteristics with common effects on the inefficiency of all 
banks. Those are, size (z1), measured as the level of total assets; and foreign ownership (z2), 
which is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if more than 50% of bank shares are foreign 
owned; and 0 otherwise. As aforementioned, these effects have been found to be relevant 
inefficiency drivers in previous studies. As risk exposure measures, we include measures for 
credit risk, liquidity, capitalization, and market risk in accordance with the literature and the 
Colombian financial regulation. Usually, credit risk has been identified as a source of bank 
inefficiency (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004).  
 
Our measure of credit risk (z*) is computed as the ratio of risky loans over total loans.19 The 
higher the share of risky loans the higher loan loss provisions required by the regulator. This 
measure of ex-ante credit risk may avoid biased efficiency estimations that have been identified 
when using ex-post credit risk measures such as NPL (see Malikov et al., 2015).20  
 
Liquidity (z2*) is measured as the ratio of liquid assets over total assets, where liquid assets 
include cash holdings, negotiable and available to sell public and private debt instruments and 
pledged collateral in repurchase agreement operations. Higher liquid assets prevent banks 
from maturity mismatches albeit holding those assets can be costless as they have shorter 
maturities and thus lower returns. Handorf (2014) documents that liquidity has a cost that 
reduces bank profits via a lower net interest spread.  
 
                                                 
18 Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2014) document the importance of including OBS when measuring cost and profit 
bank efficiency adjusted by risk. Tabak and Tecles (2010) find that omitting OBS as an output over(under)estimate 
cost (profit) efficiency results. 
19 Risky loans are based on internal loan ratings performed by banks according to the Colombian regulation. 
Measures of ex-ante credit risk are more appropriated to identify bank risk- taking in the credit market (see 
Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). 
20 We perform a robustness check by using NPL as measure of credit risk instead. Results confirm that our ex-ante 
measure of risky loans captures better the risk-taking incentives of banks (see Section 3.7). 





Capitalization (z3*) is measured as the ratio of capital equity over total assets. Our measure of 
capitalization is based on two important features. First, Colombian regulation establishes that 
foreign banks should hold the same minimum capital than local banks in order to operate. This 
is because foreign banks operate as subsidiaries rather than branches in Colombia, and in turn, 
they have to hold their own capital. Therefore, our measure of capitalization is comparable 
across banks with different ownerships. Second, we argue that differences in capitalization 
levels may signal banks risk appetite and influence their performance (as in Hughes and Mester, 
1998; Pessarossi and Weill, 2015). 
 
Market risk exposure (z4*) is measured as securities investments over total assets. Banks 
involved in more investment activities may exhibit efficiency gains from diversification (Radíc 
et al., 2012).  Lastly, it is important to remark that all risk variables are included lagged one-
period in order to account for inter-temporal effects on inefficiency and avoid reverse causality. 
Table 3.1 exhibits the summary statistics of the main variables described above, where all 
monetary values are expressed in thousands of U.S. dollars at constant prices from the year 
2012. Since we are interested in analyzing the differences between small and large banks and 
foreign and domestic banks, we also present summary statistics disaggregated by these four 
groups of banks in Table 3.A1 in the Appendix.21 
 
3.6. Results 
We estimate three different cost (C1 to C3) and profit (P1 to P3) models from our proposed 
specification in (4) by including some restrictions on the parameters associated to risk 
variables and holding size and foreign ownership as covariates in all the models. This is because 
we are interested in the effects of risk exposure measures as inefficiency determinants. Models 
C1 and P1 do not include risk exposure variables in the inefficiency, so γ*1i , γ*2i ,γ*3i , γ*4i = 0. 
Models C2 and P2 include the risk covariates in the inefficiency but restrict them to have a 
common effect on the inefficiency for all banks; thus, γ*1i , γ*2i ,γ*3i , γ*4i  = γ*1, γ*2,γ*3, γ*4. Models 
C3 and P3 include the random inefficiency coefficients for the risk exposure variables.22 
                                                 
21 To control for the impact of outliers we drop a total of 6 observations from 2 banks (3 in each case) because of 
those observations presented extreme values in terms of capital and liquidity ratios. We do not observe an impact 
from dropping those observations in our results. 
22 We also estimate one additional specification for comparison purposes (models C4 and P4). These models include 
the risk exposure covariates in the frontier rather than in the inefficiency distribution. Results are shown in the 
Appendix and exhibit that any of these covariates  are relevant when these variables are included in the frontier. 






We present the estimation results only for the parameters in the inefficiency distribution, as we 
are interested in analyzing the effects of size, ownership and risk exposure on efficiency. Table 
3.2 and Table 3.3 present the posterior mean and probability intervals for the parameters in 
the cost and profit inefficiency components, respectively. Results for the frontier parameters 
are presented in the Appendix (Table 3.7 and Table 3.8).23 
 
Model comparison indicators lead to similar conclusions in both the cost and profit models.24 
That is, models including measures of risk exposure improve from models omitting these 
variables (C1 and P1). This suggests that risk-taking is an important determinant of bank 
efficiency. From the models considering risk exposures, those including random coefficients for 
the risk covariates in the inefficiency distribution (C3 and P3) exhibit the best fit and predictive 
performance. These results suggest not only that measures of risk exposure are important 
efficiency drivers but also that risk has different effects on cost and profit efficiency of banks 
with different characteristics. This has important implications for efficiency estimations. In 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, we observe that posterior mean cost and profit efficiency are 
(over)underestimated, respectively, and that their dispersion is lower when risk exposure 
measures are not modeled as bank-specific in the inefficiency distribution. 
 
We also find differences in the predictive efficiency distributions of cost and profit models (see 
Figure 3.A7 in the Appendix). We observe that both location and dispersion of the distributions 
are affected (see Koetter, 2008, for similar results). In particular, predictive distributions from 
models including risk in the inefficiency are more symmetric and those derived from models 
with random coefficients present less dispersion. Overall, these results evidence the 
importance of accounting for risk-taking and its associated heterogeneity among banks when 
estimating bank efficiency (see Hughes et al., 2001; Pessarossi and Weill, 2015; Radíc et al. 
2012; Malikov et al. 2015, for previous evidence). 
                                                 
This would support the inclusion of these variables as inefficiency drivers.  Recently, Radíc et al. (2012) also found 
evidence to support that risk exposure is more relevant affecting the inefficiency distribution than the frontier. 
23 From the frontier parameter estimates, it is observed that loans, investments, and OBS positively affect cost and 
input prices in all models. In the case of profits, the relationship is also positive for loans and investments but 
negative, although not significant, for OBS. This result was also found by Tabak and Tecles (2010) in an application 
to the Indian banking sector. However, they found loans and investments to be not significant when OBS is included 
in both cost and profit models. 
24 Lower values for DIC3 and LPS indicate better fit and predictive performance. 





3.6.1. Efficiency determinants 
We observe that size and foreign ownership are important efficiency drivers in all the models. 
Their effects are positive on cost efficiency and negative on profit efficiency. Previous studies 
have found similar effects. Chen and Liao (2011) document that foreign banks perform better 
than local banks because they may better deal with risk exposures given cheaper access to 
funding sources and more diversification. Fries and Taci (2005) find similar results for banks 
with a majority of foreign ownership in emerging economies. Sturm and Williams (2008) argue 
that banks from more financially sophisticated nations are more efficient. Curi et al. (2015) 
document that during the financial crisis subsidiaries perform better than branches. 
Interestingly, our findings suggest that foreign banks that operate as subsidiaries in Colombia 
exhibit higher efficiency than local banks. 
 
Regarding size, previous studies have found that large institutions tend to exhibit greater 
efficiency associated with higher scale economies (Bos and Kool, 2006; Wheelock and Wilson, 
2012; Hughes and Mester, 2013). In previous applications to Colombian banks, both foreign 
and large banks have also been found to be more cost efficient than local and small banks 
(Moreno and Estrada, 2013; Galán et al., 2015; Sarmiento et al., 2018).  This relative advantage 
of large over small banks has been recently reported as evidence of the too-big-to-fail dilemma 
where larger banks take advantage of their size to obtain funds at lower cost and to take on 
more risk (Santos, 2014). There is also evidence suggesting that bank interest costs tend to 
decline with systemic size (Bertay et al., 2013). Interestingly, we show in the next section that 
scale economies are not the driving forces of higher efficiency gains from large Colombian 
banks, which may suggest evidence on too-big-to-fail implicit subsidies. 
 
Size and foreign ownership are also key characteristics determining the way credit and market 
risk, and liquidity and capitalization levels affect cost and profit efficiency. This is identified 
through the random coefficient models. We analyze these effects by type of banks (i.e. small vs. 
large and domestic vs. foreign). On this regard, our approach is close to the one in Pessarossi 
and Weill (2015), who study the effects of capital on the efficiency of Chinese banks with 
different sizes and affiliations. However, we include additional measures of risk and perform 
an analysis a posteriori after allowing for bank-specific coefficients instead of estimating 
interactions. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 present 95% probability intervals of average posterior 





random coefficients by type of bank in the cost and profit models, respectively.25 These figures 
allow us to identify whether the effects of different types of risks on the efficiency of a group of 
banks are different than those of the respective benchmark group with a probability greater 
than 95% and, at the same time, if the estimated coefficients for each group are different from 
0 with a probability greater than 95%.26 We observe two main results when bank-specific 
coefficients are estimated. First, some groups of banks are more affected than others taking the 
same risk exposures. Second, the effects of risk exposures become relevant as efficiency drivers 
for some types of banks. We explain in detail these effects in the following subsections by 
differentiating for type of risk. 
 
3.6.1.1. Credit risk 
Credit risk is identified as a key determinant of both cost and profit efficiency though with 
opposite effects. While credit risk is found to have negative effects on cost efficiency, it affects 
positively profit efficiency. These results are observed in both the fixed and the random 
coefficients models and may suggest that assuming higher credit risk exposures implies 
expending more resources on monitoring and administering problem loans. Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) also found evidence on this negative effect of problem loans on cost efficiency 
in U.S. banks and argue that extra costs are represented by additional monitoring, negotiating 
possible workout arrangements, disposing collateral for possible defaults, defending bank’s 
safety to the market and supervisor, and additional precautions to reserve quality of other 
loans. In emerging economies, Kirkpatrick et al. (2008) document that bad loans tend to 
increase bank production costs, reflecting inefficiency in lending. On the other hand, in terms 
of profit efficiency results indicate that banks may have incentives to engage in higher credit 
risk given that they earn higher returns from riskier loans (Malikov et al. 2015). 
 
By type of banks, we identify important differences in the way credit risk affect efficiency. Large 
and domestic banks are found to be less affected in cost efficiency by assuming the same level 
of credit risk. That is, it is less costly for large and domestic banks to manage problem loans. A 
possible explanation could be related to the fact that local banks have better information about 
                                                 
25 These are the average of the values for each bank-specific parameter at every iteration of the MCMC. 
26 The former is true if the 95% probability intervals of the respective benchmark groups do not overlap each other, 
and the latter is true if the correspondent intervals do not contain the 0. 





borrowers, which implies that these banks may incur in lower monitoring costs. As to large 
banks, they may benefit from scale economies that allow them to incur proportionally in lower 
costs at the same credit risk levels. Regarding profit efficiency, large and foreign banks benefit 
more from assuming similar levels of credit risk. These types of banks may take advantage of 
their recognition in order to charge higher interest rates for loans of similar quality or are 
exploiting market power benefits (see Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005; Wagner, 2010). 
 
3.6.1.2. Liquidity 
Results from our models with fixed and random coefficients suggest that liquidity has relevant 
effects on the efficiency of Colombian banks. The random coefficients model identifies an 
important negative effect of liquidity on cost efficiency of domestic and small banks. This 
suggests that holding the same proportion of liquid assets is more costly for local and small 
banks compared with foreign and large banks, respectively. This could be explained by the fact 
that foreign banks may have greater access to interbank markets and to cheaper sources of 
funding (Chen and Liao, 2011). Similarly, large banks may have higher access to alternative 
sources of funding. Angelini et al. (2011) and Sarmiento (2019) have found that large banks 
benefit from lower funding costs in the interbank markets, which may explain the lower impact 
of holding liquid assets on their cots efficiency. We also find that holding higher liquid assets 
reduces profit efficiency in both models, possibly due to those assets usually have lower 
returns. Differences in the way liquidity affects profit efficiency of banks with different 
characteristics are less relevant. However, the average impact of liquidity on profit efficiency 
tends to be greater for domestic banks than for foreign banks. 
 
3.6.1.3. Capitalization 
We identify that higher capitalization levels lead to higher cost and profit efficiency. Reasons 
behind these results may be derived from the agency problems between shareholders and 
managers. Shareholders of highly capitalized banks have more incentives to control better costs 
and capital allocation than those of thinly capitalized banks. This incentivizes better corporate 
governance mechanisms that may lead to efficiency improvements. Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) also suggest an indirect effect through credit risk. That is, highly capitalized banks have 
less moral hazard incentives to take on higher risk, and therefore they will incur in less costs. 
Previous studies have found that highly capitalized banks tend to be more efficient than less 





capitalized banks in developed countries (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Fiordelisi  et  al.  2011;  
Radíc  et  al.  2012)  and  emerging  economies  as  well (Naceur and Omran, 2011; De Jonghe et 
al. 2012; Pessarossi and Weill, 2015). 
 
Results indicate that the effect of capitalization on efficiency differs between banks with 
different sizes and ownerships. We find that small and domestic banks benefit more from 
higher capital ratios in both cost and profit efficiency. However, it is worth to notice that the 
probability that these estimates are lower than those of large and foreign banks is less than 
95%. On this regard, Berger and Bouwman (2013) document that small banks benefited more 
than large banks from increases in capital during the global financial crisis of 2008. Pessarossi 
and Weill (2015) show that domestic banks in China benefit from having higher capital while 
the effect for foreign banks is not significant. They argue that Chinese domestic banks have 
more government guarantees in case of financial distress. This would increase agency costs 
between shareholders and debt-holders, which would become more important than agency 
costs between shareholders and managers. 
 
3.6.1.4. Market risk 
We find that holding more investments in the bank’s portfolio enhances bank efficiency. This 
result may reflect the benefits from diversification as banks usually invest in private and public 
bonds to manage liquidity mismatches (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2014). Moreover, this 
result holds when heterogeneous effects are accounted for in the random coefficients models 
suggesting that market risk is a cost efficiency determinant for any type of bank. Market risk is 
also found to have positive effects on banks profit efficiency. In this case, the random 
coefficients model shows strong evidence supporting that these effects are more relevant for 
large and foreign banks, which would have greater incentives to engage in more market risk. 
Foreign banks may benefit from their parents expertise on trading securities (Lensink et al. 
2008), while large banks may take advantage from being the primary dealers of the Colombian 
public debt market. The latter condition allows large banks to obtain profits by selling public 
debt bills to small banks that have to use them as collateral to hedge liquidity either from the 
central bank or the secured money market (Sarmiento, 2019). Moreover, large and foreign 
banks may benefit from having more diversified portfolios and access to cheaper funding 
sources that allow them to get higher returns on their investments (Chen and Liao, 2011). 





However, it is important to remark that the fact that large and foreign banks tend to rely more 
on unstable sources of funding (i.e. money market funding) and to exhibit more market-based-
income may lead to financial fragility and to enhance systemic risk (Brunnermeier et al. 2012; 
Laeven et al. 2016). 
 
3.6.2. Efficiency, technical change and returns to scale 
The evolution of cost and profit efficiency over time and by groups of banks is presented in 
Figure 3.4. We observe that large and foreign banks exhibit higher cost efficiency levels than 
small and local banks. A possible explanation for the differences between banks with different 
sizes may be related to the fact that large banks might be considered by creditors as too-big-to-
fail, which allows them to have access to cheaper funding sources. Small banks have been more 
volatile in both cost and profit efficiency over time, especially after the global financial crisis, 
while large banks have been more stable and present higher cost efficiency over the whole 
period. This may suggest that large banks are less sensitive to environmental conditions, 
possibly due to more stable funding sources. In the case of small banks, the result might be the 
opposite because creditors and depositors may ask for higher returns from those banks as a 
way to exert market discipline (see Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Bertay et al. 2013; Hughes and 
Mester, 2013). 
 
Regarding ownership, although foreign banks present higher cost efficiency than local banks, 
in terms of profit efficiency they exhibit lower scores and much more volatility over the whole 
period. The highest difference is observed in 2008 coinciding with the global financial crisis. 
This suggests that foreign institutions were more affected due to their operations and 
investments in international markets (see Curi et al. 2015). Nevertheless, in the last few years, 
foreign banks have improved and exhibited an increasing trend in profit efficiency. We compute 
technical change and returns to scale from Model C3. As we did for the random coefficient 
parameters, we compute average posterior distributions by groups of banks, which allows us 
to simultaneously identify through probability intervals whether these groups of banks present 
technical progress(regress) or scale economies(diseconomies) and whether there are 





differences between groups of banks with certain probability.27 Figure 3.5 shows the 95% 
probability intervals by groups of banks with similar characteristics of size and ownership. In 
general, we observe that with a probability higher than 95% all types of banks exhibit technical 
progress and that it is on average higher for large and domestic institutions, which can be a 
consequence of the reorganization processes that these institutions carried out during the 
period including several M&A. Regarding returns to scale, some important differences are 
found between groups of banks. We observe that while large institutions operate at decreasing 
returns to scale, small and foreign banks exhibit increasing returns to scale.28 These results 
coincide with those reported by Galán et al. (2015), who suggest that M&A processes carried 
out mainly by domestic and large institutions may lead them to be oversized, while small and 
foreign banks may still present some potential scale gains. Furthermore, the fact that large 
banks exhibit decreasing returns to scale may confirm that their efficiency gains obey to 
external sources such as lower funding costs (i.e. deposits, subordinated debt or interbank 
loans) as a result of implicit government guarantees. On this regard, Davies and Tracey (2014) 
evaluated a panel of the largest international commercial banks over the period from 2001 to 
2010 and found that large banks benefit from implicit subsidies and that suppressing them 
makes scale economies disappear. Their results imply that estimated scale economies for large 
banks are affected by too-big-to-fail considerations. See also Beccalli et al. (2015) for similar 
results in the European banking system. 
 
3.7. Robustness check 
We perform several robustness exercises. First, we split the sample and search for structural 
changes in the risk-efficiency relationship after 2008. Second, we use an alternative measure of 
credit risk and check whether using an ex-post measure affects the estimations. Third, we check 
whether our findings on the relationship between risk and efficiency change when a 
profitability measure is included as an additional efficiency driver. Finally, as aforementioned 
we also check robustness of our results to the use of an alternative prior distribution for the 
inefficiency component. 
                                                 
27 We evaluate technical change and returns to scale at every iteration of the MCMC for each bank and then we 
average the values at each iteration. This procedure is consistent with the way we assess the effect of the risk-taking 
measures in the inefficiency models. 
28 The probability interval of RTS for domestic banks contains the value of 1, which do not allow us to conclude about 
decreasing returns to scale for these type of banks with a probability higher than 95%. 
 





3.7.1. Structural changes after 2008 
As presented above the evolution of cost and profit efficiency of Colombian banks exhibits 
changes in magnitude and volatility after 2008. In fact, changes in their credit and market risk 
exposures, and capital and liquidity ratios were observed. Thus, we check whether the global 
financial crisis and the regulatory changes adopted after 2008 represented a structural change 
in the risk-efficiency relationship of Colombian banks. We split the sample and estimate two 
cost and profit inefficiency random coefficients models: one for the period 2002-2007 (Modesl 
C5 and P5) and other for the period 2008-2012 (Models C6 and P6). Results of estimations are 
presented in Table 3.4. We observe that, in general, there are no relevant changes in the way 
credit risk, capital, liquidity, and market risk affects efficiency of Colombian banks. 
 
However, when random coefficients are analyzed by groups of banks, some changes in the 
effects of capital and credit risk over cost and profit efficiency of small banks are identified. 
Figure 6 shows the 95% probability intervals of average posterior capital and credit risk 
coefficients for small and large banks in the four new estimated models. We observe that the 
negative effect of credit risk on cost and profit efficiency for small banks is significantly greater 
during 2008-2012 than in the period 2002-2007. Likewise, the positive effect of capital on both 
types of efficiency is lower after 2008 for small banks. In contrast, the magnitude of these effects 
on the efficiency of large banks remains unaltered. The fact that only small banks increased 
their costs associated to similar levels of credit risk and diminished their benefits associated to 
capitalization after 2008, may suggest that large Colombian banks were either more prepared 
to operate under a less favorable environment and more strict regulation or that large banks 
were more confident in receiving public support in case of being needed. 
 
3.7.2. Non-performing loans 
In our estimations, we use an ex-ante measure of credit risk based on loan ratings. However, 
most of studies use NPL as a measure of credit risk. NPL are an ex-post measure of this type of 
risk since they account for unpaid loans and risk is already materialized. Nevertheless, 
differences in the way NPL affect efficiency of banks with different characteristics have been 
found previously. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) find negative effects on efficiency of large banks 
but positive effects for small banks in the US. Thus, we assess the effects on the estimations of 
using NPL as credit risk measure and whether the ex-ante measure proposed provides 





additional information and improves estimations. Table 3.5 presents the posterior estimations 
for the cost and profit efficiency random coefficients models using NPL. Results suggest that 
NPL affects negatively cost efficiency, as found when the ex-ante credit risk measure was used. 
In this case, unpaid loans generate costs derived from negotiating workout arrangements, 
disposing more collateral for other potential problem loans or defending bank’s safety.  
However, the model using NPL exhibit lower fit and predictive performance, suggesting that 
the ex-ante variable may provide more reliable estimations. Regarding the profit model, NPL 
shows no effect on efficiency. This is opposite to the results obtained using the ex-ante measure, 
which identifies the incentives generated from the risk-return relationship. Hence, fit and 
predictive performance indicators are poorer when NPL is used and profit efficiency 
estimations are underestimated (see Malikov et al., 2015, for evidence on biased efficiency 
estimations when ex-post measures of credit risk are used). From the regulatory perspective, 
this result is also important given that Colombian banks are required to set their provisions for 
loan losses according to their risky loans level. As a result, ex-ante credit risk measures may 
capture better risk-taking incentives of banks and provide regulators with a more suitable 
indicator for setting bank provisions for loan losses. 
 
3.7.3. Alternative inefficiency distributions and covariates 
In the literature previous studies include profitability as an inefficiency driver as well as 
estimate both gamma and exponential distributions for the inefficiency component (Tabak and 
Tecles, 2010; Tecles and Tabak, 2010). Accordingly, we include ROA as an explanatory covariate 
in the inefficiency distribution of both cost and profit models in order to assess whether 
profitability has an influence along with risk in explaining efficiency. We find that ROA has a 
statistically significant effect in the cost model (C8), while in the profit model (P8) it has no 
significant effect. This result indicates, on the one hand, that more profitable banks are more 
cost efficient, while ROA differences are not relevant as profit efficiency drivers. Interestingly, 
we find that the impact of ROA in cost efficiency increases the dispersion of efficiency estimates 
and also mean cost efficiency increases from 0.77 (baseline model) to 0.81 (see Table 3.5). 
 
Finally, we estimate all cost and profit models using a gamma distribution instead of an 
exponential distribution as described in Section 3.3 and following Tabak and Tecles (2010). 
Table 3.A9 and Figure 3.A8 in the Appendix show the posterior estimation for the inefficiency 





parameters and plot the posterior efficiency distributions, respectively. We find that results of 
the estimated coefficients re- main regardless of the use of an alternative distribution indicating 
their robustness. However, we observe that dispersion of efficiency estimates increases with 
gamma distribution and also we identify lower efficiency levels, especially in the profit models. 
 
3.8. Concluding remarks 
Risk-taking is an inherent condition of the banking business. However, traditional studies on 
bank efficiency have assumed that risk is incorporated into bank output without explicitly 
modeling its role in explaining efficiency. We present a stochastic frontier model with random 
inefficiency coefficients, which captures unobserved heterogeneity related to credit, liquidity, 
capital, and market risk exposures. The model is found to accurately distinguish heterogeneous 
responses to changes in risk exposures among banks and provides the first empirical evidence 
on the role of risk-taking in the efficiency of the Colombian banking sector.  
 
Our findings remark the importance of accounting for size, affiliation and risk exposure in the 
estimation of bank efficiency. Cost and profit efficiency are found to be over-underestimated 
when risk measures are not properly modeled into the profit and cost functions. We find that 
size and foreign ownership are not only important determinants of efficiency but also key 
characteristics determining the way changes in risk exposures affect bank efficiency. The main 
channels supporting these differences among banks are related to monitoring costs, 
diversification, information asymmetries, agency costs, and risk-taking incentives. 
 
We identify that an ex-ante measure of credit risk captures better risk-taking incentives of 
banks than an ex-post measure such as NPL, and may provide regulators with a more suitable 
indicator for setting bank provisions for loan losses. The decreasing trend on credit risk 
exposures of Colombian banks, even during a period of large credit expansion and high 
economic growth, could be related with the use of this measure for regulatory purposes. 
 
Our results provide evidence to support the hypothesis that capital requirements can 
contribute to enhance banking efficiency, especially for small and domestic banks, which can 
be related to agency problems between shareholders and managers. However, we find that the 
marginal benefits from capitalization are lower for small banks after 2008, coinciding with the 





global financial crisis and the regulatory changes on capital ratios and credit risk implemented 
by the Colombian financial regulator, implying that the positive effect of capitalization are 
limited as the cost of raising capital increases.  
 
Our results also suggest positive effects of market risk on efficiency, especially for large and 
foreign institutions. These types of banks may benefit from the expertise of their foreign 
parents, more diversified portfolios and access to cheaper funding sources. Large banks also 
benefit from being the primary dealers of the Colombian public debt market, which enhances 
their efficiency gains from the trading activity in this market. However, as large and foreign 
banks tend to rely more on unstable sources of funding (i.e. money markets) and to exhibit 
more market-based-income it can leads to financial fragility and enhances systemic risk 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Laeven et al., 2016).  
 
We observe that large banks exhibited higher efficiency than small institutions and were less 
affected by the financial crisis (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). This result suggests that large 
banks were either more prepared to operate under a less favorable environment and more 
strict regulation or that large bank were more confident in receiving public support in case of 
being needed. Moreover, the fact that large banks face lower costs and present higher incentives 
to take on more risk in credit and securities markets constitutes a signal for regulators to closely 
monitor the behavior of these type of banks and their potential accumulation of risk. Decreasing 
returns to scale exhibited by large banks may also suggest that their cost and profit efficiency 
gains obey to external sources such as lower funding costs (i.e. deposits, subordinated debt or 
interbank loans) as a result of implicit government guarantees (Davies and Tracey, 2014). Thus, 
regulators should also consider alternative measures to limit risk-taking incentives associated 
with the fact that large banks may benefit of being considered as too-big-to-fail. 
 
Bank efficiency measures that account for risk-taking constitute a useful indicator for financial 
stability considerations in emerging markets given that banks with lower efficiency have been 
found to be more prone to future bank fails and tend to engage on more risk (Tabak et al., 2011). 
Regulators should be aware not only of the consequences of prudential regulation on bank 
performance, but also of the different effects that polices intended to discourage risk exposure 
have on banks with different characteristics related to size and affiliation. 





Figure 3.1. Evolution of risk exposure measures by type of bank 2002–2012 
 
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of ratios related to credit, liquidity, capital and market risk over 
the period 2002-2012 for 31 commercial banks that operated during this period. The sample is classified 
between small and large banks and foreign and domestic banks. We define small and large banks as those 
below and above the median of the total assets level, respectively. Foreign banks are those for which 









Table 3.1. Summary statistics total sample 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Total loans    3.207.295      1.988.658      3.911.162          9.383      28.267.020    
Securities    1.228.382         838.960      1.255.500             204        6.666.803    
OBS         0,0439           0,0345           0,0358        0,0001             0,2650    
Price of deposits         0,0066           0,0063           0,0028        0,0004             0,0254    
Price of labour         9,0645           7,6186           5,7835        0,0499           66,7323    
Price of capital         0,4816           0,2781           0,7507        0,0029             8,8976    
Total assets    5.296.408      3.635.674      5.973.928        52.309      41.786.468    
Credit risk exposure         0,1110           0,0867           0,0752        0,0037             0,4740    
Liquidity ratio         0,2210           0,2060           0,1020        0,0214             0,5800    
Capital ratio         0,1160           0,1030           0,0581        0,0448             0,4970    
Market risk 
exposure         0,2400           0,2170           0,1340        0,0005             0,7650    
Total cost       295.747         173.610         384.895          5.946        3.546.014    
Total profit         20.044    
-            
755            99.533    
-  
261.771            756.685    
 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the model for the full sample. The 
variables are computed using quarterly data from 31 commercial banks operating during the period 
2002-2012. This is an unbalanced panel data set composed by 848 bank-level observations provided by 
the Colombian central bank (Banco de la República) and the FSC. All monetary values are in thousands 
of U.S. dollars at constant prices from 2012.  
 
  





Table 3.2. Parameters of the inefficiency distribution of cost models 
  Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 
  No risk Fixed risk coefficients Random coefficients 
  Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI 
γ0 1,7158* [0.9464,2.4853] 0,7982* [0.2801,1.2322] 0,7586* [0.2662,1.0968] 
γ1
 size -0,3915* [-0.5443,-0.2386] -0,3013* [-0.5546,-0.048] -0,2871* [-0.5284,-0.0458] 
γ2 foreign -1,5727* [-2.5448,-0.6006] -1,2914* [-2.0442,-0.5386] -0,8792* [-1.3917,-0.3667] 
γ1* credit     0,8087* [0.2632,1.4193] 0,7363* [0.3783,1.1390] 
γ2* liquidity     0,7494* [0.2891,1.2097] 0,8243* [0.1009,1.3935] 
γ3* capital     -1,2505* [-1.9249,-0.576] -2,1452* [-2.9732,-0.9802] 
γ4* market     -0,2269* [-0.3838,-0.07] -0,27224* [-0.5605,-0.084] 
Mean efficiency 0,9087   0,9031   0,7710   
s.d. efficiency 0,0982   0,1109   0,1477   
DIC3 2237,07   1812,33   1359,87   
LPS -12,03   -76,96   -114,74   
Notes: This table presents posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of parameters in the inefficiency 
distribution of cost models. Values for γ∗1 to γ∗4 in Model C3 correspond to the average posterior 
distribution of individual coefficients, which is the average of the values for each bank-specific parameter 
at every iteration of the MCMC. * indicates that the estimated parameter is different from 0 with a 
probability greater than 95%. Negative coefficients imply positive effects on cost efficiency and the 









Table 3.3. Parameters of the inefficiency distribution of profit models 
  Model P1 Model P2 Model P3 
  No risk Fixed risk coefficients Random coefficients 
  Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI 
γ0 -0,9282* [-1.0649,-0.7916] -1,1810* [-1.3774,-0.9847] -1,2622* [-1.472,-1.0523] 
γ1 size 0,5633* [0.4765,0.6501] 0,6635* [0.5619,0.7651] 0,6385* [0.5407,0.7363] 
γ2 foreign 0,4563* [0.6873,1.3594] 0,4456* [0.1848,0.7064] 0,5100* [0.2115,0.8085] 
γ1* credit     -1,7314* [-3.1426,-0.3201] -1,42308* [-2.583,-0.2631] 
γ2* liquidity     0,4893* [0.0599,0.9187] 0,8930* [0.1093,1.6766] 
γ3* capital     -1,7583* [-2.3555,-1.1611] -1,7240* [-2.3096,-1.1385] 
γ4* market     -0,8969* [-1.6564,-0.1373] -1,0484* [-1.8384,-0.4484] 
Mean efficiency 0,5643   0,5787   0,6883   
s.d. efficiency 0,1448   0,1758   0,2068   
DIC3 2534,41   1843,58   1763,09   
LPS -198,01   -362,90   -424,47   
Notes: This table presents posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of parameters in the inefficiency 
distribution of profit models. Values for γ∗1 to γ∗4 in Model P3 correspond to the average posterior 
distribution of individual coefficients, which is the average of the values for each bank-specific parameter 
at every iteration of the MCMC. * indicates that the estimated parameter is different from 0 with a 
probability greater than 95%. Negative coefficients imply positive effects on profit efficiency and the 





















Figure 3.2. Probability intervals of risk exposure coefficients by type of bank in cost 
efficiency    (model C3) 
 
Notes: 95% probability density intervals of average posterior distributions of the random inefficiency 
coefficients for each group of banks.  These are the average of the values for each bank-specific parameter 
at every iteration of the MCMC. If the intervals do not overlap each other, the posterior estimates for one 
group are different from the other with probability greater than 95%.  If the intervals do not contain the 
value of 0, risk affects efficiency of that group of banks with a probability greater than 95%. Negative 










Figure 3.3. Probability intervals of risk exposure coefficients by type of bank in profit 
efficiency (model P3) 
 
Notes: 95% probability density intervals of average posterior distributions of the random inefficiency 
coefficients for each group of banks.  These are the average of the values for each bank-specific parameter 
at every iteration of the MCMC. If the intervals do not overlap each other, the posterior estimates for one 
group are different from the other with probability greater than 95%.  If the intervals do not contain the 
value of 0, risk affects efficiency of that group of banks with a probability greater than 95%. Negative 




















Figure 3.4. Evolution of mean posterior cost and profit efficiency by groups of banks in 
random coefficient models 
 
 
Notes: Figures plot the mean of the average posterior cost and profit efficiency distribution for each 
group of banks and period. These are the average of the posterior efficiency values for each bank at every 









Figure 3.5. Probability intervals of technical change and returns to scale by groups of 
banks 
 
Notes: Figures show the 95% probability density intervals of average posterior distributions of TC and 
RTS for each group of banks. These are the average of the values for each bank evaluated at every 
iteration of the MCMC. If the intervals do not overlap each other, the estimates of technical change and 
RTS for one group are different from the other with probability greater than 95%. In the case of TC, if the 
intervals do not contain 0, then we can conclude in favor of technical change with a probability greater 
than 95%. In particular, from (7), TC > 0 imply technical progress and TC < 0 imply technical regress. In 
the case of RTS, if the intervals do not contain 1, we can conclude following (6) in favor of DRS (RTS < 1) 
or IRS (RTS > 1) with a probability greater than 95%. 
  





Table 3.4. Parameters of the inefficiency distribution in random coefficients models 
(sub-sample periods 2002-2007 and 2008-2012) 
 
  Model C3a Model C3b Model P3a Model P3b 
 
(2002 – 2007) (2008 – 2012) (2002 – 2007) (2008 – 2012) 
  Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI 
γ0 0,7256* [0.2546,1.0491] 0,7949* [0.2789,1.1493] -1,2215* [-1.4246,-1.0184] -1,2535* [-1.4619,-1.0451] 
γ1 size -0,2720* [-0.5006,-0.0434] -0,3208* [-0.5904,-0.0512] 0,4840* [0.4099,0.5581] 0,6825* [0.578,0.787] 
γ2 foreign -0,8260* [-1.3075,-0.3445] -0,9844* [-1.5582,-0.4106] 0,4569* [0.1895,0.7242] 0,5213* [0.2162,0.8264] 
γ1* credit 0,6833* [0.2583,1.1072] 0,7895* [0.2984,1.2793] -1,5721* [-2.6535,-0.7907] -1,3438* [-2.4391,-0.2484] 
γ2* liquidity 0,7196* [0.0095,1.4085] 0,8358* [0.0111,1.636] 0,9409* [0.1152,1.7666] 0,7374* [0.0903,1.3846] 
γ3* capital -2,3460* [-3.2514,-1.0719] -1,8924* [-2.6229,-0.8647] -1,8190* [-2.4368,-1.2012] -1,4641* [-2.2614,-0.6669] 
γ4* market -0,2167* [-0.3666,-0.0669] -0,1160* [-0.1962,-0.0358] -1,1003* [-1.9294,-0.4706] -1,0036* [-1.7599,-0.4293] 
Mean efficiency 0,8453 0,7627 0,6518 0,7106 
s.d. efficiency 0,1215 0,1547 0,1804 0,2246 
DIC3 1362,23 1361,40 1766,36 1765,45 
LPS -112,04 -112,69 -417,97 -421,90 
 
Notes: This table presents posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the inefficiency parameter distributions 
in random coefficients models for the sub-sample periods 2002-2007 and 2008-2012. Values for γ1* to γ2* 
correspond to the average posterior distribution of individual coefficients, which is the average of the values for each 
bank-specific parameter at every iteration of the MCMC. * indicates that the estimated parameter is different from 0 
with a probability greater than 95%. Negative coefficients imply positive effects on efficiency and the opposite is 






















Figure 3.6. Probability intervals of credit risk and capital: small vs large banks, 2002-
2007 and 2008-2012 
 
Notes: Figures depicts the 95% probability density intervals of average posterior distributions of the 
random inefficiency coefficients for each group of banks. These are the average of the values for each 
bank-specific parameter at every iteration of the MCMC. If the intervals do not overlap each other, the 
posterior estimates for one group are different from the other with probability greater than 95%.  If the 
intervals do not contain the value of 0, risk affects efficiency of that group of banks with a probability 
greater than 95%. Negative values imply positive effects of risk on efficiency and positive values imply a 
























Table 3.5. Inefficiency parameter distributions in random coefficients models using 
NPL as an alternative measure of credit risk 
 
  Model C7 Model P7 Model C8 Model P8 
  NPL NPL ROA ROA 
  Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI 
γ0 0,9867 [0.3712,1.5425] -1,4975 [-1.9154,-1.0127] 0,4552 [0.1597,0.6581] -1,1359 [-1.3248,-0.9471] 
γ1 size -0,3120 [-0.5028,-0.1071] 0,6019 [0.4276,0.7951] -0,1915 [-0.3655,-0.0175] 0,5747 [0.4866,0.6627] 
γ2 foreign -1,0026 [-1.3549,-0.6484] 0,6147 [0.2918,0.9580] -1,0045 [-1.6154,-0.5936] 0,4590 [0.1904,0.7277] 
γ1* credit         0,6427 [0.0871,1.1643] -1,2808 [-2.3247,-0.2368] 
γ2* liquidity 0,7617 [0.0538,1.4630] 0,8006 [0.0542,1.5929] 0,7419 [0.0098,1.4522] 0,8037 [0.0984,1.5089] 
γ3* capital -1,9483 [-2.7376,-0.9708] -1,6938 [-2.2651,-1.1855] -1,9307 [-2.6759,-0.8822] -1,5516 [-2.0786,-1.0247] 
γ4* market -0,1950 [-0.3685,-0.0264] -1,0136 [-1.6913,-0.2328] -0,2450 [-0.4145,-0.0756] -0,9436 [-1.6546,-0.4036] 
γ5* NPL 0,6569 [0.1907,0.9973] -0,1235 [-0.4107,0.2314]         
γ6* ROA         -1,3878 [-2.5052,-0.2704] 0,0417 [-0.6652,0.7486] 
Mean efficiency 0,7836 0,6708 0,8123 0,7045 
s.d. efficiency 0,1437 0,1951 0,1815 0,2011 
DIC3 1419,51 1811,90 1353,83 1876,19 
LPS -105,46 -331,85 -116,04 -351,62 
 
Notes: This table presents posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the inefficiency parameter distributions 
in random coefficients models using NPL. NPL are included as the ratio of non-performing to total loans in the 
previous period. Values for γ1* to γ4* correspond to the average posterior distribution of individual coefficients, 
which is the average of the values for each bank-specific parameter at every iteration of the MCMC. * indicates that 
the estimated parameter is different from 0 with a probability greater than 95%. Negative coefficients imply positive 























Table 3.A6. Summary statistics by groups of banks  
  Small Banks (n=416) Large Banks (n=432) 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max 
Total loans       985.515          826.879          667.003           9.383         2.696.732       5.346.787       3.451.866       4.503.450          758.826       28.267.020    
Securities       379.716          256.449          344.862              204         1.393.741       2.045.615       1.775.987       1.272.240          334.376         6.666.803    
OBS         0,0471            0,0374            0,0397         0,0001              0,2650            0,0408            0,0325            0,0313            0,0001              0,2150    
Price of deposits         0,0079            0,0075            0,0028         0,0004              0,0254            0,0053            0,0052            0,0021            0,0009              0,0118    
Price of labour       10,5659            8,4528            7,3962         1,3291            66,7323            7,6186            7,2293            2,8862            0,0499            18,2958    
Price of capital         0,5895            0,2764            1,0177         0,0029              8,8976            0,3754            0,2797            0,2997            0,0058              2,8417    
Total assets    1.619.551       1.235.202       1.115.449         52.309         3.545.718       8.837.084       6.195.099       6.581.894       3.547.137       41.786.468    
Credit risk exposure         0,1170            0,0882            0,0882         0,0037              0,4740            0,1040            0,0861            0,0596            0,0342              0,3670    
Liquidity ratio         0,2090            0,1860            0,1180         0,0214              0,5800            0,2310            0,2190            0,0819            0,0328              0,4900    
Capital ratio         0,1320            0,1080            0,0747         0,0623              0,4970            0,1010            0,0981            0,0280            0,0448              0,1780    
Market risk exposure         0,2190            0,1990            0,1470         0,0005              0,7650            0,2600            0,2340            0,1160            0,0725              0,5580    
Total cost       105.691            85.114            76.139           5.946            491.070          478.765          292.534          465.953            50.346         3.546.014    
Total profit           1.002    -         1.920            22.485    -  108.206              77.188            38.381              5.984          135.260    -     261.771            756.685    
  Domestic Banks (n=547) Foreign Banks (n=301) 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Mean Median SD Min Max 
Total loans    3.983.266       2.399.882       4.399.050         11.552       28.267.020       1.797.142       1.038.357       2.208.175              9.383       11.322.972    
Securities    1.519.082       1.059.576       1.387.424              204         6.666.803          700.101          464.628          716.145                 795         2.776.628    
OBS         0,0451            0,0357            0,0353         0,0001              0,2650            0,0418            0,0318            0,0367            0,0001              0,2150    
Price of deposits         0,0060            0,0060            0,0025         0,0004              0,0186            0,0076            0,0073            0,0030            0,0021              0,0254    
Price of labour         6,8401            6,5064            2,4024         0,0499            17,6841          13,1796          11,3445            7,5630            1,3291            66,7323    
Price of capital         0,3693            0,2525            0,5344         0,0058              8,8976            0,6840            0,4032            1,0065            0,0029              7,5630    
Total assets    6.560.745       4.256.538       6.675.098       116.867       41.786.468       2.998.759       2.101.320       3.384.305            52.309       16.983.860    
Credit risk exposure         0,1220            0,0944            0,0799         0,0072              0,4740            0,0895            0,0767            0,0606            0,0037              0,3210    
Liquidity ratio         0,2120            0,2000            0,0901         0,0214              0,5800            0,2360            0,2130            0,1190            0,0328              0,5770    
Capital ratio         0,1100            0,0994            0,0545         0,0448              0,4750            0,1290            0,1120            0,0624            0,0553              0,4970    
Market risk exposure         0,2320            0,2120            0,1190         0,0005              0,5580            0,2530            0,2290            0,1570            0,0068              0,7650    
Total cost       348.859          198.416          440.633         15.837         3.546.014          199.230          119.698          224.506              5.946         1.533.103    




Notes: This table presents summary statistics of the variables used in the model for the full sample. The variables are 
computed using quarterly data from 31 commercial banks operating during the period 2002-2012. This is an unbalanced 
panel data set composed by 848 bank-level observations provided by the Colombian central bank (Banco de la República) 
and the FSC. All monetary values are in thousands of U.S. dollars at constant prices from 2012.  We define small and large 
banks as those below and above the median of the total assets level, respectively. Foreign banks are those for which more 
than 51 percent of the bank’s equity is foreign owned.  
 





Table 3.A7. Frontier parameter distributions in cost models 
 
 Model C1 
No risk 
Model C2 
Fixed risk coefficients 
Model C3 
Random risk coefficients 
Model C4 
Risk in frontier 
Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI 
β0 5.0904∗ [4.011,6.296] 5.2911∗ [4.426,6.188] 4.8096∗ [3.691,6.065] 5.5647∗ [4.498,6.603] 
β1 0.0373∗ [0.002,0.097] 0.0207∗ [0.003,0.043] 0.0611∗ [0.003,0.123] 0.0922∗ [0.039,0.132] 
β2 0.0649∗ [0.001,0.152] 0.0554∗ [0.005,0.152] 0.0281∗ [0.001,0.076] 0.0697∗ [0.006,0.175] 
β3 0.0333∗ [0.001,0.083] 0.0361∗ [0.003,0.077] 0.0400∗ [0.002,0.127] 0.0221∗ [0.001,0.052] 
β11 0.0427∗ [0.012,0.077] 0.0468∗ [0.018,0.077] 0.0524 [-0.002,0.096] 0.0743∗ [0.044,0.104] 
β12 0.0149 [-0.03,0.055] 0.0095 [-0.031,0.048] 0.0017 [-0.056,0.067] -0.0602∗ [-0.106,-0.014] 
β13 -0.0039 [-0.009,0.000] -0.0035 [-0.008,0.001] -0.0023 [-0.008,0.003] -0.0011 [-0.005,0.003] 
β22 0.0093 [-0.028,0.047] 0.0126 [-0.021,0.046] 0.0026 [-0.060,0.056] 0.0974∗ [0.046,0,147] 
β23 0.0014 [-0.002,0.004] 0.0012 [-0.001,0.004] 0.0010 [-0.002,0.004] -0.0011 [-0.004,0.002] 
β33 0.0009∗ [0.000,002] 0.0008 [-0.001,0,002] 0.0011 [-0,000,0,003] 0.0004 [-0,001,0,002] 
δ1 0.0618∗ [0,002,0.174] 0.0594∗ [0,004,0.143] 0.0384∗ [0.001,0.114] 0.0976∗ [0.002,0.206] 
δ2 0.0721∗ [0.003,0.247] 0.0690∗ [0.005,0.164] 0.0606 ∗ [0.002,0.189] 0.0450∗ [0.002,0.099] 
δ11 0.0878∗ [0.034,0.129] 0.0746∗ [0.023,0.115] 0.0159 [-0.063,0.087] 0.0542 [-0.006,0.102] 
δ12 -0.0885∗ [-0.12,-0.052] -0.0825∗ [-0.111,-0.052] -0.0587∗ [-0.102,-0.014] -0.0660∗ [-0.099,-0.031] 
δ22 0.0804∗ [0.039,0.120] 0.0743∗ [0.039,0.109] 0.0732 ∗ [0.030,0.113] 0.0482∗ [0.007,0.089] 
η11 0.0829∗ [0.055,0.11] 0.0821∗ [0.057,0.106] 0.0893∗ [0.048,0.128] 0.0771∗ [0.049,0.104] 
η12 -0.0164 [-0.042,0.008] -0.0159 [-0.037,0.006] -0.0195 [-0.051,0.015] -0.0119 [-0.034,0.010] 
η21 -0.0096 [-0.041,0.014] -0.0156 [-0.047,0.009] -0.0539∗ [-0.094,-0.013] -0.0260 [-0.053,0.000] 
η22 -0.0460∗ [-0.070,-0.017] -0.0414∗ [-0.064,-0.018] -0.0241 [-0.055,0.007] -0.0286∗ [-0.052,-0.005] 
η31 0.0007 [-0.003,0.005] 0.0009 [-0.002,0.004] 0.0018 [-0.002,0.006] 0.0004 [-0.003,0.004] 
η32 0.0019 [-0.002,0.006] 0.0012 [-0.002,0.005] -0.0009 [-0.006,0.003] 0.0026 [-0.001,0.006] 
κ1 -0.1037∗ [-0.178,-0.027] -0.1077∗ [-0.170,-0.045] -0.0928∗ [-0.158,-0.03] -0.1086∗ [-0.172,-0.045] 
κ2 0.0007 [-0.002,0.003] 0.0007 [-0.002,0.003] 0.0015 [-0.001,0.004] -0.0002 [-0.003,0.002] 
φ1 0.0109∗ [0.004,0.018] 0.0112∗ [0.006,0.017] 0.0109∗ [0.006,0.017] 0.0107∗ [0.005,0.017] 
φ2 -0.0103∗ [-0.015,-0.003] -0.0105∗ [-0.015,-0.006] -0.0108∗ [-0.015,-0.006] -0.0090∗ [-0.014,-0.005] 
φ3 0.0001 [-0.000,0.000] 0.0000 [-0.000,0.000] -0.0002 [-0.000,0.000] 0.0000 [-0.000,0.000] 
ϕ1 -0.0120∗ [-0.02,-0.003] -0.0125∗ [-0.020,-0.006] -0.0116∗ [-0.02,-0.004] -0.0127∗ [-0.021,-0.005] 
ϕ2 0.0050 [-0.002,0.012] 0.0050 [-0.001,0.011] 0.0030 [-0.003,0.009] 0.0032 [-0.003,0.01] 
ω1    0.0538 [-0.221,0.334] 
ω2    -0.0755 [-0.236,0.086] 
ω3    0.2936 [-0.043,0.614] 
ω4    -0.4360 [-0.848,0.000] 
DIC3 2237.07 1812.33 1359.87 2119.65 
LPS -12.03 -76.96 -114.74 -20.10 
 
Notes: This table presents posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the parameter distributions in cost 
models. * indicates that the estimated parameter is different from 0 with a probability greater than 95%. In Model 












Table 3.A8. Frontier parameter distributions in profit models 
 
Model P1 
No risk covariates 
Model P2 
Fixed risk coefficients 
Model P3 
Random risk coefficients 
Model P4 
Risk in frontier 
 Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI Mean 95% PI 
β0 8.8101 [-1.462,16.767] 3.3282 [-4.316,13.527] 6.4845∗ [1.579,12.170] 8.8857 [-2.738,15.876] 
β1 2.1175∗ [0.456,3.637] 2.8217∗ [1.147,4.327] 2.0398∗ [0.869,2.997] 2.4465∗ [0.884,3.889] 
β2 2.3737∗ [1.126,3.735] 3.2102∗ [1.989,4.350] 2.4766∗ [1.705,3.224] 2.8854∗ [1.617,4.030] 
β3 -0.1391 [-0.274,0.009] -0.1828 [-0.305,0.045] -0.1485 [-0.237,0.054] -0.1523 [-0.293,0.021] 
β11 -0.2742∗ [-0.428,-0.121] -0.3065∗ [-0.465,-0.151] -0.2395∗ [-0.350,-0.103] -0.3395∗ [-0.464,-0.181] 
β12 0.2138∗ [0.058,0.367] 0.2456∗ [0.074,0.412] 0.1850∗ [0.042,0.310] 0.3075∗ [0.151,0.446] 
β13 0.0139∗ [0.002,0.026] 0.0122∗ [0.003,0.022] 0.0102∗ [0.002,0.018] 0.0141∗ [0.001,0.026] 
β22 0.0083 [-0.086,0.117] 0.0231 [-0.086,0.146] 0.0381 [-0.057,0.156] -0.0622 [-0.158,0.065] 
β23 -0.0027 [-0.015,0.010] -0.0009 [-0.010,0.008] 0.0009 [-0.004,0.006] -0.0040 [-0.012,0.003] 
β33 0.0005 [-0.002,0.003] 0.0008 [-0.002,0.003] -0.0011 [-0.003,0.000] 0.0013 [-0.002,0.005] 
δ1 -0.6712 [-1.923,0.939] -1.7524∗ [-2.989,-0.338] -1.3228∗ [-2.137,-0.449] -1.1864 [-2.644,0.022] 
δ2 0.3282 [-0.692,1.218] 0.9088 [-0.098,1.680] 0.6580 [-0.156,1.159] 0.6532 [-0.246,1.611] 
δ11 0.0716 [-0.056,0.228] -0.0117 [-0.120,0.106] -0.0174 [-0.101,0.068] 0.0410 [-0.060,0.169] 
δ12 -0.0003 [-0.149,0.127] 0.0380 [-0.073,0.132] 0.0332 [-0.030,0.094] 0.0176 [-0.103,0.112] 
δ22 -0.0307 [-0.177,0.137] -0.0600 [-0.168,0.071] -0.0817∗ [-0.152,-0.012] -0.0696 [-0.195,0.089] 
η11 0.0937 [-0.061,0.229] 0.1752∗ [0.008,0.301] 0.1294∗ [0.040,0.217] 0.1346∗ [0.007,0.273] 
η12 0.0676 [-0.039,0.175] 0.0200 [-0.079,0.123] 0.0610 [-0.005,0.124] 0.0349 [-0.075,0.130] 
η21 0.0028 [-0.063,0.077] -0.0243 [-0.085,0.041] -0.0164 [-0.059,0.024] -0.0023 [-0.063,0.053] 
η22 -0.0680 [-0.150,0.004] -0.0498 [-0.114,0.015] -0.0625∗ [-0.103,-0.019] -0.0520 [-0.123,0.016] 
η31 -0.0048 [-0.016,0.009] -0.0086 [-0.018,0.003] -0.0050 [-0.011,0.002] -0.0065 [-0.020,0.005] 
η32 -0.0030 [-0.013,0.007] 0.0022 [-0.008,0.011] -0.0018 [-0.008,0.004] 0.0003 [-0.009,0.013] 
κ1 -0.1007 [-0.305,0.123] -0.1629 [-0.329,0.005] -0.1532∗ [-0.255,-0.051] -0.1089 [-0.282,0.065] 
κ2 0.0020 [-0.004,0.008] -0.0016 [-0.006,0.003] -0.0003 [-0.003,0.003] 0.0009 [-0.004,0.007] 
φ1 0.0197∗ [0.003,0.036] 0.0248∗ [0.010,0.038] 0.0233∗ [0.013,0.033] 0.0176∗ [0.001,0.033] 
φ2 -0.0068 [-0.017,0.004] -0.0067 [-0.015,0.003] -0.0091∗ [-0.015,-0.003] -0.0049 [-0.014,0.006] 
φ3 -0.0009 [-0.002,0.000] -0.0007 [-0.002,0.000] -0.0005 [-0.001,0.000] -0.0008 [-0.002,0.000] 
ϕ1 0.0146 [-0.006,0.038] 0.0131 [-0.003,0.030] 0.0072 [-0.002,0.017] 0.0101 [-0.007,0.031] 
ϕ2 -0.0162 [-0.041,0.009] -0.0157 [-0.032,0.002] -0.0131∗ [-0.022,-0.004] -0.0140 [-0.034,0.003] 
ω1       -0.3028 [-0.802,0.209] 
ω2       -0.4596 [-0.777,0.128] 
ω3       -0.1873 [-0.764,0.454] 
ω4       0.0495 [-0.666,0.755] 
DIC3  2534.41  1843.58  1763.09  2329.63 
LPS  -198.01  -362.90  -424.47  -254.82 
 
Notes: This table presents posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the parameter distributions in profit 
models. * indicates that the estimated parameter is different from 0 with a probability greater than 95%. In Model 
P4 risk covariates are included in the frontier.  
 
  





Figure 3.A7. Predictive distributions of efficiency for cost and profit models 
 
Notes. These figures depicts predictive efficiency distributions of cost and profit models. Models with no 
risk-taking covariates (C1 and P1), models with common risk coefficients (C2 and P2), and models with 






















Table 3.A9. Inefficiency parameter distributions in random coefficients models using a 
gamma distribution 
 
  Model C9 Model P9 
  Mean 95\% PI Mean 95\% PI 
γ0 0,8134 [0.2987,1.1363] -1,1934 [-1.3516,-1.0540] 
γ1 size -0,2435 [-0.4523,-0.0908] 0,5279 [0.4115,0.6473] 
γ2 foreign -1,2539 [-1.7284,-0.7192] 0,6326 [0.3510,0.8854] 
γ1* credit 0,6952 [0.3090,0.9516] -1,3147 [-2.0682,-0.6348] 
γ2* liquidity 0,8351 [0.0192,1.4572] 0,8135 [0.1693,1.4256] 
γ3* capital -1,9360 [-2.6157,-1.3745] -1,6518 [-2.0719,-1.1425] 
γ4* market -0,2075 [-0.4136,-0.0351] -0,9872 [-1.7015,-0.5160] 
Mean efficiency 0,7244 0,6376 
s.d. efficiency 0,1625 0,2331 
DIC3 1350,24 1791,37 
LPS -116,78 -418,52 
 
Notes: This table presents posterior mean and 95% probability intervals of the inefficiency parameter 
distributions in random coefficients models using a gamma distribution. Values for γ1* to γ4* correspond 
to the average posterior distribution of individual coefficients, which is the average of the values for each 
bank-specific parameter at every iteration of the MCMC. * indicates that the estimated parameter is 
different from 0 with a probability greater than 95%. Negative coefficients imply positive effects on 












Figure 3.A8. Posterior cost and profit efficiency distributions –Gamma vs. exponential 
inefficiency parameter distributions  
 
Notes: These figures compare posterior cost and profit efficiency distributions for Models C3 and P3, 















The Impact of Exogenous Liquidity Shocks on Banks’ Funding Costs:       
Micro-Evidence from the Unsecured Interbank Market 
4. The Impact of Exogenous Liquidity Shocks on Banks’ Funding 
Costs: Micro-Evidence from the Unsecured Interbank Market 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks in the unsecured interbank 
market. We evaluate the effects of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks—arising from deposits outflow 
at the bank level—and of the aggregate liquidity shock related to the U.S. tapering observed in 
2013. We find that both liquidity shocks are associated with higher interbank loan prices, albeit 
the magnitude of the overprice and the impact on the access to interbank liquidity differ 
depending on the borrower-specific characteristics. More capitalized and liquid banks tend to 
pay less for liquidity—concurrent with evidence on market discipline—also can absorb better 
the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks, suggesting benefits from capital and liquidity ratios. 
Our results suggest that lending relationships can alleviate funding costs during idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks, but are less effective during aggregate liquidity shocks, where capitalization, 
and central bank liquidity have more relevance. Results have implications for both financial 




Acknowledgements: Miguel Sarmiento (corresponding author) (CentER & EBC, Tilburg 
University). I am grateful to Harry Huizinga and Olivier de Jonghe for their valuable suggestions 
and fruitful discussions during this research. I would like to thank Fabio Castoglionesi, Hang 
Degryse, Sylvester Eijffinger, and Wolf Wagner for their helpful comments that decisively 
contributed to this chapter. I would also like to thank the participants at the Annual Meeting of 
the IFABS (Barcelona, 2016), and the International Conference on the Implementation of 
International Financial Standards organized by CEMLA (Mexico City, 2016), for their comments. 
Discussion sessions with Pamela Cardozo, Jorge Cely, Yi Huang, Carlos León, Daniel Osorio, 
Fabio Pozzolo, and Hernando Vargas, enriched and improved this paper in several dimensions. 
This research has greatly benefited from the Bilateral Assistance and Capacity Building 
Program for Central Banks (BCC), a partnership program between the Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva and the Swiss Economics Secretariat 
(SECO). I would like to thank the IHEID for its hospitality during my research visit to the IEHID. 
Chapter 4: The Impact of Exogenous Liquidity Shocks on Banks’ Funding Costs:                  





4.1. Introduction   
The unsecured interbank funds market is mainly used by financial institutions to hedge short-
term liquidity against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks arising from the behavior of retail 
depositors (Freixas et al. 2000). Because there is no collateral pledged to the loan, participants 
in this market have powerful incentives to monitor each other and to maintain stable lending 
relationships to properly gain access when they face liquidity shocks (Rochet and Tirole, 1996). 
In normal times, the interbank market tends to be a stable source of short-term funding for 
banks allowing them to cover idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (Afonso et al. 2014). However, 
during aggregate liquidity shocks—as observed during the global financial crisis (GFC) of 
2008—interbank market liquidity can quickly evaporate due to concerns over counterparty 
and liquidity risk of its participants (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Angelini, et al. 2011; 
Acharya and Merrouche, 2013), which forced central banks to implement alternative liquidity 
facilities to alleviate liquidity tensions in the interbank market (Christensen et al. 2009; Allen 
et al. 2009; Freixas et al. 2011; Abbassi and Linzert, 2012). The unconventional monetary 
policies implemented in the U.S.—such as the quantitative easing (QE)—and Eurozone to 
alleviate domestic liquidity tensions have increased global liquidity, leading to capital inflows 
and easing the financial conditions in emerging markets (Mohanty, 2014; Tillmann, 2016; 
Anaya et al. 2017). Between May and September, 2013, Fed officials informed the market of the 
possibility of tapering its securities purchases1, an unexpected announcement that had negative 
impact on financial markets in emerging economies, leading to capital outflows, exchange rate 
depreciation and increased funding costs (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015; Bouwman et al. 2015; 
Aizenman et al. 2016).  
In this paper, we identify how exogenous liquidity shocks affect borrowing banks in the 
interbank market. We are particularly interested in understanding these related questions: i) 
How the availability and pricing of liquidity in the interbank market is affected by exogenous 
liquidity shocks? ii) Do banks respond differently to an idiosyncratic liquidity shock compared 
                                                        
1 In early May 2013, Fed officials first began to talk of the possibility of tapering its securities purchases (gradually 
reducing them from $85 billion monthly to a lower level until its potential termination depending on the US economy 
conditions). However, in May 22, 2013, the Chairman Ben Bernanke raised the possibility of tapering in his testimony 
to the Congress, confirming the higher probability to initiate a tapering soon (Bernanke, 2013). The uncertainty 
related to the QE termination remained until September 17, 2013, when new data on the condition of the US economy 
led Fed officials to make statements that moderated prior expectations of tapering (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015).  
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to an aggregate liquidity shock? iii) Can lending relationships and central bank liquidity 
mitigate the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks? 
Our analytical framework is close to recent studies evaluating the behavior of banks under tight 
liquidity conditions in interbank markets (Angelini, et al. 2011; Acharya and Merrouche, 2013; 
Afonso et al., 2014; Bednarek et al. 2015; Braüning and Fecht, 2016). Unlike these studies—that 
center their analysis on the liquidity shock related to the GFC of 2008 in advanced economies—
we focus on the role of market discipline, lending relationships and central bank liquidity in 
mitigating the impact of idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks on the interbank market 
in an emerging economy. We also contribute to this branch of literature by incorporating 
alternative measures of counterparty and liquidity risk—including bank’s stability, banks’ 
liquidity position and liquidity ratios—and by examining the role of reciprocal lending, and 
secured funding from the central bank and from the money market in alleviating the impact of 
liquidity shocks in the interbank market.  
Our main contribution consists in to evaluate two different types of liquidity shocks. First, 
because we can observe deposits outflow at the bank level, we use it as an approximation of 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (i.e. bank-specific shocks) that affect both prices and access to the 
interbank market (Freixas et al. 2000; Aschraft, et al. 2011). Second, we use the U.S. tapering—
observed between May and September, 2013—as an aggregate exogenous liquidity shock and 
evaluate its impact on the interbank market. While most of the literature evaluating the U.S. 
tapering has focused on its impact using aggregate data at the country level (i.e. exchange rates, 
capital flows, equity, bonds, CDS, etc.), we use microdata from the interbank market to identity 
its effect on the availability (and price) of short-term liquidity in an emerging market2. To our 
knowledge, the impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks—related to deposits outflow—and 
aggregate liquidity shocks—associated to the effects of the U.S. tapering—on interbank 
markets in emerging economies remains unexplored in the literature.  
Our analysis uses a rich data set supplied by the CB of Colombia and the Financial 
Superintendence of Colombia (FSC). First, we use micro-level data on unsecured loans among 
                                                        
2 See for instance: Rai and Suchanek (2014); Eichengreen and Gupta (2015); Bouwman et al., (2015);Fratzscher, et. 
al., (2018). In section 5.2 we extend the US tapering period until December 18, to account for the impact of the FOCM 
meetings on the size of the potential reduction in the QE (Aizenman et. al., 2016). 
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the financial institutions participating in the Colombian interbank market. Our sample 
comprises non-publicly available data on daily overnight bilateral unsecured operations among 
53 banking institutions from January 2011 to December 2014. The data set also has information 
of overnight-secured loans in the money market at the bank level. Unique to this paper, we 
employ observed data on overnight interbank loans instead of approximations of the interest 
rates and volumes extracted from large-value payment systems.3  Second, we employ daily 
liquidity reports including CB’ repo operations, deposits, reserve balances, cash holdings, liquid 
assets, and required reserves of banking institutions, which makes it possible to properly gauge 
the liquidity position of banks over time. Third, we match these data with bank-specific 
characteristics of size, risk, capitalization and liquidity using monthly balance sheet reports. 
The detailed information at the borrower-lender loan level and about lender and borrower 
specific-characteristics allow us to include a large set of fixed effects in the specifications to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, isolate aggregate changes in liquidity, and disentangle 
supply from demand effects.  
Our results contribute to the literature devoted to understand the behavior of the participants 
in the interbank market and provide new evidence on the effects of liquidity shocks in this 
market. First, we find that both liquidity shocks are associated to higher liquidity prices and 
that the overpriced and its impact on the access to interbank liquidity vary with bank-specific 
characteristics. We observe that, on the one hand, riskier banks pay higher prices and have less 
access to the market based on the existence of market discipline (Furfine, 2001; King, 2008) 
and that; on the other hand, these effects are stronger during exogenous liquidity shocks. In 
addition, large banks are found to pay less for liquidity and have more access to interbank 
funds—compared to small banks— which concurs with the behavior of surplus banks that exert 
market power in interbank markets (Allen et al. 1989; Acharya et al, 2012) and with evidence 
on implicit government guarantees (Angelini et al. 2011). However, we identify that during the 
US tapering period all banks—irrespective of their size— were affected by higher prices on 
unsecured interbank loans.  
                                                        
3  Thus, we can directly observe the characteristics of the interbank loans (i.e., rates, volumes, maturities and 
counterparties) as they are registered by the participants on a daily basis and reported to the FSC. Therefore, we 
avoid the disadvantages of the traditional algorithms employed in the literature to extract information on interest 
rates and the volume of the loans (see, for instance, Furfine 2001; Heijmans, et al. 2010). 
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Second, we show that although banks facing idiosyncratic liquidity shocks pay higher prices, 
they are able to obtain funds in the interbank market to cover their liquidity needs by relying 
more on lending relationships (see, Cocco et al. 2009; Afonso et al. 2014; Braüning and Fecht, 
2016). However, the reduction in the loan prices associated to borrowing from lenders with 
established relationships is lowers for large idiosyncratic shocks, especially for borrowers with 
less capitalization, suggesting a more significant role of hard information over soft information. 
We observe that liquid banks—either banks with more stable reserves or higher collateral—
can absorb better the impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, highlighting the benefits from 
liquidity ratios on funding costs.4  We also find that small banks are more prone to idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks, and in turn suffer more in finding liquidity when they face higher credit and 
liquidity risk (Fecht et al. 2011). 
Third, we identify that the U.S. tapering—our aggregate liquidity shock—was associated to 
increased loan prices in the interbank market and higher volatility in the availability of short-
term liquidity. This finding is consistent with the international credit channel suggesting that 
even if the domestic policy rate remains unaltered (as in Colombia during the US tapering 
period) domestic financial conditions are affected by the change in monetary policy of the Fed 
via the role of the dollar as an international currency (Passari and Rey, 2015). Although the 
higher spread is observed for all banks operating in the interbank market, we identify that the 
magnitude of the premium varies with the borrower’s characteristics. Specifically, less liquid 
and capitalized banks exhibited higher funding prices and less market access during that 
period. This result provides micro-evidence on the impact of the U.S. tapering on funding costs 
in emerging markets, enhancing the scope of the recent literature focused mainly on country 
level financial and macro data (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015; Bouwman et al. 2015; Aizenman 
et al. 2016). Our findings also shed light on the transmission of the U.S. monetary policy to 
lending conditions in emerging economies (Dias et al, 2017; Morais et al, 2017), which concurs 
with the spillovers of the global financial cycle (Bruno and Shin, 2015; Rey, 2016).  
Fourth, we observe that, unlike idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, lending relationships had lees 
effect on banks’ access to the interbank market during the U.S. tapering, suggesting that hard 
                                                        
4 Bonner and Eijffinger (2016) show that banks close to their short-term regulatory liquidity requirement pay and 
charge higher interest rates in the Dutch unsecured interbank market. 
Chapter 4: The Impact of Exogenous Liquidity Shocks on Banks’ Funding Costs:                  





information seems to dominate soft information during aggregate liquidity shocks (Bednarek 
et al. 2015). We find that, in turn, the higher central bank liquidity—which increased by 25% 
during this period—contributed to mitigate the impact of the U.S. tapering on the interbank 
market by allowing banks to obtain short-term funding at a large scale. This result not only 
provides evidence on the crucial role of central banks in alleviating liquidity tensions in the 
interbank market (Christensen et al. 2009; Allen et al. 2009; Freixas et al. 2011; Abbassi and 
Linzert, 2012), but also suggests that holding high quality collateral in the banks’ portfolios 
contributes to hedging liquidity risk under aggregate liquidity shocks. We find that reciprocal 
lending helps banks to smooth the impact of liquidity shocks on its funding costs, which can be 
related to risk-management motivation, as banks tend to combine deposits and commitment 
lending to provide a liquidity-risk hedge (see, Kashyap, et al. 2002; Gatev, et al. 2009). 
Lastly, our results highlight some benefits from the recent banking regulation. We observe that 
increased counterparty and liquidity risk is associated with reduced lending activity in the 
interbank market, evidencing the crucial nexus between counterparty and liquidity risk in 
unsecured markets (Beltran et al., 2015; Heider et al. 2015). This result implies that capital and 
liquidity regulatory requirements can contribute to enhance financial stability (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013; Pierret, 2015; Calomiris et al. 2015; Bonner and Eijffinger, 2016).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background of the 
Colombian interbank market and shows initial evidence of the impact of exogenous liquidity 
shocks on the interbank market. Section 3 presents the methodology, and the variables 
employed in the models’ estimation. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 presents 
robustness checks and extensions of the baseline models. Finally, section 6 concludes.   
4.2. The interbank market   
 
The Colombian interbank funds market is an unsecured market for liquidity in which 
participants impose counterparty limits among themselves based on their credit risk 
assessments5. This behavior is of a bilateral (i.e., over-the-counter) nature. Thus, counterparty 
risk plays a key role in the determination of both the price and the quantity of liquidity that 
                                                        
5 The credit risk regulation establishes a lending concentration limit of 10% among banks, meaning that a bank is 
not allowed to have more than 10% of the total lending with a single counterpart.   
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banks can trade in this market. During the period 2011-2014, approximately 75% of interbank 
loans were agreed upon at an overnight maturity, demonstrating that it is a short-time market 
for liquidity. The participants in the interbank market are banking institutions divided into the 
following categories: commercial banks, financial companies specializing in retail loans and 
corporate loans for small and medium firms, and financial corporations that operate as 
investment banks. During the evaluated period, 53 banking institutions participated in the 
interbank market. Despite the differences in their banking business, these credit institutions 
usually exchange liquidity among themselves, although large commercial banks tend to be the 
most active participants, playing the role of super-spreaders of central bank liquidity 
throughout the interbank market (see León, et al. 2018). As a result, the interbank market rate 
tends to be close to the CB rate due to it is the target rate for the monetary policy 
implementation (Figure 1A).  
 
4.2.1. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks  
 
We are interested in understanding the influence of exogenous liquidity shocks on the 
interbank market. We first evaluate whether borrowing banks suffering deposits outflow (our 
measure of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) obtain interbank liquidity at different prices. In 
Table 4.1. we classify all interbank loans granted during 2011-2014 that involve a borrower 
bank suffering an idiosyncratic liquidity shock (i.e. a deposits outflow) compared to loans in 
which the borrower does not exhibit such liquidity shock.6 We observe that loans associated to 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are priced at higher spreads, albeit those loans do not entail 
grater cross-sectional standard deviations of borrowing rates compared to loans with no 
liquidity shocks involved. We also observe a higher volume of granted loans, and more lending 
and borrowing banks, concurrent with the regular activity of the interbank market under 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (Afonso et al. 2014).  
 
In Table 4.2 we present mean comparison tests of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and interbank 
market activity distinguishing between small and large banks. This allows to explore whether 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks may affect differently banks depending of their size. In panel A, 
                                                        
6 In particular, we select all interbank loans of the borrower bank that had a negative rate of change of deposits in 
t-1 and, 0 otherwise. 
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we evaluate the frequency and magnitude of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks derived from the 
behavior of depositors by computing the rate of change in deposits, and the deposits outflow 
(change and number of days) for participating banks of the interbank market. We classify large 
(small) banks as those with assets value higher (lower) than the 66th (33th) percentile of the 
assets distribution during the evaluated period. We observe that large banks tend to have a 
higher growth of deposits (0.056) compared to small banks (0.011), and that small banks 
exhibit negative liquidity shocks more frequent than large banks. During the evaluated period, 
small banks registered a negative rate of growth of deposits for 423 days of the 982 effective 
days, while large banks exhibit negative liquidity shocks on 327 days, i.e., 43% and 33%, 
respectively. This seems to be reflected in the distribution of the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks 
for small and large banks (Figure 4.1, panel a), which is consistent with the view that small 
banks are more affected by liquidity squeezes (Fetch, et al, 2011). 
 
In Table 4.2 (panel b), we observe that on average, small banks pay 3.0 bps over the CB rate for 
an interbank loan while large banks pay 1.5 bps under the CB rate. Indeed, we find a different 
distribution of borrowing rates between large and small banks (Figure 4.1, panel b). We 
identify ample differences between small and large banks in terms of the amount of funds that 
they exchange in the interbank market. On average, small banks borrow COP$1.39 billion and 
lend COP$7.61 billion per day, while large banks borrow COP$16.23 billion and lend COP$7.15 
billion. That is, small banks borrow almost ten times less liquidity in the interbank market than 
large banks, but both lend relatively similar quantities. The implication is that large banks 
behave as net borrowers in the interbank market while small banks behave more as net lenders 
(as documented by Allen et al. 1989; Furfine (2001) for the U.S. federal funds market). These 
findings confirm that small banks are more vulnerable to adverse liquidity shocks and that 
finding liquidity can be more expensive for those banks compared to large banks (as 
documented by Fecht et al., 2011). 
 
4.2.2. Aggregate liquidity shocks  
 
Since May of 2013, the announcements from the Fed officials on the possibility of reducing the 
purchase of assets (i.e. the U.S. tapering) affected negatively financial markets in emerging 
economies leading to exchange rate depreciation, capital outflows and increased funding costs 
in emerging markets (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015; Bouwman et al. 2015; Aizenman et al. 
Chapter 4: The Impact of Exogenous Liquidity Shocks on Banks’ Funding Costs:                  





2016; Fratzscher, et. al, 2018) 7. The impact of this aggregate liquidity shock concurs with the 
spillovers effects from the U.S. conventional and unconventional monetary policies on emerging 
markets (see, Rey, 2016; Morais, et al. 2017; Dias et al. 2017) 8. In Colombia, the U.S. tapering 
was an aggregate liquidity shock that significantly affected expectations on short-term liquidity, 
raising concerns among financial authorities (see, Banco de la República, 2013a; Banco de la 
República, 2013b)9. The Colombian government bonds’ yields exhibited a rapid increase during 
the U.S. tapering. The 5-year government’ yields (TES) increased from 4.77% in late April to 
5.97% at the end of May (i.e. an increase of 120 bps right after the first announcement of the 
U.S. tapering) and by the end of June, the TES rates achieved 6.84% (i.e. 87 bps more after the 
second Fed’s announcement), following similar trend than the 10-years U.S. Treasury bills 
(Figure 4.3A). In Figure 4.2, we observe that the interbank market exhibited higher rates and 
greater volatility during the U.S. tapering. In the first week of the U.S. tapering announcement 
(between May 22 and May 30, 2013) the interbank rate exhibited a rapid increase—from 3.12% 
to 3.26% (i.e. 14 bps or 4.5%)—reaching a level above to the CB rate, and the highest level since 
the last change of the CB policy rate (i.e. the period between March 27 and May 21, 2013). In 
the following weeks, the interbank rate exhibited greater volatility, and by the last week of July 
it again reached a level above the CB rate, followed by a significant decline in the volume of 
loans from COP 1,000 million to COP 200 million (Figure 4.2, right axis), associated to prior 
expectations from the FOCM meeting of July. During the rest of the U.S. tapering period (i.e. until 
September 17, 2013) the interbank rate remained above the CB rate, and the volume of loans 
exhibited greater variation. Note that the spread over the central bank rate continued until mid 
December, consistent with the last FOCM meeting of 2003 that confirmed the size of the QE 
reduction from $85 billion per month to $75 billion. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 confirm the 
greater volatility in both interbank market rates and loan volume during the U.S. tapering 
                                                        
7 The uncertainty related to the QE termination began in May, 22, 2013 with the Bernanke’s speech to the U.S. 
Congress (Bernanke, 2013) and remained until September, 17, 2013 when the Fed moderated prior expectations of 
tapering (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015). Aizenman et. al, (2014) consider that the US tapering uncertainty began in 
March 20 (with the first announcement of Chair Bernanke to the Congress) and remained until December 18, 2013, 
when the Fed decided at the FOMC meeting to taper its quantitative easing policy by $10 billion per month, to $75 
billion. They also show that financial markets in emerging economies react to both FOMC statements and Fed 
officials’ communications.  
8 Bruno and Shin (2015) show that a contractionary shock to U.S. monetary policy leads to a decrease in cross-border 
banking capital flows and a decline in the international banks’ leverage. 
9 The minutes of the Central Bank of Colombia in May and June mentioned the concerns of the Board members on 
the financial markets volatility in advanced and emerging markets. In the minutes of June, the Board specifically 
mentioned that the U.S. tapering has increased the volatility in the international financial markets, which was 
reflected in a rise in interest rates on Colombian government and private bonds (Banco de la República, 2013b).  
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period indicating that participants of the interbank market faced higher funding costs and 
greater uncertainty in accessing the market during the U.S. tapering period.10  
 
In response to the weak economic growth and the higher uncertainty in financial markets, the 
CB of Colombia kept its policy rate unchanged and increased the liquidity supply through the 
daily repo operations (Figure 4.1A) (Banco de la República, 2013b). Between March 26 and 
May 21, 2013 (before the U.S. tapering) the median daily repo auction was 3.6 billion COP, while 
during the U.S. tapering it reached 4.5 billion COP (i.e. an increase of 25% in the short-term 
liquidity granted by the CB) (Figure 4.4, panel a). The higher volatility in the interbank market 
was also reflected in a greater volatility of the banks’ reserves holdings accompanied by a 
slightly increase in the system‘s excess of reserves (Figure 4.4, panel b), which can suggest 
evidence of liquidity hoarding. The greater liquidity granted by the CB seems to mitigate the 
transmission of the U.S. tapering to the deposits market as the rate of growth of deposits 
remained relatively stable and in similar levels to the ones observed during the entire period 
2011-2014 (Figure 4.2A).      
 
In Table 4.3, we present the results of a mean comparison test that allows to identifying 
whether banks behave differently in the interbank market during the U.S. tapering period. We 
compare interbank market conditions during the U.S. tapering period and the previous period 
since the last change of the CB policy rate. We find that during the U.S. tapering the mean loan 
volume was 13% lower compared to the volume observed the period before. Spite of the 
interbank rate remained below the CB rate, we observe significantly higher loan spreads and 
greater volatility of borrowing rates compared to the period before the U.S. tapering. We also 
identify that during the U.S. tapering there was an increase in the number of borrowing banks 
and a decline in the number of lending banks. This suggests that the announcement of the U.S. 
Fed officials related to the possibility to reduce the purchases of assets forced surplus banks to 
                                                        
10  Unlike other emerging markets and most advanced economies, the interbank market in Colombia has no 
interconnection with other unsecured interbank markets in the region, including the U.S. The interaction of banks 
operating in Colombia with banks in other jurisdictions takes place via the cross-border lending market, which is a 
credit market used for term loans and credit lines with maturities between 3 months to 5 years. Thus, we argue that 
the transmission of the US tapering in Colombia was observed via increased uncertainty about expected higher 
interest rates in the U.S. that lead to higher funding costs in the Colombian interbank market (as observed in Figure 
2). This is consistent with a potential large-scale capital outflows from emerging markets, after a long period of large 
capital inflows derived from the lower interest rates and the extraordinary monetary expansion in the U.S. (i.e. the 
QE) (Mohanty, 2014). 
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hoard liquidity and in turn, deficit banks had to borrow funds at higher rates. In addition, the 
wider dispersion across individual borrowing rates during the US tapering period may reflect 
concerns over counterparty risk across banks, which can be related to uncertainty over the 
availability of short-term liquidity, which force banks to hoard liquidity for precautionary 
reasons (see, Diamond and Rajan, 2011; Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Ashcraft et al. 2011; Acharya 
and Merrouche, 2013).  
4.3. The empirical model    
The proposed approach relies on the drivers of liquidity demand developed by Heider et al. 
(2015), in which the decision to borrow—but not the decision to lend—in an unsecured market 
depends on the banks’ own risk, and the market conditions. Thus, our model relates bank-
specific characteristics of borrowing banks and market conditions to the prices and availability 
of funds negotiated in the interbank market. We employ a Heckman-type model to correct for 
the selection bias in the sample of borrowing banks, which further allows the drivers of bank 
access to interbank market liquidity to be identified. To achieve identification, we employ a 
large set of fixed effects that allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity and to disentangle 
supply from demand effects, as well. 
More concretely, because we only observe the interest rate of an interbank loan when it is 
granted, we need to account for the possibility of a sample selection on unobservable 
conditions. Thus, we employ a Heckman-type selection model to account for the potential 
selection bias (Heckman, 1979). This model is proposed because if the bank’s decision to 
participate in the interbank market is non-random, then the estimated coefficients will be 
inconsistent (Acharya and Merrouche, 2013; Braüning and Fecht, 2016). The model combines 
a selection mechanism for participating in the interbank market with a regression model.  
The selection equation is as follows:    
                                                                      z*ijt = ´wijt + ijt.                                                                                                                   (1) 
The regression model is: 
                                                                       pijt = ´Xijt + ijt                                                                                                       (2) 
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In (1), z*ijt is not observed; the variable is observed as:  
                𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡 {
1       𝑖𝑓 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡
∗ >  0 with Prob
(𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡  = 1)
=  Φ(γ´w𝑖𝑗𝑡)
      0           𝑜. 𝑤.          with Prob
(𝑍𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 0)
= 1 −  Φ(γ´w𝑖𝑗𝑡)
                                             (3) 
In the regression model (2), the latent variable pijt (i.e. the price of the loan) is observed only if 
zijt = 1, which in our case, indicates that the bank i borrows liquidity from bank j in the interbank 
market at time t; where Xijt is a vector of variables (i.e. bank-specific characteristics and market 
conditions) that determine pijt. The bank’s decision to borrowing liquidity is modeled by the 
selection equation (1), under the mechanism denoted in (3), where wijt is a set of variables 
assumed to determine whether zijt is observed, and  is the standardized normal cumulative 
distribution function. Therefore, in the selected sample, we have the following: 
                                               E [pijt  zijt = 1] = ´ Xijt +    (´wijt)                                                            (4) 
In (4),  is the inverse Mills ratio. In addition, (ijt,ijt) are assumed to be bivariate normal, with 
ijt N(0, 1); ijt N(0, ) and corr(ijt, ijt) = . Thus, if   0, then standard ordinary least squares 
(OLS) models applied to (2) will yield biased results. To overcome this problem, we employ a 
two-step Heckman-type selection model that provides consistent parameter estimates of the 
second-stage parameters.11 Under this approach, we first estimate a standard Probit model 
using equations (1) and (3), then correct for the possible selection bias by including the inverse 
Mills ratio in the price equations (2) and (4), which are estimated by OLS. Note that in (4), wijt, 
is a vector that contains the same set of variables than Xijt, plus an additional variable that 
validates the Heckman’s exclusion restriction.12 We choose the excess reserves ratio (of both 
lender and borrower) as our instrument to meet the exclusion restriction under the Heckman 
two-step procedure (as in Braüning and Fecht, 2016). 13 The rationality is that, under inflation 
                                                        
11 In order to have borrowing and non-borrowing banks in t, we match the bank-specific-characteristics of all the 
banks operating at time t with the interbank loan data. Thus, in our matched data, we have banks that are active in 
the financial system but are not borrowing funds from the interbank market (z=0), compared to banks that are both 
active and borrowing from the interbank market (z=1) (Braüning and Fecht, 2016).  
12 The Heckman model centers on a valid exclusion restriction: the selection equation should contain at least one 
variable that is not in the outcome equation. Thus, in (1), we employ an additional variable that conditions the 
likelihood that a bank will borrow from the interbank market and that is part of wijt, namely, excess reserves. The 
excess reserve ratio is defined as the bank’s reserve holdings less the amount that a bank needs to hold on a daily 
basis for the balance of the reserve maintenance period to exactly fulfill the reserve requirements, divided by the 
average daily required reserves during the month (See Table 4.A3). 
13 That is, the variable should be correlated with the likelihood of a bank to borrow (lend) in the interbank market 
but has to be less correlated with the interest rate of the loan. 
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targeting, the central bank uses a corridor to set the short-term interest rate and employs 
reserve requirements to control for the monetary supply. Thus, one of the main drivers of a 
bank to borrow from the unsecured interbank market is to fulfill the reserve requirements, and 
in turn banks with excess reserves also have a greater incentive to lend those funds in this 
market (Furfine, 2001; Afonso et al, 2014). As the unsecured interbank market is an over-the-
counter market (in which participants do not use costly collateral) banks in need of reserves 
and those with excess of reserves tend to interact more frequent (and at lower costs) compared 
to the secured market (King, 2008). From a lender’s perspective, lend the excess of reserves in 
the unsecured interbank market at a interest rate slightly higher (or close) to the central bank 
rate is more profitable than hold the reserves at the central bank at a interest rate of 100 (or 
50) bps below the central bank policy rate. From a borrower’s perspective, trading liquidity 
with a counterpart that has excess reserves may entail lower costs and a greater likelihood to 
get the funds.  
We are particularly interested in identifying whether exogenous liquidity shocks can 
exacerbate concerns over counterparty and liquidity risk, affecting the price and availability of 
liquidity in interbank markets. Thus, we perform two exercises including the interaction terms 
of our measures of idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks with the set of variables in Xijt 
(and wijt), which capturing the bank-specific characteristics of the borrower i, and market 
conditions observed at t. More specifically, the influence of the idiosyncratic liquidity shock in 
(4) is identified as:  
´ Xijt (´wijt) = 1 * Liquidity_Shockit + 2 * Liquidity_Shockit x Borrower_Characteristicsit +                                            
                                   3 * Liquidity_Shockit x Market Conditionst + FEijt                                               (5)        
In a similar form, the impact of the aggregate liquidity shock related to the U.S. tapering can be 
identified as: 
              ´ Xijt (´wijt) = 1 * US Taperingt + 2 * US Taperingt x Borrower_Characteristicsit +                              
                                          3 * US Taperingt x Market Conditionst + FEijt.                                          (6) 
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Where, Borrower_Characteristicsit includes bank size, counterparty risk measures (i.e. credit 
risk, capital ratio and z-score), liquidity risk and measures of lending relationships. Market 
Conditionst is composed of a measure of market liquidity risk and the CB’s supply of liquidity. 
These variables are explained in the data section. In (5), Liquidity_Shockit denotes an 
idiosyncratic liquidity shock faced by the borrower bank i at time t (i.e. deposits outflow), while 
in (6), US. taperingt corresponds to our aggregate liquidity shock observed during the period t 
in which the Fed announced to the market the possibility of reducing its purchase of assets 
(between May 22 and September 17, 2013).14 We saturate the model with a large set of fixed 
effects (FEijt) that allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity and to disentangle supply 
from demand effects. In particular, we include borrower fixed effects, to control for 
unobservable bank characteristics of borrowing banks, borrower*lender fixed effects, to 
account for borrower-lender variation in credit that may affect borrower’s participation and 
loan pricing in the interbank market. We include a set of lender time-variant controls (i.e. size, 
capitalization, credit risk, and liquidity risk) to control for lender characteristics that may affect 
the supply of liquidity in the interbank market.  We also include lender*time fixed effects to 
control for variation in supply by lenders in a particular period. Thus, variation in demand of 
liquidity of a bank from this lender in that period will reflect demand factors as the common 




We employ a unique data set composed by the universe of overnight-unsecured bilateral loans 
among the financial institutions participating in the Colombian interbank market. We match the 
interbank loans with banks’ daily liquidity reports (including access to CB repo operations) and 
monthly banks’ balance sheet information to compute bank specific-characteristics related to 
                                                        
14 In section 5.2 we extend the US tapering period until December 18, 2013 to account for the higher spread over the 
central bank rate that remained until mid-December, in line with the FOCM of December that informed the market 
on the size of the reduction in the QE (Aizenman et al, 2016). In Figure 2A, we employ daily data at the bank level 
and compare the distribution of deposits outflow during the US tapering period (May, 22 to December 18, 2013) and 
during the full period excluding the US tapering. Although we observe a lower density during the US tapering period, 
we find that both periods have similar distributions and also both have the same mean value and have similar 
extreme values. This suggests that there was no increased deposits outflow during the US tapering compared to the 
full period of study, indicating that the idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks are orthogonal.  
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liquidity, credit risk, size, and capitalization. Thus, we construct a daily panel composed of 
25,910 unsecured overnight loans granted among 53 financial institutions between January 
2011 and December 2014. Summary statistics and definitions of the set of variables employed 
in the model are presented in Table 3A in the appendix.  
 
Our baseline dependent variable in (1) is the match of a borrower bank with a lender bank (i.e. 
loan), which in case of a successful match (zijt = 1) indicates that the bank i borrows liquidity 
from bank j in the interbank market at time t. In (2), our dependent variable is the price of 
liquidity (pijt), which is defined as the spread in bps between the volume-weighted average 
interest rate paid by bank i to bank j over all its overnight unsecured loans during the day (t) 
and the CB rate in t. We use the spread to the CB rate because all interbank market participants 
have access to the regular liquidity of the CB.15 Thus, pit gauges how costly the liquidity is 
compared to the CB liquidity. 16 
The main goal of the proposed model is to identify the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks on 
the price and availability of interbank funds. We employ two alternative liquidity shocks that 
differ in their nature. First, we use the bank’s deposits outflow as our measure of idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks, based on that banks suffer from liquidity shocks associated with unexpected 
withdrawals by their depositors that condition their liquidity (Frexias, et al. 2000; Ashcraft et. 
al. 2011). Thus, if the bank suffers a deposits outflow in t-1, it may force the bank to borrow in 
t from the interbank market and (depending on the bank’s characteristics and market 
conditions) it may entail a greater borrowing cost. In particular, we define the borrower’s 
liquidity shockit as a dummy variable equal 1 if the rate of change of the deposits of bank i is 
negative in t-1 and, 0 otherwise.  
Second, we employ the U.S. tapering as an aggregate liquidity shock that may affect the prices 
of interbank funds as it affected financial conditions in emerging markets (see, Eichengreen and 
Gupta, 2015; Bouwman et al. 2015). As reported in Figure 2, Figure 3 and Table 3, this 
                                                        
15 All interbank market participants are credit institutions with regular access to central bank liquidity that includes 
intraday and daily liquidity auctions and overnight liquidity facilities.   
16 To control for the effect of outliers in the estimation, we limit the interest rates to values between -100 bps and 
100 bps to the central bank rate. Note also that our pricing measure is given by the spread in bps between the 
volume-weighted average interest rate paid by bank i to bank j over all its overnight unsecured loans during the day 
(t) and the CB rate in t. This also helps us to mitigate the impact of outliers (i.e. small loans with a relatively high (or 
low) interest rate). 
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announcement was associated with higher volatility in both the price and the availability of 
interbank funds. We define US taperingt as a dummy variable equal to 1 during the period t in 
which the Fed announced to the market the possibility of reducing its purchase of assets: 
between May 22 and September 17, 2013, and 0, during the period immediately before (since 
the last change of the CB policy rate), that is, between March 23 and May 21, 2013.  
As we are particularly interested in identifying the role of counterparty risk in explaining the 
liquidity prices in the interbank market, we employ alternative measures aimed at capturing 
counterparty risk of a bank.17 Initially, we include the ratio of non-performing loans over total 
loans (npl) and the capital ratio (car), defined as capital equity (Tier I and Tier II) over risk-
weighted assets.18 We expect that banks with a higher credit risk in their loan portfolios and 
lower capital ratios pay more for liquidity, given that their creditors tend to charge higher 
prices to less healthy banks (see Furfine, 2001; King, 2008; Gorton and Metrick, 2012).19 We 
compute the bank’s z-score, which gauges the risk-taking of a bank.20 This indicator is defined 
as the sum of the mean rate of the return on assets (ROA) of a bank i (μroa) and the mean equity-
to-assets ratio (car) divided by the standard deviation of the ROA σroa; that is, z-scoreit = (μroa + 
carit /σroa). It tells us the number of roa standard deviations that a bank’s ROA must decrease to 
surpass equity. Thus, a lower z-score indicates a higher probability that a bank will become 
insolvent, which we expect to be reflected in higher loan prices, suggesting evidence of market 
discipline.21 The interaction between our measures of exogenous liquidity shocks and the set of 
borrower’s counterparty risk measures further allows to identifying whether banks 
approaching insolvency or facing higher credit risk tend to pay more for their liquidity during 
exogenous liquidity shocks.   
                                                        
17 Market discipline considers that if a bank is taking too much risk and its creditors can identify this behavior, then 
they will request a higher return (i.e., risk premium) that will be reflected in the market prices (Berger, 1991; 
Flannery, 2001). Evidence on market discipline in financial markets can be found in Sironi (2003); Flannery (2010); 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) and Gurara, et. al., (2018). 
18 Colombian regulation establishes that the capital ratio should be greater than 9%, and it is defined as equity capital 
over risk-weighted assets plus 100/9 of the value at risk of the bank’s securities portfolio.  
19 This is based on the role of peer monitoring given that banks usually have information on the riskiness of their 
peers and can observe their behavior from different markets (Rochet and Tirole, 1996) 
20 The z-score has been employed as a measure of bank risk-taking in the banking literature (see, for instance, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Bertay et al., 2013). 
21 To compute the z-score, we use the approach of Lepetit and Strobel (2013), in which the mean and standard 
deviation estimates, μroai and σroai, are calculated over the full sample [1 … T], and we combine these with the 
current t values of the equity ratio (carit). Sarmiento et al., (2017) find that banks that consistently pay high 
borrowing rates in the interbank market exhibit low z-score values, demonstrating their higher riskiness. 
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We employ several measures of liquidity to gauge the impact of liquidity risk on the price of 
interbank funds. First, as the liquidity position of banks is affected by the reserve requirements, 
we expect that banks short on reserves may face liquidity squeezes when approaching the 
fulfillment date of their reserve requirements, forcing them to borrow funds from the interbank 
market (Fecht et al. 2011). Thus, to account for the liquidity position of a bank in terms of its 
reserves holdings, we include a measure of the bank’s excess reserves (excess_reservesit). This 
variable is defined as the bank’s reserve holdings less the amount that a bank needs to hold on 
a daily basis for the balance of the reserve maintenance period to exactly fulfil the reserve 
requirements, divided by the average daily required reserves during the month. Thus, banks 
with low (or negative) values in this ratio exhibit a deficit of reserves, and in turn, they are more 
willing to borrow in the interbank market to fulfil the reserve requirement. This variable is 
included only in the selection model to account for the Heckman exclusion restriction (Braüning 
and Fecht, 2016).  
Second, we argue that when banks are exposed to relatively large liquidity shocks, they might 
need to trade funds at unfavorable prices (Cocco et al. 2009). We account for this effect by 
including a measure of the liquidity risk of a bank i at time t (Liquidity_riskit), defined as the 
standard deviation of the daily change in the reserve holdings of the bank during the last 30 
days, normalized by the reserve requirements (as in Braüning and Fecht, 2016). In order to 
evaluate the effect of the bank’s structural liquidity on the price and availability of interbank 
funding, in alternative specifications we employ the ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
(Liquidity_ratioit). We consider that banks with lower liquidity can be more affected by 
exogenous liquidity shocks forcing them to borrow funds at higher prices to cover their 
liquidity needs. We evaluate this prediction by employing a set of interactions between the 
measures of liquidity risk and our exogenous liquidity shocks.  
As we observe in Table 4.2, bank size seems to play an important role in liquidity pricing. We 
control for this effect by including the natural log of the value of a bank’s assets (sizeit). We are 
also interested in testing whether, compared to large banks, small banks are more penalized by 
their creditors when they face higher liquidity risk and counterparty risk. To account for these 
effects, we include two interaction terms small*liq_riskit and small*nplit, where small is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the bank’s assets are below the 33th percentile of the assets distribution 
in the sample and zero otherwise. In addition to this, we interact our exogenous liquidity shocks 
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with the latter set of variables to check whether the concerns over counterparty risk and 
liquidity risk increased when small banks suffer exogenous liquidity shocks. 
Lending relationships play a key role in determining the access of banks to the interbank 
market. Banks with stable lending relationships benefit from greater access to the interbank 
market, which contributes to hedging liquidity risk (Cocco et al. 2009; Affinito, 2013; Afonso et 
al. 2014). To account for this effect, we employ three alternative measures: relationship lending 
(RLijt), the borrowing preference index (BPIijt), and lending reciprocity (RL_recjit) (Braüning and 
Fecht, 2016). The RL gauges the frequency of interactions between two banks in the interbank 
market (Furfine, 1999) and is computed by the logarithm of one plus the number of days a bank 
i has lent to bank j during the last 30 days preceding day t: RLijt= log (1+ ∑ 𝐼(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 0))𝑡 𝜖𝑇 . We 
expect that banks that keep stable lending relationships have more access to the interbank 
market and can benefit from lower prices. The BPIijt is computed as the amount of funds 
borrowed by bank i from bank j at time t (qijt) over period T relative to the overall amount 
borrowed by bank i over the same period T as: BPIijt = ∑  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡´𝑡 𝜖𝑇  / ∑ .𝑗 ∑  𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡´𝑡´𝜖𝑇 .22 Hence, if a 
bank has higher concentration of counterparties providing liquidity (high BPI), it is more likely 
that it accesses the market on a regular basis to cover its liquidity needs. We consider that a 
higher frequency and concentration of lending relations may contribute to absorb the impact 
of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (as in Afonso, et al. 2014). However, in case of an aggregate 
liquidity shock, the dependence on a small set of counterparties may lead to higher prices, as 
all the interbank market participants are being affected by the same liquidity shock (Bernarek, 
et al. 2015).  We also include a measure of lending reciprocity to account for possible mutual 
insurance against liquidity shocks. The measure is computed as RL_recijt= log (1+ ∑ 𝐼(𝑦𝑗𝑖𝑡 >𝑡 𝜖𝑇
0)), which gauge for the number of loans granted from borrower i to lender j during the last 30 
days preceding day t. We expect a mitigating effect of reciprocal lending on funding costs of 
banks affected by liquidity shocks, as banks tend to combine deposits and commitment lending 
to provide a liquidity-risk hedge (Kashyap, et al. 2002; Gatev, et al. 2009). We check these 
predictions, by using the interaction of our exogenous liquidity shocks with the lending 
relationships measures.    
                                                        
22 We set the variable to zero if the denominator is zero, which means that the banks did not borrow at all. In Table 
4.1A we present the correlation across the three alternative measures of lending relationships.  
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Market conditions play a key role in determining the access of banks to the interbank market. 
In our specification, we include several variables to account for the effects of market conditions. 
First, we include our measure of liquidity risk; however, it is computed across all banks j at time 
t, which corresponds to the standard deviation of the normalized excess reserves among banks, 
namely, Market Liq_riskt. The intuition here is that in the presence of liquidity imbalances across 
banks, the liquidity demand tends to increase because more banks need funds, which, in turn, 
would affect both the prices and volumes in the interbank market. Second, as noted above, all 
interbank market participants have access to the liquidity of the CB. Thus, we expect that 
increases in the liquidity supply by the CB might increase the activity of the interbank market 
and exert downward pressure on interbank prices (León et al. 2018). We account for this effect 
by including the log of the total liquidity supply of the CB at time t (CB_Liq_Supplyt).23 We are 
also interested in testing whether the access to secured money markets alleviates funding costs 
in the interbank market based on the premise that using collateral reduce borrowing costs 
(Allen et al. 1989), and on the benefits from diversification across money markets (León and 
Sarmiento, 2016). To do this, we employ a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank i borrows 
funds in the secured money market in time t, and zero otherwise (Borrowing securedit). Then, 
we include the interactions of our exogenous liquidity shocks with the set of market conditions 
to check whether these shocks exacerbate concerns on market liquidity conditions. In Figure 
4, we observe that during the U.S. tapering the CB significantly increased the liquidity supply, 
while the volatility of reserve holdings raised suggesting the presence of liquidity imbalances 
across banks. 
4.4. Main Results 
4.4.1. The impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in the interbank market 
In this section, we present results on the effect of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in accessing and 
pricing interbank funds. In Table 4.4 (panel a), columns (1) to (6), we present the results of the 
selection models, where the dependent variable is the probability of a bank to borrow from the 
interbank market (zit =1). In Table 4.4 (panel b), columns (7) to (12) correspond to the second 
stage estimates of the interest rate models in which the spread to the CB rate (in bps) is 
                                                        
23 The liquidity supply includes the daily liquidity auctions of the central bank (repo operations), intraday repos by 
demand, and the liquidity facility, which has a penalty rate of 100 bps over the central bank rate.   
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employed as a dependent variable (i.e. the price of liquidity (pit)). Columns (3) to (6) and (9) to 
(12) incorporate the effects of our idiosyncratic liquidity shock (deposits outflow) in accessing 
and pricing funds in the interbank market, respectively. All models have borrower, 
borrower*lender and time fixed effects to control for unobservable effects of the borrower, 
borrower-lender availability of credit, and aggregate changes in liquidity, respectively. Time-
variant lender controls are included in columns (4) to (6) and (10) to (12).  In columns (6) and 
(12) we check the robustness of our baseline results under a more demanding specification that 
includes lender*time fixed effects in order to control for variation in supply by lenders in a 
particular period and thus to capture variation in demand of liquidity (as the common supply 
effect is controlled for). In addition, we cluster robust standard errors at the borrower bank 
level.  
4.4.1.1. Accessing the interbank market 
The specification in Table 4.4 column (1) includes our set of counterparty risk measures along 
with the variables of lending relationships and the supply of CB liquidity. This specification 
allows to identify the impact of counterparty risk of the borrower bank on the access to the 
interbank market liquidity by controlling for lending relationships and market conditions. 
Results indicate that banks with higher capital ratios are more likely to borrow liquidity from 
the interbank market. Interestingly, banks with a higher share of non-performing loans are less 
likely to borrow from the interbank market. A 1% increase in the share of non-performing loans 
is associated with 9.1% less probability to borrow from the interbank market. These results 
confirm that riskier banks have less access to the interbank market (King, 2008, Furfine, 2001). 
The estimated coefficient of size indicates that the larger the bank, the higher the likelihood that 
it will borrow from the interbank market. This coincides with our findings in Table 4.2, 
confirming that large banks have incentives to be net borrowers in the interbank market, which 
can be associated the existence of too-big-to-fail implicit guarantees (Angelini et al. 2011; 
Davies and Tracey, 2014; Sarmiento and Galán, 2017). We also observe that banks are more 
likely to obtain funding from a credit bank with whom they had established lending 
relationships compared to a spot lender, and that the excess of bank’s reserves is a key driver 
of access to the interbank market (Cocco et al. 2009). 
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In column (2), we include the liquidity position at the bank level (liquidity risk) and across 
banks (market liquidity risk) to gain further insights into the role of liquidity risk in accessing 
to the interbank market. We find that banks with a greater liquidity needs are more likely to 
borrow funds from the interbank market while the opposite is true for banks with excess 
reserves. The estimated coefficient of excess reserves—our additional variable in the selection 
model—suggests that banks holding large reserves are 12.9% less likely to borrow from the 
interbank market, while banks facing a higher liquidity risk are 6.3% more likely to borrow 
liquidity. This result indicates that banks short on reserves or with higher uncertainty over 
their liquidity needs are more prone to borrowing funds from the interbank market. In addition, 
we identify that the probability of borrowing liquidity from the interbank market falls 2.7% 
when liquidity positions across banks are more imbalanced, suggesting lower activity under 
higher uncertainty over liquidity conditions among banks, which can be associated to 
precautionary motives (Diamond and Rajan, 2011; Acharya and Skeie, 2011).  
In column (3) we include our idiosyncratic liquidity shock (deposits outflow) and interaction 
terms with bank-specific-characteristics and market conditions. We find that banks facing 
deposits outflow are 18.1% more likely to borrow liquidity from the interbank market. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of RL suggests that banks affected by this liquidity shock 
are 19.6% more likely to get funding from a credit bank with whom they had established 
lending relationships in the past 30 days, compared to a spot lender24 . Assuming that the 
deposits outflow is not caused by bank liquidity reliance, this result confirms the role of lending 
relationships in overcoming liquidity shocks (Cocco et al. 2009; Braüning and Fecht, 2016). We 
also observe that—under idiosyncratic liquidity shocks—more capitalized banks are more 
likely to get funding from the interbank market. In addition, higher CB liquidity supply 
contributes to overcome the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faced by borrowing banks in the 
interbank market. Because of the participants of the interbank market have access to the 
discount window facility; the latter results may indicate that CB liquidity is used to overcome 
bank-specific liquidity shocks.  
In column (4), we extend the model by including the interactions of liquidity shocks with our 
measures of liquidity risk, and by including time-variant lender controls. We observe that 
                                                        
24 The effect is computed as [0.049 x (log(31) – log (1)] + [0.008 x (log(31) – log (1)]=0.1957 
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greater market liquidity risk significantly reduces the probability of a bank to borrow from the 
interbank market, suggesting that higher uncertainty over the availability of liquidity may 
induce liquidity hoarding affecting more those banks with higher liquidity needs. In column (5), 
we test whether small banks are more affected in accessing the interbank market when facing 
higher credit and liquidity risk. We find that small banks are more vulnerable to changes in the 
credit risk exposure as the probability of borrowing funds decreases more compared to large 
banks (i.e  3.7% vs. 8.3%). Interestingly, we observe that in spite of higher credit risk exposure 
or liquidity risk do not affect the probability of a small bank to borrow during an idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks, those banks have 24.4% less probability of borrowing liquidity compared to a 
large bank (compare 9.8% vs 16.2%). This may indicate that size plays a crucial role in the 
access to the interbank market (Furfine, 2001). Lastly, in column (6), we identify that our 
results are robust to the use of lender*time fixed effects, which suggests that we are capturing 
how the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks affect the demand for liquidity in the interbank market.     
4.4.1.2. Liquidity pricing   
After identifying the drivers of a bank to borrow from the interbank market, we estimate the 
pricing models by using the Heckman second-stage procedure. Results are presented in Table 
4.4 (panel b). The specification in column (7) includes the bank size and the measures of 
counterparty risk along with the variables of lending relationships and supply of CB liquidity. 
The results indicate that the price of liquidity decreases with increase in bank size, in line with 
evidence from the U.S., German, and Portuguese interbank funds markets (see Furfine, 2001; 
Cocco et al. 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 2012; Abbasi, et al. 2013). We also find that more 
capitalized banks pay less for liquidity. The estimated coefficient indicates that a 1% increase 
in the capital ratio (car) is associated with a discount on the price of interbank funds of 7 bps. 
Holding a higher credit risk in the bank’s portfolio is associated with higher liquidity prices in 
the interbank market, suggesting that riskier banks seem to be charged a risk premium 
(Furfine, 2001). Banks with stable counterparties are associated with a significant lower 
spread, confirming the importance of lending relationships in interbank markets (see Cocco, et 
al. 2009; Craig et al. 2015; Braüning and Fecht, 2016). The estimated coefficient of RL has an 
economic and significant impact: a bank pair that interacted on any given day in the past month 
will agree on an interest rate that is about 4 bps lower than the spread agreed on a bank pair 
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that did not trade during the prior month.25 In addition, we observe the higher CB liquidity is 
associated to lower prices in the interbank market, indicating that CB liquidity can exert 
downward pressure on market interest rates (Christensen et al. 2009; Allen et al. 2009) 
In column (8), we include variables that gauge the liquidity position both at the bank level and 
across banks to gain further insights into the role of liquidity risk in liquidity pricing. We find 
that higher volatility of the reserve holdings of borrowing banks is associated with higher loan 
prices. This effect is captured by our measure of Liq_risk, which is significant, although with a 
relatively small effect. Hence, banks with higher uncertainty over their liquidity needs are 
associated with higher liquidity prices (Fecht et al. 2011). Liquidity imbalances across banks 
are associated with higher prices as well. The estimated coefficient of Market Liq_risk is positive 
and highly significant. Note that the estimated coefficient of Market Liq_risk (0.065) is 
considerably larger than that observed at the bank level (0.031). This difference suggests that 
the price of liquidity in the interbank market is more sensitive to changes in the market liquidity 
conditions.  
In column (9), we include our measure of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (Liq. Shock) and 
interaction terms with bank-specific-characteristics and market conditions. We find that a 
deposits outflow force banks to borrow at significant higher prices. On average, a bank facing a 
deposits outflow in t-1 pays 5.13 bps more on an interbank loan in t, compared to a day in which 
it has no deposits outflow. Note that the mean spread during the full sample period is 1.85 bps 
(Table 2A), meaning that the idiosyncratic liquidity shock adds (on average) a premium of 
almost three times the mean spread in the market.26 Second, we identify that this liquidity 
shock seems to have more impact over small and riskier borrowers. The estimated coefficient 
of the interaction term Liquidity_shock*size suggests that large banks pay a lower spread even 
when they are affected by a deposits outflow. The rationale of this effect can be related to the 
behavior of smaller banks whose prefer lending to larger banks even at lower rates due to too-
big-to-fail considerations (Angelini et al. 2011). Indeed, large banks behave more as net 
borrowers while small banks as net lender in the interbank market (Table 4.2). Deposits 
                                                        
25 The effect is computed as -1.181 x (log(31) – log (1)=-4.05. 
26 The economic effects are considerable high for the large borrowers that tend to borrow between COP 50,000 
million and COP 150,000 million per day (i.e. USD 17,8 million and USD 53,5 million), which can reach up to USD 
275,000 and USD 825,200 in a month. 
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outflow does not affect more the prices of interbank funds for less capitalized banks, but they 
do increase prices for borrowers with higher credit risk exposition. The estimated coefficient 
of Liquidity_shock*npl indicates that, if a borrower faces a deposits outflow, an increase of 1% 
in the borrower’s share of non-performing loans adds 1.2 bps of spread (an additional 22.2%) 
compared to a day in which the borrower has no deposits outflow. This finding is consistent 
with the view that liquidity risk and counterparty risk are intrinsically linked (Heider et al. 
2015). Third, we find that lending relationships alleviate borrowing costs for banks suffering 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.  
In column (10), we include the interaction terms of our idiosyncratic liquidity shock with 
measures of liquidity risk, in addition to time-variant lender controls. We find that borrowers 
facing greater liquidity risk have a significant higher spread associated to deposits outflow. The 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term Liq_Shock*Liq_risk indicates that if a borrower 
bank faces a deposits outflow, one standard deviation of the ratio between the daily change in 
the reserve holdings of the bank (during the last 30 days) and the reserve requirements, leads 
to a premium of 0.8 bps (i.e. 14.3% more compared to the same effect during a day without 
deposits outflow). During deposits outflow, borrowers’ funding costs are more affected by 
liquidity imbalances across banks as well. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term 
Liq_Shock *Market_Liq_risk suggests that, when the borrower faces a deposits outflow, one 
standard deviation in the market liquidity risk adds a premium of 1.1 bps, that is 17.4% more 
compared to a day in which the borrower has no deposits outflow. These results indicate that 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks force banks to pay more for their interbank funds when they face 
greater liquidity risk.    
In column (11), we test whether small banks are more penalized by their creditors in the 
presence of higher credit risk and liquidity risk, and also we check if idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks can affect more these banks. The estimated coefficient of interaction of small*npl implies 
that small banks are more sensitive to changes in their credit risk than large banks. Thus, 
further deterioration in the quality of loans of small banks would have a greater effect on their 
funding costs in the interbank market. A 1% increase in the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans for small banks is associated with overpricing of 8.8 bps. (i.e. 63,7% higher than the 
premium for a large bank), which means an extra cost of 117,000 USD over the average loan 
during a month. Small banks are also more affected by uncertainty over their liquidity needs. 
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The estimated coefficient of the interaction term small*liq_risk is positive and significant. 
Although the coefficient has a lower level (0.009), the total effect of liquidity risk on small banks 
is 26.4% higher than that observed for large banks. 27  We also identify that idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks have more effect over small banks. When small banks have deposits outflow, 
they pay 2.39% more for interbank loans compared to large banks, and if an small bank has 
higher liquidity risk, the overprice is 3.7% more compared to a large bank. This result is 
consistent with the view that small banks are more affected by liquidity squeezes (Nyborg and 
Strebulaev, 2004; Fecht, et al. 2011), but also with evidence showing that large banks enjoy 
lower funding costs in financial markets (Bertay, et al., 2013).   
In column (12) we observe that our results are robust to the inclusion of lender*time fixed 
effects, indicating that we are able to capture the effect of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks on the 
demand for liquidity in the interbank market. We identify that during a deposits outflow, banks 
that rely more on lending relationships—compared to spot borrowers—can obtain a lower 
spread of about 3.83 bps for interbank funds, which is nearly 80% of the observed spread (i.e. 
4.87 bps).28 This finding is in line with Afonso et al. (2014) whose show that in the US Fed funds 
market, banks pay lower prices and borrow more from their concentrated lenders and that—
when there are exogenous shocks to liquidity supply—concentrated lenders insulate 
borrowers from the shocks without charging significantly higher interest rates.  
4.4.2. The impact of the US tapering in the interbank market 
In this section, we present results on the impact of our aggregate liquidity shock—related to 
the U.S. tapering—in accessing and pricing interbank funds as stated in equation (6). The 
approach is the same as the one employed in evaluating the idiosyncratic liquidity shock. In 
Table 5 (panel a), columns (1) to (6), we present the results of the selection models, where the 
dependent variable is the probability of a bank to borrow from the interbank market (zit =1). 
Panel b, columns (7) to (12) correspond to the second stage estimates of the interest rate 
models in which the spread to the CB rate (in bps) is employed as a dependent variable (i.e. the 
price of liquidity (pit)). As in our previous model, all the specifications have borrower, 
                                                        
27 The total effect of liquidity risk for small banks is computed as follows: liq_risk + small x liq_risk = 0.034 + 0.009 = 0.043. 
Note that compared to the benchmark group (i.e., large banks), the interaction adds an impact of 26.4% to the effect 
of liquidity risk.   
28 The effect is computed as [-0.852 x (log(31) – log (1)] + [-0.262 x (log(31) – log (1)]=-3.825. 
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borrower*lender and time fixed effects to control for unobservable effects of the borrower, 
borrower-lender availability of credit, and aggregate changes in liquidity, respectively. Time-
variant lender controls are included in columns (4) to (6) and (10) to (12). In columns (6) and 
(12) we check the robustness of our baseline results under a more demanding specification that 
includes lender*time fixed effects to control for variation in supply by lenders in a particular 
period and thus to capture variation in demand of liquidity. In addition, we cluster robust 
standard errors at the borrower bank level. 
4.4.2.1. Accessing the interbank market 
Results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.5 show that riskier banks have less access to the 
interbank market, and those that rely more on lending relationships are more likely to borrow 
funds, as observed during idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. In column (3) we include our 
aggregate liquidity shock (U.S. taperingt) and interaction terms with bank-specific-
characteristics and market conditions. We find that during the U.S. tapering the banks were 
5.2% more likely to borrow from the interbank market compared to the period before. Note 
that this probability is considerably lower compared to the one we observe during idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks in Table 4.4 (18.1%), suggesting lower market activity compared to 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Surprisingly, the interaction terms of banks size and credit risk 
with the US tapering variable have no significant effect on the probability to access the 
interbank market, while the effect of capital ratio becomes more relevant. The estimated 
coefficient suggest that an increase of 1% in the bank’s capital ratio is associated with an 
increase of 8.2% in the probability of a bank to borrow funds in the interbank market. This 
result may indicate that the U.S. tapering posed more concerns on banks’ solvency rather than 
to their credit risk exposure; and also that large banks faced similar constrains in accessing 
interbank funds compared to small banks. Another interesting results is that during the U.S 
tapering, banks that borrowed more from their frequent counterparties had similar access to 
the interbank market compared to borrowing from spot lenders. This result contrasts to the 
one we observe under idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, and may suggest that aggregate liquidity 
shocks do forces liquidity hoarding in the interbank market (Acharya and Merrouche, 2013). 
Indeed, we observe lower market activity during the US tapering compared to the period before 
the shock (Table 4.3). 
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In column (4), we identify that banks with higher liquidity risk were less likely to obtain funds 
during the U.S. tapering, compared to the period before. Note that the opposite effect was found 
under idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, which may indicate that aggregate liquidity shocks affect 
more the availability of liquidity compared to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. During the U.S. 
tapering, more imbalanced liquidity positions across banks (i.e. higher market liquidity risk) 
significantly reduce the probability of a bank to borrow from the interbank market. In Figure 
4.4 (panel a) we observe a higher volatility in the banks’ reserves holdings around the U.S. 
tapering period, indicating higher uncertainty over the liquidity conditions during this period. 
Then, in column (5), we find that small banks are more affected by aggregate liquidity shocks 
compared to large banks, especially when those banks are less liquid. The probability to borrow 
funds of a small bank during the U.S. tapering was 16.2% lower compared to the one for a large 
bank. In addition, an increase in the liquidity risk for small banks further deteriorates the access 
to the interbank market in 0.02%, which is 18.2% higher compared to large banks. Column (6) 
confirms that our results are robust to the use of lender*time fixed effects indicating that model 
is able to identify how the U.S tapering affected the demand for liquidity in the interbank 
market.     
4.4.2.2. Liquidity pricing 
Results from the pricing models are presented in Table 5 (Panel B), columns (7) to (12). The 
estimated coefficients from the baseline specifications confirm our previous findings on the role 
of counterparty and liquidity risk in the liquidity pricing in interbank markets. In column (7) 
we observe that riskier banks are charged with higher prices and that larger banks have 
cheaper funding from the interbank market, while more liquid banks are associated to lower 
prices (column 8). In addition, we confirm that lending relations and central bank liquidity 
alleviate funding costs in the interbank market.  
In column (9), we find that the U.S. tapering was associated to significant higher prices in the 
interbank market. On average, banks paid 3 bps more on an interbank loan, compared to the 
period before the U.S tapering. Note that this overprice is 61% higher than the mean spread 
observed during the full period (1.85 bps), albeit lower that the one a bank pay during an 
idiosyncratic liquidity shock (5.13 bps). Unlike the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, we observe 
that the U.S. tapering affected more the prices of interbank funds for less capitalized banks—as 
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well as their access to the market (column 3)—. This indicates that more capitalized banks were 
able to absorb better the impact of the U.S. tapering, consistent with the role of capital in 
enhancing the performance of banks during times of increased uncertainty (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013).  
In spite of the probability to get funds from frequent counterparts during the U.S. tapering was 
no statistically different from the one to borrow from spot lenders (column 3), results suggest 
that lending relationships significantly alleviate borrowing costs during aggregate liquidity 
shocks (Braüning and Fecht, 2016).29 In addition, higher CB liquidity was associated to lower 
prices in the interbank market, indicating that CB liquidity can exert downward pressure on 
market interest rates during aggregate liquidity shocks. This result—in conjunction with the 
effect of the CB liquidity in the access to interbank market—may indicate that the higher 
liquidity granted by the CB during the U.S. tapering (which reached 25%, Figure 4.4, pane b) 
contributed to alleviate funding costs in the interbank market and to enhance the access to 
interbank liquidity (see, Abbassi and Linzert, 2012). This finding is consistent with the evidence 
of León and Sarmiento (2016), for whom the connective structure of the repo network of the 
CB can mitigate liquidity tensions in the money market. 
In column (10), we find that banks facing higher liquidity risk were charged with a spread of 
1.3 bps during the U.S. tapering period. This effect is similar to the one we observe under 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Interestingly, more imbalanced liquidity positions across banks 
were associated to a spread of 2.4 bps, which is almost twice the effect associated to the bank-
specific liquidity risk. These results indicate that when banks face greater liquidity risk 
(individual or across banks), aggregate liquidity shocks force them to pay more for their 
interbank funding. We also observe that banks that rely more on lending relationships—
compared to spot borrowers—obtained a lower spread of about 3.6 bps for their interbank 
funds, which represents 93% of the size of the spread.30 However, unlike the idiosyncratic 
shocks, the challenge here is to find a lender due to the probability to get funds from established 
lenders during the US tapering has no statistical significance (column 4). Note that this 
                                                        
29 Braüning and Fecht (2016) find that, during the GFC, relationship lenders in the German interbank market 
provided cheaper loans to their closest borrowers, confirming that lending relationships help banks to reduce 
search frictions, even for opaque borrowers. 
30 The effect is computed as [-0.876 x (log(31) – log (1)] + [-0.198 x (log(31) – log (1)]=-3.83 bps. This value is 93% 
of the spread associated to the US tapering (3.94 bps). 
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specification includes time-variant lender controls to account for supply factors. In column 
(11), we observe that small banks were more affected by uncertainty over their liquidity needs 
during the U.S. tapering. The total effect of liquidity risk on small banks was 28.2% higher than 
that observed for large banks.31 However, during the U.S. tapering small banks paid only 3.2% 
more for interbank loans compared to large banks, and under higher liquidity risk, they paid 
0.4% more compared to large banks. The lower spread for small borrowers compared to large 
borrowers and the lack of significance of bank size in the probability to access the interbank 
liquidity can indicate that the US tapering affected all the banking system. Moreover, the higher 
effect of the CB liquidity across all the specifications also suggest that the banks’ access to the 
central bank liquidity facilitated the transmission of liquidity to the unsecured market.  Note 
that the baseline results remain intact to the inclusion of lender*time fixed effects, suggesting 
that the proposed model captures the effect of the U.S. tapering on the demand for liquidity in 
the interbank market (column 12).     
4.5. Robustness and extensions 
In this section we perform additional exercises to test the robustness of our baseline results by 
using alternative bank-specific-characteristics, lending relationships and market access 
measures. We also investigate the role of lending reciprocity and bank heterogeneity and test 
our results by using an alternative measures of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and two sub-
periods of the US tapering. 
4.5.1. Bank’ stability, secured funding and lending concentration 
We perform additional exercises to test the robustness of our model by using alternative bank-
specific-characteristics, lending relationships and market access measures. First, we test 
whether the results hold under alternative measures of counterparty and liquidity risk. In 
particular, we employ the bank’s z-score instead of the capital ratio, and employ the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets (liquidity_ratioit) as an alternative measure of the liquidity position 
of the borrower bank.32 Second, we use a measure of borrowing concentration instead of the 
                                                        
31 The total effect of liquidity risk for small banks is computed as follows: liq_risk + small x liq_risk = 0.039 + 0.011 = 0.050. 
Note that compared to the benchmark group (i.e., large banks), the interaction adds an impact of 28.2% to the effect 
of liquidity risk.   
32 Liquid assets include cash holdings, negotiable and available to sell public and private debt instruments and 
pledged collateral in repurchase agreement operations.  
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frequency of interactions, by employing the BPIijt instead of RLijt. This allows to test whether 
higher concentration of counterparties providing liquidity (high BPI) increases the probability 
of a bank in accessing the interbank market to cover its liquidity needs. Third, we extend the 
baseline model in order to test whether the access to secured money markets alleviate funding 
costs in the interbank market as the use of collateral may reduce borrowing costs (Allen et al., 
1989). We employ a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank i borrows funds in the secured 
money market in time t, and zero otherwise (Borrowing securedit). In addition to check the 
robustness of our baseline results, this exercise allows assessing the role of banks’ stability, 
liquidity ratios, secured funding and lending concentration in mitigating the impact of 
idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity over banks’ funding in the interbank market. 
The results on the impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in the interbank market using 
alternative covariates of risk, liquidity, secured funding and lending relationships are presented 
in Table 4.6. Overall, the estimated parameters of the alternative covariates capturing 
counterparty and liquidity risk yield results similar to those that we obtained in our baseline 
models. However, they exhibit lower levels but remain significant compared to the estimated 
coefficients in our baseline specifications. Regarding the z-score, we find that a lower 
probability of insolvency is associated with more access to the interbank market and lower 
spread (columns 1 and 6). The estimated coefficient in column (7) suggests that an increase of 
one standard deviation in the bank’s z-score is associated with a decrease in the price of 
liquidity of 3.2 bps. In addition, we identify that under idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, higher 
bank’s z-score is associated to lower prices (column 9). Thus, banks engaging in less risk-taking 
are found to pay less for liquidity, confirming our evidence on market discipline.  
Banks with a higher ratio of liquid assets are associated with lower prices (column 7), albeit it 
has no significant impact on the probability to borrow from the interbank market (column 2). 
However—under idiosyncratic liquidity shocks—, more liquid banks have higher access to 
interbank market and benefit from lower prices (columns 4 and 10), suggesting that liquid 
banks are in a better position to obtain liquidity from the money market (Craig et al. 2015). The 
rationality is that if prices in the unsecured interbank market are high, then banks can use their 
liquid assets in the secured market to cover their liquidity needs, lowering their funding costs. 
This intuition is supported by our findings using the indicator variable on the banks’ access to 
the secured money market. We identify that borrowing liquidity in secured markets 
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significantly reduces borrowing costs in the interbank market during idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks. This result implies, on the one hand, that collateral can reduce asymmetric information 
problems (Allen et al., 1989); and on the other hand, that liquid banks (banks with higher 
collateral) can absorb better the impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks33. Thus, our results 
provide further support to the benefits of liquidity ratios in mitigating liquidity shocks, and then 
in preserving financial stability.  
Higher concentration of lending relations (high BPI) is associated to more access to the 
interbank market (column 1) and lower prices (column 7). In addition, banks with more 
concentrated counterparties are found to pay lees for liquidity during idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks compared to those borrowing from spot lenders (column 9). This effect survives to the 
use of time-variant lender controls and lender*time fixed effects (columns 10 to 12). The 
coverage from higher concentration of counterparties ranges between 89% and 93% of the 
liquidity shock. This result confirms our previous finding using RL, and provides further 
evidence on the role of lending relationships in mitigating liquidity shocks (Afonso, et al. 2014).  
Results on the impact of the aggregate liquidity shock in the interbank market using alternative 
covariates of risk and lending relationships are presented in Table 4.7. We observe similar 
results to those that we obtained in our baseline models in Table 4.5. Regarding the alternative 
covariates of risk, we identify that during the U.S. tapering, more stable banks are associated to 
a higher probability to access the interbank market (column 3), and to lower liquidity prices 
(column 9). More liquid banks are associated to lower interbank loan prices (column 10). We 
find that higher concentration of counterparties is associated to more access to the interbank 
market (column 1) and lower prices (column 7). However, during the U.S. tapering, banks that 
borrow from a small set of counterparties did not obtain significant lower prices (column 9), 
albeit they did benefit from higher access to the interbank market (column 3). This can be 
evidence on liquidity hoarding, based on the fact that all the interbank market participants are 
being affected by the same liquidity shock. Note that in the most demanding specification 
(columns 6) the estimated coefficient of our measure of US tapering market*liquidity risk is 
more than three times the one we observe in Table 4.5 for the interaction of 
                                                        
33  Bonner and Eijffinger (2016) find that German banks with higher liquidity ratios pay lower prices for their 
interbank funds. Similarly, Pierret (2015) shows that liquid banks benefit from lower funding costs and a lower 
insolvency risk 
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Liquidty_shock*market liquidity risk (compare -0.004 vs. -0.015), and twice in the pricing 
models (compare 0.011 vs. 0.022). This result implies that during aggregate liquidity shocks, 
more imbalanced liquidity positions across banks significantly reduced the ability of a bank to 
borrow funds from the interbank market. Note also that the effect of the CB liquidity remains 
statistically significant and that the point estimate increases during the U.S. tapering—in line 
with our previous findings reported in Table 4.6—and supporting the role of CB in alleviating 
liquidity tensions in the interbank market. 
Banks with access to the secured market are more likely to borrow from the interbank market, 
and had more access to the market during the U.S. tapering (column 3). However,—unlike the 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks—the higher access to secured market does not significantly 
reduced borrowing costs; neither contributed to absorb the liquidity shock associated to the 
U.S. tapering. The lack of significance of secured borrowing in the price models can be 
associated to the fact that the main collateral used in secured markets is the government bill 
(TES), which prices were severely affected during the U.S. tapering period (see Figure 4.3A, 
panel b). This lead to increasing funding costs in the secured money market (Banco de la 
República, 2013). Overall, our results confirm that during aggregate liquidity shocks, in 
addition to CB liquidity, the role of hard information (solvency and liquidity ratios) seems to be 
more important in the liquidity pricing than soft information (i.e. lending relationships). 
4.5.2. The role of lending reciprocity and bank heterogeneity  
Our results suggest that lending relationships are more beneficial in overcoming idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks compared to aggregate liquidity shocks. In this section, we test if it holds when 
there is lending reciprocity that accounts for the possible mutual insurance against liquidity 
shocks (Braüning and Fecht, 2016). We define LR_reciplocalijt as the number of loans granted 
from borrower i to lender j during the last 30 days preceding day t.34 We expect that those 
borrowers suffering a liquidity shock in t-1 are more likely to get funding from banks that have 
been received funds from the affected banks in the past 30 days35. We also check whether there 
are heterogeneous effects of reciprocal lending depending on bank characteristics. To do this, 
                                                        
34 The definition of LR_reciprocalijt can be found in section 4.3 and Table 4.A2. 
35This is because of banks tend to combine deposits and commitment lending to provide a liquidity-risk hedge (see, 
Kashyap, et al, 2002; Gatev, et al. 2009). 
Chapter 4: The Impact of Exogenous Liquidity Shocks on Banks’ Funding Costs:                  





we interact our measure of lending reciprocity with the bank’s characteristics of size, capital 
ratio and liquidity risk. We employ a similar specification than in eq. 5 for the idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks and as in eq. 6 for the effect of the US tapering. We include a large set of fixed 
effects including borrower, borrower*lender, lender*time, and time fixed effects, in addition to 
time-variant lender controls. 
We use the size of the idiosyncratic liquidity shock to test whether the shocks are related to 
public information about the banks’ riskiness (i.e. endogenous) or to depositors’ preferences 
(i.e. more exogenous). Large shocks can be more related to public information on the bank’s 
behavior, while small shocks can be related to a rebalancing of deposits (across banks) or to the 
depositors’ liquidity needs (Freixas et al. 2011). In Figure 4.1 (panel a) we observe that while 
most of the banks’ deposits outflow is within a range of {-3,0} standard deviations, some shocks 
reached up to -8 standard deviations. This suggests that in our sample some banks exhibited 
large liquidity shocks. To test these predictions, we estimate the model using a subsample of 
interbank loans composed only for those loans in which the borrower banks exhibited a 
deposits outflow, and then redefine the liquidity shock equal to 1 for those loans in which the 
borrower has a deposits outflow in t-1 greater than the mean deposits outflow observed in t-1 
(i.e. large shock) and zero for those interbank loans for which the deposits outflow of the 
borrower in t-1 was lower than the mean deposits outflow in t-1 (i.e. small shocks).  
Results are presented in Table 4.8. Columns (1) to (3) and (6) to (8) are the probability and 
price models using the baseline definition of liquidity shock and the full sample, while columns 
(4) to (5) and (9) to (10) are the results of the probability and price models using the sample 
with only interbank loans affected by deposits outflow, and the indicator variable of liquidity 
shock comparing between large and small liquidity shocks as defined above. We observe that 
banks that have a reciprocal lending relationship tend to have higher access to the interbank 
market (column 1) and that it also helps them to overcome the effect of idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks (column 2). In column (3), we identify that large banks and those with higher capital 
ratio benefit more from reciprocal lending during idiosyncratic liquidity shocks as they are 
associated to higher access to the interbank market. Results from the price models show that 
banks that rely more on reciprocal lending benefit from significant lower interbank prices 
(column 6), and that they also are able to cover—ceteris paribus—around 86% of the overprice 
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observed during idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (column 7). 36  Moreover, large and more 
capitalized banks benefit more from reciprocal lending during idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, 
albeit the effect is relatively small (0.005 and 0.002, respectively). The observed effects of the 
CB liquidity and the risk covariates remain as in our baseline models.   
We identify that banks affected by relatively large idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are more 
sensible to its capitalization level and to the market liquidity risk. Also those banks seem to 
depend less on reciprocal lending compared to banks affected by small liquidity shocks 
(columns 4 and 9). The higher sensitivity to market liquidity risk—in terms of both access and 
prices—may indicate that it can be more difficult for a bank suffering a large liquidity shock to 
find enough funds in the interbank market when there is higher uncertainty in the market (i.e. 
higher volatility in the excess of reserves across banks). Our interpretation of the result on the 
lower effect of lending reciprocity is that when banks need to cover large liquidity shocks they 
try to borrow from both known counterparts and spot lenders to diversify its exposition to its 
main lenders, as they have private information gained by repeated interaction in the interbank 
market. Note that the reduction in the spread for banks with reciprocal lending is only 65%, 
which is 21 percentage points lower compared to the baseline in column (7). Moreover, the fact 
that capitalization is associated to higher access to interbank liquidity— and to significant 
lower prices (column 10)—indicate that large shocks can affect more the weaker banks, and 
that public information on the borrower’ solvency has a crucial effect on the banks’ funding 
costs (Furfine, 2001; King, 2008). Indeed, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term 
Liquidity Shock*LR_reciprocal*Capital_ratio suggests that banks with higher capital ratios 
benefit more (i.e. higher access and lower prices) from their reciprocal relations when they are 
facing large liquidity shocks, compared to banks facing small shocks (columns 5 and 10). 
Overall, the results indicate that banks exhibiting large liquidity shocks are more penalized by 
their counterparts compared to those banks suffering small liquidity shocks, and that market 
characteristics and hard information becomes more relevant in determining the access and 
pricing of interbank liquidity under large liquidity shocks.  This confirms that large shocks can 
be more associated to public information on the banks’ behavior, while small shocks can be 
                                                        
36 The effect is computed as [-0.835 x (log(31) – log (1)] + [-0.321 x (log(31) – log (1)]=-3.970 bps. This value 
represents 86% of the spread associated to the idiosyncratic liquidity shock (i.e. 4.626 bps). 
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related to a rebalancing of deposits (across banks) or to the depositors’ liquidity needs (Freixas 
et al, 2011). 
In Table 4.9 we present the results of the role of lending reciprocity and bank heterogeneity 
during the US tapering in order to test whether reciprocal relationships might contribute to 
smooth the impact of aggregate liquidity shocks in the interbank market. In addition to this, we 
also test our results by using an alternative measure of the US tapering period. Figure 4.2 
shows that the interbank rate in Colombia reached a level above the central bank rate on May 
22 (in line with Bernanke’s testimony), and then exhibited higher volatility until mid-July when 
it reached again a level above the central bank policy rate (coinciding with prior expectations 
on the FOMC of July). The spread over the central bank rate remained until mid December, in 
line with the FOCM of December that informed the market on the size of the reduction in the 
QE37 (as documented by Aizenman et. al. 2014). This suggests that the uncertainty derived from 
the US tapering may have affected the interbank market in Colombia between May and 
December, but also that there are two different periods during the tapering: i) high volatility—
from May, 22 to July, 30—, and ii) high prices—from July, 31 to December, 18—.38 To account 
for these sub-periods under our analytical framework, we split the sample and redefine the US 
tapering variable. In particular, we use a first sample for the period March 26 to July 30, and 
then define the US Tapering variable as equal 1 during May 22 to July 30 (i.e. beginning of the 
tapering), and 0 during March 26 to May 21 (i.e. before the tapering). Then, we use a sample for 
the period May 22 to December 18—corresponding to the extended US tapering—, and define 
the US Tapering variable equal to 1 for the period July 31 to Dec 18 (i.e. high loan prices), and 0 
for the beginning of the tapering—May 22 to July 30—in which we observe higher uncertainty 
in the interbank market.  
In columns (1) to (3) and (8) to (10) we present the results of the probability and pricing 
models, respectively, using the baseline sample and the initial definition of the US tapering. We 
                                                        
37 Our definition of the tapering period follows Eichengreen and Gupta (2015) whose identify the beginning of the 
tapering in May 22, 2013 until September 17, 2013. Aizenman et. al, (2014) consider that the US tapering uncertainty 
began in March 20 (with the first announcement of Chair Bernanke to the Congress) and remained until December 
18, 2013, when the Fed decided at the FOMC meeting to taper the QE by $10 billion per month, to $75 billion. They 
also show that financial markets in emerging economies react to both FOMC statements and Fed officials’ 
communications. 
38 Figure 3 (panel b) confirms that there was an increased volatility on interbank’ loan volume between May and 
July and then a decline in the loan volume until December. 
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find that most of the estimated effects remain as in our baseline model. Banks that rely on 
lending reciprocity are found to have higher probability to access the interbank market (column 
1) and also benefit from lower prices (column 8). However, when we evaluate the effect of 
reciprocal lending during the US tapering we observe that the price reduction declined from 
92% in the baseline (column 9) to 79% in the sub-period of tapering uncertainty (column 11), 
and then to 64% in the sub-period of high prices (column 13). This result reflects not only the 
increased liquidity prices during the US tapering, but also could indicate that banks in need of 
liquidity were forced to trade with spot lenders at higher prices. We also observe that more 
capitalized banks were able to get funding at lower prices during the US tapering, and also 
during the sub-periods of increased uncertainty and high prices of the US tapering. The benefits 
of higher capitalization are also observed from borrowers that obtained funding from 
reciprocal lenders (column 14). Note that bank size is associated to lower prices during the US 
tapering (baseline) but then it is no longer significant during the sub-periods of US tapering 
uncertainty and high prices, and also when we interact it with reciprocal lending. This finding 
confirms that all banks—irrespective of its size—were affected by higher liquidity prices during 
the US tapering. Indeed, we observe a higher effect of the market liquidity risk during the sub-
periods of uncertainty and high prices compared to the baseline period. 
4.6. Final remarks  
This paper evaluates the impact of liquidity shocks on the behavior of banks participating in the 
interbank market. We study the impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks—associated to 
deposits outflow at the bank level—and of the aggregate liquidity shock derived from the US 
tapering—observed between May and September, 2013—on the access and pricing of 
interbank liquidity.  Our results indicate that both liquidity shocks are associated with higher 
interbank loan prices, albeit the magnitude of the overprice and the impact on the access to 
interbank liquidity differ depending on the borrower-specific characteristics. In particular, 
riskier banks are found to pay higher prices and to have less access to the market confirming 
evidence on market discipline. Moreover, we observe that these effects are stronger during 
exogenous liquidity shocks. One implication of our results is that higher capital and liquidity 
buffers can reduce short-term funding costs, and increase access to interbank market liquidity, 
allowing banks to absorb better the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks. Thus, recent 
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regulation—under the umbrella of Basel II and III—can contribute to mitigate the impact of 
exogenous liquidity shocks over short-term funding. 
Our findings on the impact of the U.S. tapering in the Colombian interbank market are 
consistent with the international credit channel in which domestic financial conditions are 
affected by the change in the U.S monetary policy via the role of the dollar as an international 
currency. We also identify that during aggregate liquidity shocks, the role of the central bank in 
alleviating liquidity strains throughout the interbank market becomes more relevant—as hard 
information seems to dominate soft information—while the benefits of lending relationships 
are significantly more important when banks face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Overall, our 
results point out that understanding the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks on the interbank 
market is crucial for identifying potential disruptions in the allocation of liquidity that could 
affect not only short-term funding, but also bank lending and monetary policy transmission.  
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Table 4.1. The impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks on the interbank market. 
 
 Interbank market conditions Liquidity shock = 0 Liquidity shock =1 Difference 
No of loans 35,56 41,24 -5,68*** 
Total volume of loans 532.240 603.340 -71.100*** 
Average amount of loans 11.635 14.723 -30.88*** 
Average spread of loans  0,03 0,07 -0,04*** 
Spread to CB rate 0,05 0,07 -0,02 
St. Dev of spreads of loans 0,05 0,06 -0,01 
No. of lending banks 22,12 23,45 -1,33 
No. of borrowing banks 17,71 21,35 -3,64*** 
 
Notes: This table presents mean comparison test for daily variables of the interbank market. Liquidity 
shock =1 corresponds to all interbank loans that involve a borrower bank suffering an idiosyncratic 
liquidity shock (i.e. a deposits outflow). Liquidity shock=0 is composed by the remaining loans in which 
the borrower does not face this liquidity shock. The test employs all loans observed between January 1, 
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Table 4.2. Banks’ size, idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and interbank market activity 
 
Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (Panel a) Small banks Large banks 
Difference between large 
and small banks 
Change in deposits (percent) 0,011 0,056 0,045*** 
Deposits outflow (percent) -0,137 -0,084 0,053*** 
Deposits outflow (No of days) 423 327 -96*** 
Interbank market activity  (Panel b)    
Spread (bps) 3,00 -1,50 -4,50*** 
Total amount borrowed (billion COP) 1,39 16,28 14,89*** 
Total amount lent (billion COP) 7,61 7,15 -0,47*** 
Net position 6,22 -9,13 -15,35*** 
Notes: This table presents mean comparison tests for selected variables of participating banks in the interbank 
market. Large (small) banks are those with assets value larger (lower) than the 66th (33th) percentile of the assets 
distribution during the period. In Panel A change in deposits is the daily mean change in the deposits of the bank (in 
percent). Deposits outflow is the mean value of the negative rate of change in deposits (percent), and the number of 
days a bank has a negative rate of change of deposits. Panel B has measures of interbank market activity. Spread is 
the difference between the interest rate paid by a bank in the interbank market and the CB rate measured in basis 
points (bps). Total amount borrowed and total amount lent in the interbank market per day in billion COP. Net 
position is the difference between the total amount lent and the total amount borrowed during a day in billion COP. 
*** p>0.01 
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Figure 4.1. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, banks’ size, and borrowing costs   
 
Panel (a) Distribution of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks by banks’ size 
 
 
Panel (b) Distribution of borrowing rates by banks’ size
 
Notes: Panel (a) presents the distribution of the rate of change of deposits by type of bank during the period 2011-
2014 assuming normal distributions. Panel (b) presents the distribution of the interest rates of overnight-unsecured 
loans in the interbank market during the period 2011-2014. In both figures large (small) banks are those with assets 
value larger (lower) than the 66th (33th) percentile of the assets distribution during the period. 
Large banks (data)   _____     
Small banks (data)   _____ 
Large banks (Fit_N) _____    
Small banks (Fit_N) ____ 
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Figure 4.2. The impact of the U.S. tapering in the Colombian interbank market 
 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the overnight interbank market rate (red line) and central bank rate (black line) in 
percentage (%) during the period March 26 and December 30, 2013. Average daily amount traded in the interbank 
market in billion COP (Right axis). Dotted lines correspond to the U.S. tapering announcements: Bernanke’s speech 











































Volume interbank rate central bank rate
Bernanke
FOMC (1) FOMC (2) FOMC (3)
Chapter 4: The Impact of Exogenous Liquidity Shocks on Banks’ Funding Costs:                  





Figure 4.3. Interbank market volatility during the U.S. tapering   
  








Notes: Panel (a) depicts the standard deviation of the overnight interbank market rate in percentage points. Panel 
(b) presents the daily volume of interbank loans (billion COP). Data is from the period March 26 and December 30, 
2013. Dotted lines correspond to the U.S. tapering period: May 22 to September 17, 2013. 
US Tapering
US Tapering
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Figure 4.4. Market liquidity and the U.S. tapering 
 




Panel (b) Volatility of banks’ reserve holdings 
   
 
 
Notes: Panel (a) shows the CB liquidity supply (i.e. size of the REPO auction on a daily basis in billion COP). Panel (b) 
depicts our measure of market liquidity risk defined as the standard deviation of the normalized excess reserves 
across banks (per day) in percentage points. Data is from the period March 26 and December 30, 2013. Dotted lines 
correspond to the U.S. tapering period: May 22 to September 17, 2013. 
US Tapering
US Tapering
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Table 4.3. The impact of the U.S. tapering in the Colombian interbank market 
 Interbank market conditions U.S Tapering =0 U.S Tapering =1 Difference 
No of loans 40,23 37,25 -2,98*** 
Total volume of loans 666,57 579,55 (87,02)*** 
Average amount of loans 12.356 10.503 (1.853)*** 
Average spread of loans 0,04 0,07 0,03*** 
Spread to CB rate -0,03 0,02 0,05*** 
Std of spreads of loans 0,04 0,14 0,10*** 
No. of lending banks 21,47 20,12 -1,35 
No. of borrowing banks 16,46 19,76 3,30*** 
      
Notes: This table presents mean comparison test for daily variables of the interbank market. U.S Tapering =1 corresponds 
to the loans granted during May 22 and September 17, 2013, while U.S Tapering =0 covers the loans granted between March 
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Table 4.4. The impact of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in the interbank market 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS parameter estimates of the Heckman two-stage procedure that corrects for sample 
selection bias. Panel A, columns (1) to (6), present the results of the selection models, where the dependent variable 
is the probability of a bank to borrow from the interbank market (zit =1). Panel B, columns (7) to (12) correspond to 
the second stage estimates of the interest rate models in which the spread to the CB rate (in bps) is employed as a 
dependent variable (i.e. the price of liquidity (pit)). Columns (3) to (6) and (9) to (12) incorporate the effects of our 
idiosyncratic liquidity shock (deposits outflow) in accessing and pricing funds in the interbank market, respectively. 
All models have borrower, borrower*lender and time fixed effects to control for unobservable effects at the 
borrower, borrower-lender and time levels. Time-variant lender controls are included in columns (4) to (6) and (10) 
to (12).  Columns (6) and (12) include lender*time fixed effects. We cluster robust standard errors at the borrower 
bank level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Liquidity Shockit-1 0,181 0,162 0,131 0,119 5,135 5,356 5,267 4,872
                     (5,87)***                     (5,60)***                  (5,81)***                   (5,23)***                      (5,30)***                     (5,29)***                   (5,91)***                   (6,18)***
Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,130 0,139 0,121 0,135 0,122 0,127 -0,110 -0,108 -0,112 -0,117 -0,116 -0,123
                     (4,06)***                     (4,02)***                     (3,76)***                     (4,04)***                  (3,55)***                   (3,42)***                     (-3,12)***                    (-3,23)***                     (-2,81)**                     (-2,74)**                     (-3,12)***                   (-3,31)***
Capital ratioit (percent) 0,051 0,064 0,052 0,057 0,053 0,056 -0,069 -0,071 -0,064 -0,074 -0,061 -0,047
                     (3,21)***                     (3,11)***                     (3,02)***                     (3,42)***                  (3,46)***                   (3,34)***                     (-1,79)*                   (2,46)**                    (2,31)**                     (2,53)**                   (2,27)**                   (2,09)**
Nplit (percent) -0,091 -0,082 -0,095 -0,079 -0,084 -0,079 0,052 0,051 0,054 0,059 0,063 0,071
                     (-1,86)**                     (-1,81)**                     (-1,76)*                   (-2,09)**                  (-2,15)**                   (-1,48)**                     (2,46)**                    (2,59)**                    (2,61)**                     (2,16)**                   (2,19)**                   (2,38)**
Liquidity_riskit (percent) 0,063 0,061 0,072 0,069 0,073 0,031 0,037 0,047 0,034 0,027
                     (2,19)**                     (2,11)**                     (2,08)**                  (2,16)**                   (2,20)**                      (3,19)***                     (3,25)***                     (4,04)***                   (3,17)***                   (3,40)***
Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,027 -0,038 -0,017 -0,024 -0,019 0,065 0,071 0,061 0,072 0,064
                     (-1,87)**                     (-1,82)**                     (-1,79)*                  (-1,83)*                   (-1,75)*                      (3,87)***                     (3,91)***                     (3,23)***                     (2,28)**                   (2,53)**
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,005 0,007 -0,019 -0,017
                     (1,67)*                     (1,42)*                      (-1,91)*                     (-1,93)*
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Capital ratioit (percent) 0,061 0,057 -0,004 -0,007
                     (2,47)**                     (2,41)**                      (-1,19)                     (-1,27)
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Nplit (percent) -0,016 -0,018 -0,011 -0,007 0,012 0,011 0,007 0,014
                     (-1,19)                     (-1,22)                  (-1,16)                   (-1,19)                      (2,19)**                     (2,34)**                   (2,33)**                   (2,75)**
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Liquidity_riskit (percent) -0,011 -0,008 -0,015 0,008 0,013 0,012
                     (-1,08)*                  (-1,05)*                   (-1,14)*                      (3,19)***                   (3,73)***                   (3,30)***
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,008 -0,009 -0,012 0,011 0,008 0,009
                     (-1,95)**                  (-2,11)**                   (-2,26)**                      (2,95)***                     (2,70)**                     (1,89)*
Smallit * nplit (percent) -0,046 -0,053 0,025 0,029
                     (-2,55)**                   (-2,38)**                      (2,71)**                   (2,63)**
Smallit * Liquidity_riskit (percent) 0,004 0,003 0,009 0,011
                     (1,47)**                   (1,23)**                      (2,34)**                   (2,80)**
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Smallit -0,033 -0,041 0,126 0,119
                     (-4,11)***                   (-3,34)***                      (2,75)***                   (3,14)***
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Smallit * nplit (percent) -0,018 -0,007 0,071 0,073
                     (-1,34)                   (-1,28)                      (1,09)**                   (1,13)**
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Smallit * Liquidity_riskit (percent) -0,003 -0,005 0,033 0,028
                     (-1,23)                   (-1,25)                      (2,16)**                   (2,32)**
RLijt 0,048 0,051 0,049 0,041 0,042 0,045 -1,181 -1,192 -1,167 -0,948 -0,874 -0,852
          (7,59)***          (6,21)***          (7,04)***          (6,82)***          (6,70)***          (5,28)***           (-5,59)***          (-5,10)***          (-4,38)***          (-4,19)***          (-3,31)***          (-3,62)***
Liquidity Shockit-1 * RLijt 0,008 0,012 0,013 0,017 -0,411 -0,372 -0,331 -0,262
          (2,59)***          (2,86)***          (3,17)***          (3,41)***           (-3,84)***          (-3,18)***          (-2,97)***          (-3,21)***
CB Liq_supplyt  [ln (mln)] 0,012 0,015 0,022 0,018 0,015 0,011 -0,038 -0,027 -0,021 -0,022 -0,027 -0,033
       (1,28)*        (1,25)*        (1,18)*        (1,09)*       (1,43)*       (1,23)*        (-1,72)*       (-1,84)*       (-2,03)**        (-2,19)**       (-2,35)**       (-1,78)*
Liquidity Shockit-1 * CB Liq_supplyt [ln (mln)] 0,004 0,005 0,006 0,003 -0,008 -0,004 -0,006 -0,003
       (1,25)**       (1,33)**       (1,23)**       (1,15)**        (-1,25)*        (-1,76)*       (-0,97)*       (-1,06)*
Inv_Mills ratioit -4,254 -3,741 -4,073 -4,742 -3,893 -3,846
          (-4,17)***          (-4,51)***          (-4,28)***          (-3,97)***          (-3,75)***          (-4,11)***
Excess_reserves it (percent) -0,118 -0,129 -0,134 -0,125 -0,128 -0,133
                     (-5,06)***                     (-5,47)***                     (-4,77)***                     (-5,19)***                  (-5,72)***                   (-4,83)***
Observations 813150 813150 813150 813150 813150 813150 27105 27105 27105 27105 27105 27105
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower*Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant Lender controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Lender*Time FE No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Variables
Panel A: Probability to access the market: P (zit =1) Panel B: Pricing Models: Spread it
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Table 4.5. The impact of the U.S. tapering in the interbank market 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
US taperingt 0,052 0,047 0,043 0,052 3,021 3,945 4,317 3,724
                     (3,51)***                     (3,22)***                     (3,45)***                     (3,65)***                      (4,21)***                     (4,75)***                     (4,23)***                     (4,15)***
Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,091 0,108 0,103 0,108 0,175 0,168 -0,095 -0,087 -0,092 -0,077 -0,084 -0,073
                     (3,24)***                     (3,12)***                     (2,98)***                     (3,05)***                     (3,14)***                     (3,13)***                     (-3,04)***                     (-2,88)***                     (-2,91)**                     (-2,94)**                     (-2,69)**                     (-3,12)**
Capital ratioit (percent) 0,048 0,051 0,047 0,041 0,047 0,051 -0,065 -0,079 -0,071 -0,064 -0,071 -0,068
                     (3,15)***                     (3,18)***                     (3,06)***                     (2,84)***                     (2,97)***                     (3,14)***                     (-2,65)**                     (2,71)**                     (3,14)***                     (3,31)***                     (3,21)***                     (3,21)***
Nplit (percent) -0,084 -0,087 -0,072 -0,075 -0,083 -0,075 0,058 0,061 0,047 0,053 0,047 0,043
                     (-2,14)**                     (-2,21)**                     (-2,16)**                     (-2,14)**                     (-2,2)**                   (-1,90)**                     (2,27)**                     (2,61)**                     (2,77)**                     (2,35)**                     (2,38)**                     (1,72)*
Liquidity_riskit (percent) 0,053 0,035 0,033 0,023 0,037 0,028 0,033 0,041 0,039 0,035
                     (2,54)**                     (2,17)**                     (2,17)**                     (2,12)**                     (2,63)**                      (3,06)***                     (3,10)***                     (3,28)***                     (2,82)***                     (2,34)***
Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,039 -0,047 -0,053 -0,045 -0,041 0,055 0,058 0,064 0,058 0,061
                     (-2,13)**                     (-2,74)**                  (-2,86)***                     (-3,32)***                     (-2,24)**                      (2,42)**                     (2,85)**                     (2,17)**                     (2,31)**                     (2,39)**
US taperingt * Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,012 0,013 -0,019 -0,013
                     (1,24)**                     (1,11)**                      (-1,91)*                     (-1,82)*
US taperingt * Capital ratioit (percent) 0,082 0,081 -0,015 -0,013
                     (3,30)***                     (3,38)***                      (-3,04)***                     (-3,42)***
US taperingt * Nplit (percent) -0,012 -0,009 -0,011 -0,012 0,016 0,025 0,029 0,021
                     (-1,04)                     (-1,20)                     (-1,33)                     (-1,22)                      (1,24)**                     (1,32)**                     (1,07)**                     (1,16)**
US taperingt * Liquidity_riskit (percent) -0,016 -0,014 -0,011 0,013 0,011 0,013
                     (-3,12)***                     (-2,83)**                  (-3,34)***                      (2,19)*                     (2,05)*                     (2,36)**
US taperingt * Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,012 -0,013 -0,009 0,024 0,017 0,014
                     (-2,73)**                     (-2,75)**                     (-2,52)**                      (3,17)***                     (3,04)***                     (3,41)***
Smallit * nplit (percent) -0,034 -0,025 0,017 0,012
                     (-1,62)*                     (-1,25)*                      (1,05)*                     (1,08)*
Smallit * Liquidity_riskit (percent) -0,008 -0,007 0,011 0,013
                     (3,55)***                     (2,73)**                      (3,46)***                     (3,21)***
US taperingt * Smallit -0,007 -0,005 0,139 0,134
                     (-2,11)**                     (-2,51)**                      (2,08)**                     (2,29)**
US taperingt * Smallit * nplit (percent) -0,011 -0,014 0,013 0,016
                     (-1,38)**                     (-1,27)**                      (1,24)*                     (1,22)*
US taperingt * Smallit * Liquidity_riskit (percent) -0,002 -0,001 0,019 0,017
                     (-3,22)***                     (-2,76)**                      (2,31)**                     (2,42)**
RLijt 0,041 0,041 0,044 0,049 0,038 0,042 -1,123 -1,054 -1,075 -0,876 -0,821 -0,723
          (7,20)***          (7,54)***          (8,10)***          (8,71)***          (8,11)***          (8,07)***          (-5,94)***          (-5,75)***          (-5,07)***          (-4,81)***          (-4,22)***          (-4,54)***
US taperingt * RLijt 0,014 0,009 0,017 0,013 -0,225 -0,198 -0,212 -0,248
          (1,05)*          (0,90)*          (0,85)*          (1,11)*           (-3,92)***          (-3,74)***          (-3,63)***          (-3,37)***
CB_Liq_supplyt  [ln (mln)] 0,014 0,011 0,017 0,016 0,011 0,014 -0,057 -0,061 -0,053 -0,067 -0,072 -0,063
       (1,48)*        (1,50)*       (0,98)**       (1,08)**       (1,12)**       (1,06)**        (-3,73)***       (-3,80)***       (-3,86)***       (-3,56)***        (-3,19)***        (-3,89)***
US taperingt * CB_Liq_supplyt [ln (mln)] 0,009 0,011 0,008 0,01 -0,011 -0,015 -0,011 -0,015
       (2,15)**       (2,33)**       (2,27)**       (3,28)***        (-4,21)***       (-3,61)***        (-4,26)***        (-4,71)***
Inv_Mills ratioit -3,478 -3,657 -3,986 -3,341 -3,623 -3,734
          (-3,17)***          (-2,50)**          (-2,34)**          (-2,35)**          (-3,30)***          (-4,12)***
Excess_reserves it (percent) -0,101 -0,112 -0,121 -0,124 -0,114 -0,117
                     (-4,91)***                     (-4,82)***                     (-4,29)***                     (-4,83)***                     (-4,19)***                     (-4,37)***
Observations 102060 102060 102060 102060 102060 102060 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant Lender controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Lender*Time FE No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Variables
Panel A: Probability to access the market: P (zit =1) Panel B: Pricing Models: Spread it
Notes: This table presents OLS parameter estimates of the Heckman two-stage procedure that corrects for sample selection bias. Panel A, 
columns (1) to (6), present the results of the selection models, where the dependent variable is the probability of a bank to borrow from 
the interbank market (zit =1). Panel B, columns (7) to (12) correspond to the second stage estimates of the interest rate models in which 
the spread to the CB rate (in bps) is employed as a dependent variable (i.e. the price of liquidity (pit)). Columns (3) to (6) and (9) to (12) 
incorporate the effects of our aggregate liquidity shock (US tapering) in accessing and pricing funds in the interbank market, respectively. 
All models have borrower, borrower*lender and time fixed effects to control for unobservable effects at the borrower, borrower-lender 
and time levels. Time-variant lender controls are included in columns (4) to (6) and (10) to (12). Columns (6) and (12) include lender*time 
fixed effects. We cluster robust standard errors at the borrower bank level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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             Table 4.6. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks: Bank’s stability, secured funding and 
lending concentration 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Liquidity Shockit-1 0,169 0,168 0,132 0,141 4,854 4,572 4,624 4,837
                     (4,58)***                     (4,25)***                     (4,21)***                     (3,95)***                      (5,19)***                     (5,12)***                   (5,35)***                     (5,12)***
Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,131 0,124 0,127 0,135 0,128 0,138 -0,146 -0,127 -0,108 -0,135 -0,127 -0,130
                     (3,25)***                     (3,78)***                     (3,84)***                     (3,28)***                     (3,16)***                     (3,22)***                     (-3,62)***                    (-3,47)***                     (-3,09)**                     (-3,28)**                (-3,39)***                     (-3,45)***
z-scoreit (percent) 0,062 0,054 0,058 0,065 0,074 0,071 -0,032 -0,028 -0,019 -0,022 -0,017 -0,019
                     (2,71)**                     (2,45)**                     (2,14)**                     (2,61)**                     (1,96)**                     (1,89)*                     (-2,25)**                     (2,13)**                     (2,26)**                     (2,78)***                   (3,19)***                     (2,94)***
Nplit (percent) -0,091 -0,086 -0,082 -0,071 -0,081 -0,075 0,047 0,055 0,062 0,058 0,052 0,047
                     (-2,10)**                     (-1,91)**                     (-1,79)*                   (-2,29)**                     (-2,21)**                     (-2,17)**                     (2,18)**                    (2,33)**                     (2,08)**                     (2,32)**                   (2,28)**                     (2,53)**
Liquidity_ratioit (percent) 0,049 0,069 0,075 0,072 0,062 -0,026 -0,031 -0,023 -0,025 -0,027
                     (1,15)**                     (1,06)**                     (1,34)**                     (1,31)**                     (1,28)**                      (-2,17)**                    (-2,29)**                     (-2,40)**                     (-1,82)*                     (-2,24)**
Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,013 -0,017 -0,029 -0,023 -0,019 0,058 0,063 0,053 0,061 0,064
                     (-2,05)**                     (-1,96)**                     (-2,27)**                     (-1,83)*                    (-1,93)**                      (3,01)***                    (3,24)***                     (3,18)***                     (2,52)**                     (2,30)**
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,013 0,011 -0,015 -0,012
                     (1,26)*                     (1,48)*                      (-1,73)*                     (-1,82)*
Liquidity Shockit-1 * z-scoreit (percent) 0,011 0,026 -0,007 -0,011
                     (1,40)**                     (1,12)**                      (-2,04)**                     (-2,21)**
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Nplit (percent) -0,014 -0,017 -0,015 -0,013 0,008 0,006 0,007 0,003
                     (-1,12)                     (-1,29)                     (-1,26)                     (-1,24)                      (1,84)*                     (1,98)**                   (2,11)**                     (1,81)*
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Liquidity_ratioit 
(percent)
0,015 0,011 0,009 -0,006 -0,005 -0,007
                     (2,65)**                     (2,45)**                     (2,38)**                      (-2,52)**                   (-2,32)**                     (-2,44)**
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,008 -0,007 -0,004 0,014 0,013 0,011
                     (-2,28)**                     (-2,53)**                     (-2,50)**                      (2,12)*                (2,27)**                     (1,94)**
BPIijt 0,035 0,035 0,031 0,041 0,038 0,028 -1,026 -1,058 -1,112 -1,082 -1,043 -0,973
          (4,96)***          (5,15)***          (5,74)***          (6,35)***          (5,16)***          (5,19)***          (-3,90)***          (-4,06)***          (-4,25)***          (-3,81)***          (-3,74)***          (-4,23)***
Liquidity Shockit-1 * BPIijt 0,016 0,015 0,017 0,015 -0,206 -0,218 -0,236 -0,274
          (3,51)***          (3,37)***          (5,03)***          (4,26)***           (-3,25)***          (-3,25)***          (-2,97)***          (-3,15)***
Borrowing securedit 0,012 0,018 0,013 0,023 0,019 0,022 -0,017 -0,011 -0,019 -0,024 -0,019 -0,015
       (1,21)*        (1,07)*        (1,78)*        (1,39)*        (1,29)*        (1,29)*        (-1,25)*       (-1,14)*       (-0,96)*        (-1,14)*       (-1,34)*        (-1,05)*
Liquidity Shockit-1 * Borrowing securedit 0,004 0,008 0,004 0,005 -0,003 -0,004 -0,006 -0,007
       (1,75)*        (1,87)*        (1,42)**        (1,28)**        (-2,20)**        (-2,33)**       (-2,15)*        (-2,26)**
CB_Liq_supplyt  [ln (mln)] 0,015 0,011 0,019 0,014 0,011 0,013 -0,024 -0,031 -0,029 -0,032 -0,024 -0,028
       (1,30)*        (1,14)*        (1,22)*        (1,22)*        (1,33)*        (1,16)*        (-2,47)**       (-2,26)**       (-2,19)**        (-2,94)***       (-2,25)**        (-1,92)**
Liquidity Shockit-1 * CB Liq_supplyt [ln
(mln)]
0,007 0,008 0,003 0,004 -0,011 -0,009 -0,011 -0,013
       (1,07)**       (1,22)**        (1,19)**        (1,18)**        (-1,15)*        (-1,23)*       (-1,03)*        (-1,27)*
Inv_Mills ratioit -6,135 -5,846 -5,024 -5,127 -4,573 -5,316
          (-3,75)***          (-3,97)***          (-4,02)***          (-4,48)***          (-4,28)***          (-4,02)***
Excess_reserves it (percent) -0,205 -0,237 -0,216 -0,263 -0,249 -0,234
                     (-6,21)***                     (-5,36)***                     (-5,54)***                     (-5,72)***                     (-6,03)***                     (-6,29)***
Observations 813150 813150 813150 813150 813150 813150 27105 27105 27105 27105 27105 27105
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant Lender controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Lender*Time FE No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Variables
Panel B: Pricing Models: Spread itPanel A: Probability to access the market: P (zit =1)
Notes: This table presents OLS parameter estimates of the Heckman two-stage procedure that corrects for sample selection bias. 
Panel A, columns (1) to (6), present the results of the selection models, where the dependent variable is the probability of a bank 
to borrow from the interbank market (zit =1). Panel B, columns (7) to (12) correspond to the second stage estimates of the interest 
rate models in which the spread to the CB rate (in bps) is employed as a dependent variable (i.e. the price of liquidity (pit)). Columns 
(3) to (6) and (9) to (12) incorporate the effects of our idiosyncratic liquidity shock (deposits outflow) in accessing and pricing 
funds in the interbank market, respectively. All models have borrower, borrower*lender and time fixed effects to control for 
unobservable effects at the borrower, borrower-lender and time levels. Time-variant lender controls are included in columns (4) to 
(6) and (10) to (12). Columns (6) and (12) include lender*time fixed effects. We cluster robust standard errors at the borrower bank 
level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
US taperingt 0,063 0,058 0,042 0,051 3,104 3,373 3,296 2,652
                     (3,28)***                     (3,53)***                     (3,63)***                     (3,37)***                      (5,14)***                     (5,28)***                     (5,72)***                     (5,70)***
Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,086 0,097 0,101 0,119 0,122 0,117 -0,079 -0,086 -0,094 -0,075 -0,068 -0,075
                     (3,45)***                     (3,29)***                     (3,08)***                     (3,21)***                     (3,15)***                     (3,21)***                     (-3,41)***                     (-3,07)***                     (-2,87)***                     (-2,73)***                     (-3,21)**                     (-3,41)**
z-scoreit (percent) 0,051 0,043 0,040 0,053 0,059 0,046 -0,065 -0,079 -0,071 -0,072 -0,061 -0,051
                     (2,26)**                     (2,14)**                     (2,18)**                     (2,22)**                     (2,13)**                     (2,03)**                     (-2,65)**                     (2,71)**                     (2,14)**                     (2,35)**                     (1,77)*                     (2,23)**
Nplit (percent) -0,077 -0,081 -0,075 -0,071 -0,079 -0,076 0,055 0,057 0,039 0,044 0,053 0,043
                     (-2,26)**                     (-2,18)**                     (-2,34)**                     (-2,27)**                     (-2,19)**                     (-1,87)*                     (2,31)**                     (2,41)**                     (2,30)**                     (2,56)***                     (2,49)**                     (2,21)**
Liquidity_ratioit (percent) 0,042 0,046 0,039 0,037 0,021 -0,018 -0,012 -0,014 -0,007 -0,018
                     (1,26)**                     (1,18)**                     (1,30)**                     (1,18)**                     (1,19)**                      (-2,06)**                     (-2,19)**                     (-1,93)*                     (-2,15)**                     (-1,83)*
Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,032 -0,041 -0,051 -0,043 -0,053 0,046 0,051 0,055 0,059 0,068
                     (-2,28)**                     (-2,19)**                     (-2,12)**                     (-2,21)**                     (-2,31)**                      (3,28)***                     (3,41)***                     (3,25)***                     (3,17)***                     (3,54)***
US taperingt * Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,016 0,019 -0,015 -0,013
                     (1,04)**                     (1,18)**                      (-1,74)*                     (-1,37)
US taperingt * z-scoreit (percent) 0,017 0,009 -0,015 -0,018
                     (2,77)**                     (2,36)**                      (-2,04)**                     (-2,31)**
US taperingt * Nplit (percent) -0,018 -0,015 -0,013 -0,011 0,019 0,021 0,018 0,022
                     (-1,10)                     (-1,19)                     (-1,26)                     (-0,99)                      (2,30)**                     (1,92)*                     (2,29)** -1,62
US taperingt * Liquidity_ratioit (percent) -0,017 -0,021 -0,014 -0,012 -0,008 -0,013
                     (-1,08)                     (-1,32)                     (-1,28)                      (-2,47)***                     (-2,33)**                     (-2,19)**
US taperingt * Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,019 -0,013 -0,015 0,018 0,015 0,022
                     (-3,25)***                     (-3,21)***                     (-3,38)***                      (2,32)**                     (3,11)***                     (3,18)***
BPIijt 0,051 0,047 0,039 0,034 0,328 0,342 -1,021 -1,014 -1,072 -1,032 -1,003 -1,012
          (6,90)***          (7,33)***          (7,03)***          (6,27)***          (7,17)***          (6,27)***          (-3,72)***          (-4,18)***          (-4,20)***          (-3,43)***          (-3,35)***          (-3,82)***
US taperingt * BPIijt 0,011 0,014 0,015 0,013 -0,053 -0,061 -0,081 -0,054
          (1,86)*          (1,77)*          (2,28)**          (2,26)**           (-1,62)*          (-1,25)*           (-1,37)*           (-1,35)*
Borrowing securedit 0,017 0,012 0,013 0,018 0,023 0,017 -0,013 -0,012 -0,018 -0,015 -0,012 -0,007
       (1,12)*        (1,04)*        (1,16)*        (1,25)*        (0,97)*        (1,22)*        (-0,95)*        (-0,84)*        (-0,77)*        (-0,88)*        (-1,08)*        (-0,72)*
US taperingt * Borrowing securedit 0,004 0,008 0,003 0,008 -0,006 -0,008 -0,005 -0,004
       (1,98)**       (2,17)**       (2,35)**       (2,38)**        (-1,20)*        (-1,26)*        (-1,22)*        (-0,82)*
CB_Liq_supplyt  [ln (mln)] 0,011 0,018 0,012 0,011 0,015 0,019 -0,062 -0,057 -0,049 -0,061 -0,053 -0,055
       (1,23)*        (1,08)*        (0,91)*        (1,21)*        (1,25)*        (1,02)*        (-3,21)***       (-3,42)***       (-3,24)***       (-3,35)***        (-3,33)***        (-3,29)***
US taperingt * CB_Liq_supplyt [ln (mln)] 0,009 0,007 0,007 0,008 -0,019 -0,022 -0,019 -0,017
       (2,15)**       (2,25)**       (2,18)**        (1,87)*        (-5,06)***       (-4,24)***        (-4,87)***        (-4,21)***
Inv_Mills ratioit -2,856 -3,162 -3,436 -2,834 -3,064 -2,922
          (-3,28)***          (-3,19)***          (-2,46)**          (-3,12)***          (-3,42)***          (-3,50)***
Excess_reserves it (percent) -0,114 -0,109 -0,118 -0,122 -0,111 -0,115
                     (-4,02)***                     (-4,23)***                     (-3,74)***                     (-3,92)***                     (-3,74)***                     (-3,82)***
Observations 102060 102060 102060 102060 102060 102060 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant Lender controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Lender*Time FE No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Variables
Panel A: Probability to access the market: P (zit =1) Panel B: Pricing Models: Spread it
Notes: This table presents OLS parameter estimates of the Heckman two-stage procedure that corrects for sample selection 
bias. Panel A, columns (1) to (6), present the results of the selection models, where the dependent variable is the probability 
of a bank to borrow from the interbank market (zit =1). Panel B, columns (7) to (12) correspond to the second stage 
estimates of the interest rate models in which the spread to the CB rate (in bps) is employed as a dependent variable (i.e. 
the price of liquidity (pit)). Columns (3) to (6) and (9) to (12) incorporate the effects of our aggregate liquidity shock (US 
tapering) in accessing and pricing funds in the interbank market, respectively. All models have borrower, borrower*lender 
and time fixed effects to control for unobservable effects at the borrower, borrower-lender and time levels. Time-variant 
lender controls are included in columns (4) to (6) and (10) to (12). Columns (6) and (12) include lender*time fixed effects. 
We cluster robust standard errors at the borrower bank level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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      Table 4.8. Idiosyncratic liquidity shocks: lending reciprocity and bank heterogeneity 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Liquidity Shockit 0,142 0,134 0,072 0,063 4,626 4,122 3,876 3,542
                     (4,71)***                     (4,95)***                     (5,37)***                     (5,02)***                      (4,19)***                     (4,43)***                     (4,89)***                     (5,02)***
Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,132 0,138 0,126 0,084 0,076 -0,122 -0,128 -0,115 -0,352 -0,217
                     (3,81)***                     (3,17)***                     (3,26)***                     (4,23)***                     (3,28)***                     (-3,25)***                     (-3,18)**                     (-3,35)***                     (-2,84)**                     (-2,25)**
Capital ratioit (percent) 0,051 0,057 0,064 0,035 0,029 -0,031 -0,025 -0,019 -0,027 -0,032
                     (2,37)**                     (2,61)**                     (2,03)*                    (3,23)***                     (3,12)***                     (2,17)**                     (2,42)***                     (2,56)***                     (3,11)***                     (3,04)***
Liquidity_riskit (percent) 0,056 0,061 0,068 0,028 0,024 -0,021 -0,025 -0,029 -0,009 -0,011
                     (1,09)**                     (1,12)**                     (1,03)**                     (1,04)*                     (1,18)*                     (-2,34)**                     (-2,19)**                     (-2,03)**                     (-2,01)*                     (-2,32)**
Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,017 -0,021 -0,023 -0,011 -0,005 0,047 0,049 0,038 0,063 0,075
                     (-2,11)**                     (-2,19)**                     (-1,88)*                     (-1,74)*                     (-1,61)*                     (3,11)***                     (3,19)***                     (2,63)**                     (3,28)***                     (2,25)**
LR_reciprocalijt 0,064 0,058 0,045 0,023 0,019 -0,812 -0,835 -0,843 -0,551 -0,487
          (3,57)***          (4,28)***          (4,01)***          (3,15)***          (3,24)***          (-4,08)***          (-3,51)***          (-3,73)***          (-4,84)***          (-4,24)***
Liquidity Shockit * LR_reciprocalijt 0,021 0,019 0,009 0,004 -0,321 -0,287 -0,173 -0,194
          (3,40)***          (3,91)***          (3,04)***           (2,72)**           (-3,18)***          (-2,79)**          (-3,28)***          (-3,17)***
Liquidity Shockit * Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,011 0,008 0,011 0,009 -0,014 -0,012 -0,015 -0,015
                     (1,31)*                     (1,39)*                     (1,42)*                     (1,26)*                      (-1,94)*                     (-2,01)*                     (-1,98)*                     (-1,98)*
Liquidity Shockit * Capital_ratioit (percent) 0,048 0,052 0,018 0,022 -0,005 -0,003 -0,011 -0,013
                     (2,11)**                     (2,16)**                     (2,71)**                     (2,56)**                      (-1,17)*                     (-1,25)*                     (-2,78)**                     (-3,03)***
Liquidity Shockit * Liquidity_riskit (percent) 0,011 0,006 -0,003 -0,001 0,005 0,003 0,007 0,011
                     (2,58)**                     (2,31)**                     (-1,18)*                     (-1,12)*                      (2,13)**                     (2,22)**                     (3,14)***                     (3,78)***
Liquidity Shockit * LR_reciprocalijt *Size it 0,007 0,004 -0,005 -0,004
                     (2,02)*                      (2,23)**                      (-2,05)**                      (-2,25)**
Liquidity Shockit * LR_reciprocalijt *Capital_ratioit 0,014 0,008 -0,004 -0,006
                     (3,32)***                      (2,47)**                      (-2,51)**                      (-3,21)***
Liquidity Shockit * LR_reciprocalijt *Liquidity_riskit 0,009 0,002 -0,007 -0,005
                     (1,21)**                      (1,04)**                      (-1,03)**                      (-1,14)**
CB_Liq_supplyt  [ln (mln)] 0,013 0,015 0,011 0,013 0,011 -0,024 -0,029 -0,021 -0,024 -0,028
       (1,23)*        (1,17)*        (1,27)*        (1,12)*        (1,37)*        (-2,32)**        (-2,25)**        (-2,28)**        (-2,17)**        (-2,31)**
Liquidity Shockit * CB Liq_supplyt [ln (mln)] 0,011 0,008 0,005 0,003 -0,005 -0,002 -0,005 -0,001
       (1,03)**        (1,09)**        (1,28)**        (1,15)**        (-1,19)*        (-1,14)*        (-1,25)*        (-0,98)*
Inv_Mills ratioit -5,657 -5,326 -4,745
          (-3,71)***          (-3,62)***          (-3,58)***
Excess_reserves it (percent) -0,282 -0,234 -0,216 -0,129 -0,118 -4,723 -4,135
                     (-5,12)***                     (-5,61)***                     (-5,72)***                     (-5,36)***                     (-5,24)***           (-4,82)***          (-4,30)***
Observations 813150 813150 813150 530315 530315 27105 27105 27105 17677 17677
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant Lender controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 Variables
Panel A: Probability to access the market: P (zit =1) Panel B: Pricing Models: Spread it
Baseline Large Shocks Baseline Large Shocks
Notes: This table presents OLS parameter estimates of the Heckman two-stage procedure that corrects for sample selection 
bias. Panel A, columns (1) to (6), present the results of the selection models, where the dependent variable is the probability 
of a bank to borrow from the interbank market (zit =1). Panel B, columns (7) to (12) correspond to the second stage 
estimates of the interest rate models in which the spread to the CB rate (in bps) is employed as a dependent variable (i.e. 
the price of liquidity (pit)). Columns (1) to (3) and (6) to (8) are the probability and price models using the baseline 
definition of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and the full sample, while columns (4) to (5) and (9) to (10) are the results of 
the probability and price models, respectively, but using the sample with only interbank loans affected by deposits outflow, 
and the indicator variable of liquidity shock comparing between large and small liquidity shocks. All models have borrower, 
borrower*lender, lender*time, and time fixed effects, in addition to time-variant lender controls. We cluster robust standard 
errors at the borrower bank level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
US taperingt 0,047 0,051 0,049 0,037 0,022 0,019 4,012 3,824 4,273 4,149 5,028 5,141
                     (3,13)***                     (3,22)***                     (3,18)***                     (3,25)***                     (3,18)***                     (3,23)***                      (5,17)***                     (5,20)***                     (4,73)***                     (4,81)***                     (5,26)***                     (5,37)***
Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,102 0,108 0,114 0,109 0,117 0,087 0,092 -0,081 -0,075 -0,072 -0,078 -0,067 -0,074 -0,055
                     (3,12)***                     (3,22)***                     (3,04)***                     (3,45)***                     (3,28)***                     (3,04)***                     (3,11)***                     (-3,14)***                     (-2,97)**                     (-2,84)**                     (-2,73)**                     (-3,26)***                     (-2,71)**                     (-2,82)**
Capital ratioit (percent) 0,045 0,051 0,057 0,062 0,058 0,063 0,067 -0,068 -0,063 -0,063 -0,078 -0,063 -0,055 -0,061
                     (2,31)**                     (2,23)**                     (2,18)**                     (2,31)**                     (2,19)**                     (2,35)**                     (2,28)**                     (2,17)**                     (2,53)***                     (2,30)**                     (2,28)**                     (2,35)**                     (2,14)**                     (2,28)**
Liquidity_riskit (percent) 0,036 0,029 0,031 0,023 0,021 0,019 0,024 0,023 0,017 0,021 0,024 0,031 0,033 0,029
                     (1,45)**                     (1,39)**                     (1,27)**                     (1,42)**                     (1,25)**                     (1,26)**                     (1,14)**                     (2,13)**                     (2,05)**                     (2,11)**                     (2,34)**                     (2,19)**                     (2,75)***                     (2,28)**
Market Liq_riskt (percent) -0,038 -0,032 -0,041 -0,039 -0,043 -0,055 -0,061 0,046 0,039 0,042 0,049 0,043 0,052 0,056
                     (-2,26)**                     (-1,94)*                  (-2,03)**                     (-2,16)**                     (-2,12)**                     (-2,24)**                     (-2,31)**                     (3,24)***                     (3,45)***                     (3,27)***                     (3,30)***                     (3,18)***                     (3,64)***                     (3,19)***
LR_reciprocalijt 0,058 0,049 0,056 0,052 0,042 0,036 0,039 -1,054 -1,026 -0,921 -0,935 -0,894 -0,902 -0,863
          (5,28)***          (5,67)***          (6,02)***          (5,72)***          (6,20)***          (6,40)***          (5,82)***          (-4,15)***          (-3,72)***          (-3,45)***          (-3,52)***          (-3,28)***          (-3,17)***          (-3,36)***
US taperingt * LR_reciprocalijt 0,012 0,015 0,013 0,014 0,012 0,015 -0,052 -0,059 -0,045 -0,051 -0,042 -0,039
          (2,11)*          (2,08)**          (2,26)**          (2,31)**          (2,23)**          (2,22)**           (2,11)*           (2,19)**           (2,28)**          (2,31)**          (2,21)**                     (-2,19)**
US taperingt * Sizeit [Log of assets (mln)] 0,021 0,018 0,024 0,019 0,018 0,014 -0,014 -0,012 -0,018 -0,021 -0,017 -0,014
                     (1,15)**                     (1,23)**                     (1,17)**                     (1,04)**                     (1,29)**                     (1,47)**                      (-2,02)*                     (-1,95)*                     (-1,53)                     (-1,48)                     (-1,55)                     (-1,60)
US taperingt * Capital_ratioit (percent) 0,077 0,072 0,083 0,086 0,089 0,084 -0,017 -0,013 -0,018 -0,017 -0,022 -0,025
                     (3,21)***                     (2,97)***                     (3,06)***                     (3,27)**                     (2,94)***                     (2,88)***                      (-2,94)***                     (-3,23)***                     (-3,32)***                     (-3,11)***                     (-3,46)***                     (-3,38)***
US taperingt * Liquidity_riskit (percent) -0,012 -0,011 -0,014 -0,013 -0,016 -0,011 -0,009 -0,011 -0,013 -0,018 -0,014 -0,012
                     (-2,08)**                     (-2,14)**                     (-2,21)**                     (-2,23)**                     (-2,19)**                     (-2,07)**           (2,09)*           (2,11)**           (2,25)**          (2,34)**          (2,27)**                     (-2,18)**
US taperingt * LR_reciprocalijt *Size it 0.008 0.003 0.003 -0,006 -0,008 -0,005
                     (2,95)***                      (2,59)**                      (2,34)**                      (-1,43)                      (-1,39)                      (-1,44)
US taperingt * LR_reciprocalijt 
*Capital_ratioit
0,012 0,015 0,011 -0,007 -0,005 -0,009
                     (2,28)**                      (2,19)**                      (2,89)***                      (-2,94)***                      (-2,72)**                      (-3,03)***
US taperingt * LR_reciprocalijt 
*Liquidity_riskit
-0,012 -0,012 -0,012 -0,009 -0,007 -0,011
                     (-1,02)                      (-1,02)                      (-1,02)                      (-1,81)*                      (-1,45)*                      (-1,28)*
CB_Liq_supplyt  [ln (mln)] 0,011 0,012 0,019 0,014 0,013 0,016 0,019 -0,049 -0,052 -0,067 -0,045 -0,061 -0,069 -0,062
       (2,23)**       (2,34)**       (2,47)**       (2,75)***        (2,43)**       (2,98)***       (3,02)***        (-4,06)***       (-4,47)***        (-4,12)***        (-3,89)***       (-4,02)***       (-4,62)***       (-4,08)***
US taperingt * CB_Liq_supplyt [ln (mln)] 0,007 0,009 0,006 0,005 0,008 0,011 -0,023 -0,032 -0,017 -0,023 -0,028 -0,032
       (2,22)**       (2,19)**        (2,31)**        (2,34)**        (2,45)**        (2,17)**        (-3,81)***        (-3,92)***        (-3,68)***       (-3,91)***       (-3,84)***       (-3,03)***
Inv_Mills ratioit -4,653 -5,726 -4,931 -4,752 -4,958 -5,025 -4,734
          (-3,29)***          (-3,18)***          (-3,34)***          (-3,07)***          (-3,29)***          (-3,61)***          (-3,46)***
Excess_reserves it (percent) -0,118 -0,112 -0,123 -0,119 -0,109 -0,118 -0,114
                     (-4,35)***                     (-4,26)***                     (-4,71)***                     (-4,36)***                     (-4,02)***                     (-4,08)***                     (-3,92)***
Observations 102060 102060 102060 73273 73273 123868 123868 3402 3402 3402 2443 2443 4129 4129
Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower-Lender FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-variant Lender controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
US Tapering Uncertainty
US Tapering High 
Prices
Panel A: Probability to access the market: P (zit =1) Panel B: Pricing Models: Spread it
 Variables Baseline 





Notes: This table presents OLS parameter estimates of the Heckman two-stage procedure that corrects for sample 
selection bias. Panel A, columns (1) to (7), present the results of the selection models, where the dependent variable is 
the probability of a bank to borrow from the interbank market (zit =1). Panel B, columns (8) to (14) correspond to the 
second stage estimates of the interest rate models in which the spread to the CB rate (in bps) is employed as a dependent 
variable (i.e. the price of liquidity (pit)). Columns (1) to (3) and (8) to (10) correspond to the baseline sample with the 
initial definition of the US tapering. In columns (4) to (5) and (11) to (12) the sample period is from March 26 to July 30, 
and the US Tapering variable is equal 1 during May 22 to July 30 (first stage of the tapering), and 0 during March 26 to 
May 21 (before the tapering). In columns (6) to (7) and (13) to (14) the sample period is from May 22 to December 18, 
and the US Tapering variable is equal 1 during July 31 to December 18 (second stage of the tapering), and 0 during May 
22 to July 30 (first stage of the tapering). All models have borrower, borrower*lender, lender*time, and time fixed effects, 
in addition to time-variant lender controls. We cluster robust standard errors at the borrower bank level. Robust t-statistics 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Figure 4.1A. Interbank market rate, central bank rate, and daily volume of interbank 
funds 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the overnight interbank market rate and central bank rate in percentage (%) during the 
period 2011-2014. Average daily amount traded in the interbank market in billions of COP (Right axis). Shared 
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Notes: This figure presents the distribution of the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (i.e. deposits outflow) using daily 
data at the bank level. US_Tapering=0 corresponds to the full period from January 1, 2011 to December 30, 2014, 
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Table 4.1A. Correlation among lending relationship measures 
 
  RLijt BPIijt LR_reciprocaljit 
       
RLijt 1***     
BPIijt 0.42** 1*** 0.22*** 
LR_reciprocaljit 
0.35*** 0.32** 1*** 
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Figure 4.3A. Government bills in U.S. and Colombia during the U.S. tapering 
Panel (a) 10-years U.S. Treasury bills (yields, %) 
 
 
Panel (b) 5-years Colombian bills (TES) (yields, %) 
 
Notes: Panel (a) depicts the 10-years Treasury bills (yields, in %). Panel (b) shows the 5-years Colombian bills (TES) 
(yields, in %). Data is from the period March 26 and December 30, 2013. Dotted lines correspond to the U.S. tapering 
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Table 4.2A. Summary statistics and definitions of the variables employed in the model  
 
Variable Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Obs. 
       
       
pit (spread) 
The difference in basis points (bps) 
between the volume-weighted average 
interest rate (rit) paid for a bank i of all its 
overnight unsecured loans during the day t 
and the central bank rate in t (rcbt). 
1,85 17,50 (148,32) 195,36 27105 
Loanijt 
Indicator variable equal 1 if the bank i 
borrows liquidity form bank j in the 
interbank market at time t. 
0,73 0.27 0 1 813150 
US taperingt 
Dummy variable equal to 1 during the 
period t in which the Fed announced to the 
market the possibility of reducing its 
purchase of assets: between May 22 and 
September 17, 2013, and 0 during the 
period immediately before (since the last 
change of the CB policy rate) i.e. March 23 
and May 21, 2013. 
We also use two sub-periods composed by 
interbank loans observed during the period 
March 26 to July 30, 2013(US Tapering 
uncertainty), and during the period July 31 
to December 18, 2013 (US Tapering high 
prices).  
0.28 0,16 0 1 3402 
Liq.Shockit  
Dummy variable equal 1 if the rate of 
change of the deposits of bank i is negative 
in t-1 and, 0 otherwise. That is if a bank 
suffers a deposits outflow in t-1. 
We also use the variable Large liquidity 
shock that is equal to 1 if the deposits 
outflow in t-1 for a borrower i is greater 
than the mean deposits outflow in t-1 and, 0 
if it is below the mean deposits outflow in t-
1. 
0,43 0,75 0 1 27105 
Sizeit 
Log of total assets (million COP, end of 
month)  
14,68 1,92 9,08 18,42 1138 
Capital ratioit 
Capital equity (Tier I and Tier II) over risk-
weighted assets (end of month) (in %) 
0,19 0,17 (2,93) 0,95 1138 
Nplit 
Ratio of nonperforming loans (loans past 
due more than 90 days) over total loans 
(end of month) (in %) 
0,04 0,02 0,00 0,20 1138 
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Sum of mean roa plus capital ratio in period 
t (cart) over the standard deviation of roa (z-
score= μroa + cart /σroa) computed on a 
rolling window of 12 months for the ROA 
and monthly for CAR. (in %) 
4,51 4,82 (1,60) 7,55 1138 
Excess_resit 
Reserve holding less the amount a bank 
needs to hold on a daily basis for the balance 
of the reserve maintenance period in order 
to exactly fulfil reserve requirements, 
divided by the average daily required 
reserves 
17,06 39,21 (11,47) 293,24 27105 
         
Liquidity_riskit 
Liquidity risk is measured as the standard 
deviation of daily change in reserve 
holdings during the last 30 days divided by 
reserve requirements 
0,19 9,31 (82,57) 183,43 67950 
Liquidity_ratioit 
Liquidity position computed as liquid assets 
over total assets (end of month) (%) 
0,52 0,62 0,38 0,87 1138 
Market_liq_riskjt 
Standard deviation of the normalized excess 
reserves among all banks j during the 
period t. 
0,08 3,40 (14,87) 26,31 67950 
RLijt 
 
RL gauges the frequency of interactions 
between two banks in the interbank market 
and is computed by the logarithm of one 
plus the number of days a bank i has lent to 
bank j over a certain time of period T as: 
RLijt= log (1+ ∑_tϵT I(y_ijt>0)), with T = 30 
days. 
 





Borrowing preference index (BPI) 
computed as the amount of funds borrowed 
by the bank i from a bank j at time t over a 
period T relative to the overall amount 
borrowed by bank i from all banks j over the 
same period T (with T = 30 days) 
Lending reciprocity is defined as the 
Logarithm of (1 + the number of loans 
granted from borrower i to lender j during 


































Dummy variable equal 1 if the bank i 
borrows funds in the secured money 
market in time t, and zero otherwise. 
0,16 0,38 0,00 1,00 27105 
CB_Liq_Supplyt 
Log of the total liquidity supply of the 
central bank at time t (in billion COP) 
29,36 0,48 27,81 30,35 1138 
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5. Borrowing Costs and the Role of Multilateral Development Banks: 
Evidence from Cross-border Syndicated Bank Lending 
 
Abstract 
Cross-border bank lending is a growing source of external finance in developing 
countries and could play a key role for infrastructure financing. This paper looks at the 
role of multilateral development banks (MDBs) on the terms of syndicated loan deals, 
focusing on loan pricing. The results show that MDBs’ participation is associated with 
higher borrowing costs and longer maturities—signaling a greater willingness to 
finance high risk projects which may not be financed by the private sector—but it is 
also associated with lower spreads for riskier borrowers. Overall, our findings suggest 
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Long term financial flows to developing countries have been partly limited by high risk 
perception and the resulting high cost of borrowing (Collier and Mayer, 2014; Collier and Cust, 
2015, Hayakawa, et al. 2013; WorldBank, 2015). An average developing country in sub-Saharan 
Africa, for instance, pays 300 basis points more than an average emerging market country in 
the bond market (Gueye and Sy, 2015).1 Multilateral development banks (MDBs) can play two 
key roles in reducing such high-risk perception, and thereby, facilitating long term financial 
flows. First, MDBs can de-risk investment by signaling the profitability of projects allocating 
their own money in projects and loan syndicates, as well as taking a subordinate loan position 
and extending their de facto preferred creditor status (Rodrik, 1995; Hagen, 2009; Hainz and 
Kleimeier, 2012; Chelsky et al. 2013; Humphrey and Michaelowa, 2013; Humphrey, 2015; 
Pereira dos Santos and Kearney, 2018). Second, de-risking could be the result of MDBs' 
informational advantages and strong monitoring capacity—without which private lenders are 
reluctant to invest in projects that are deemed as too risky (Arezki et al. 2017)—. More 
generally, even though the largest share of lending to developing countries is provided by the 
private sector, international financial institutions—and especially MDBs—are a key player in 
development finance, especially in light of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and 
the financing needs for infrastructure investment (United Nations, 2015, International 
Monetary Fund, 2017)2  
 
In this paper, we look at the de-risking role of MDBs using loan-level data on cross-border 
syndicated lending to emerging and developing countries during the period 1994-2015. 
Specifically, we address two interrelated questions. First, does the presence of an MDB in a loan 
syndicate affect loan terms, especially loan pricing? Second, does the involvement of an MDB 
mitigates borrower's riskiness, translating into lower loan spreads? 
 
We focus on cross-border syndicated lending since it is an important—and growing—source of 
external finance in many emerging and developing countries (Nini, 2004; Godlewski and Weill, 
                                                 
1 Similarly, Presbitero et al. (2016) show that, after controlling for several macroeconomic characteristics, sub-
Saharan Africa countries are as likely as other developing economies to issue sovereign bonds, but they issue at a 
premium of more than 100 basis points. 
2 For an overview of the key functions of MDBs, see Griffith-Jones, 2016). 
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2008; Cortina et al. 2018). Syndicated loans account for about one third of total cross-border 
lending between 1995 and 2012, on average (Cerutti et al. 2015), and the size of the market is 
comparable to that of the bond market (World Bank, 2015). As countries develop, an increasing 
number of firms—for instance, large exporters and firms in the infrastructure and mining 
sectors in developing countries—access the cross-border syndicated loan market to support 
their expansion strategies. These loans are increasingly important as a source of finance for 
firms across the world. From a borrower’s perspective, syndicated loans are generally less 
costly than bond issuance and a series of bilateral loan agreements; provide access to finance 
to borrowers that are unable to tap into the bond markets because of their low 
creditworthiness; and could also help to diversify the sources of external finance, promoting 
financial deepening and stability (Santos and Winton, 2008; Godlewski and Weill, 2008). From 
the lenders’ standpoint, the syndicated loan market allows banks to generate fee income, 
diversify credit exposures to particular borrowers, industries, or countries as well as to make 
loans in markets where they lack origination capabilities (Sufi, 2007; Haselmann and Wachtel, 
2011). 
 
Although there is an emerging empirical literature on the pricing of syndicated loans, it is 
mostly limited to advanced and emerging economies and, to our knowledge, there is no study 
on the effect of MDBs' participation on loan pricing3. Most of the empirical literature analyzing 
the syndicated loans markets has been focused on advanced economies (see, for instance 
Dennis and Mollineaux, 2000; Carey and Nini, 2007; Sufi, 2007; Bosch and Steffen, 2011; Lim et 
al. 2014; Berg et al. 2016). Studies on cross-border lending to emerging markets have mainly 
investigated the drivers of loan syndication and the role of international banks (Eichengreen 
and Mody, 2000; Godlewski and Weill, 2008). However, little is known on cross-border 
syndicated lending to developing countries. One exception is the analysis by (Altunbaş and 
Gadanecz, 2004), who evaluate the determinants of loan pricing in syndicated loans granted to 
borrowers in developing countries between 1993 and 2001. They find that riskier borrowers 
pay higher prices albeit macroeconomic conditions in borrowers' countries play a predominant 
role in explaining loan pricing. 
                                                 
3 Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) document that the participation of MDBs in the loan syndicate helps to mitigate 
political risk. Broccolini et al. (2018) focus on the mobilization effects of MDBs. However, there is no evidence on the 
role of MDBs in mitigating borrower riskiness. 
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Our analysis fills this gap by looking at how the syndicate structure—and in particular the 
presence of an MDB in the pool of lenders—affects loan terms. We use deal-level data on a large 
sample of about 17,000 syndicated loans granted to borrowers from 107 emerging and 
developing countries during the period 1994-2015. In addition to the loan-characteristics 
(price, amount, maturity, type of loan, etc.), the data includes loan-level information on lenders’ 
name and location, number of banks in the syndicate, and type of bank (private bank or MDB), 
and borrowers' name, industry, location, and credit risk. We use a standard risk-return 
framework, as in Carey and Nini (2007) and Berg et al. (2016), to identify the drivers of 
syndicated loan terms and capture the role of MDBs. We also exploit loan-level information to 
test whether riskier borrowers pay a premium, and whether the participation of MDBs in the 
syndicate could mitigate the effect of borrower riskiness on loan pricing.  
We have three main results. First, MDBs' participation is associated with higher borrowing 
costs and longer loan maturities. This finding indicates MDBs' higher capacity to lend at longer 
tenure than the private sector and—as long as spreads reflect borrower risk—the higher 
propensity of MDBs to finance risky projects—especially those in infrastructure—which may 
not be financed by the private sector. Second, the presence of an MDB in a syndicate is 
associated with a reduction of the effect of borrower riskiness on loan spreads by about one 
third, suggesting that MDBs’ participation can lower borrowing costs for risky firms in 
developing countries. This effect could be the result of better information and monitoring of 
MDBs and the extension of their preferred creditor status. These results hold controlling for a 
large set of deal characteristics and absorbing time-varying unobserved heterogeneity at the 
industry and country level, as well as country*industry fixed effects. The results remain intact 
when considering different sub-samples and when using a matching technique, that compares 
loans with similar characteristics, but with and without an MDB in the loan syndicate. Third, 
our findings suggest that the role of MDB participation has more relevance during the 
downward phases of the economic cycle, which can alleviate the flight to home effects observed 
after 2008. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the data and the main stylized facts 
on the role of MDBs in the syndicated loan market. Section 5.3 discusses the analytical 
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framework and the main results. Extensions and robustness tests are discussed in Section 5.4. 
Section 5.5 concludes. 
 
5.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
We collect data for more than 23,000 syndicated loans to emerging and developing countries 
originated during the 1994-2015 period from Dealogic Loan Analytics. A syndicate is formed 
by a pool of banks organized by a lead bank (arranger), who usually has a bank relationship 
with the borrower and has information on the borrower's creditworthiness. Then, to achieve 
the loan agreement, the arranger presents the loan conditions (e.g., amount, price, maturity, 
currency, type of loan) to the borrower and to the members of the syndicate. Each syndicate 
member has a separate claim on the borrower, albeit there is only a single loan agreement. 
Syndicated loans are priced at LIBOR plus a spread associated to borrower's credit risk. 
Participating banks charge several fees related to the type of loans (i.e., utilization, 
participation, facility, and underwriting fees). Thus, spread and fees capture different features 
of the lender-borrower relationship (Sufi, 2007b). We include only loans with full information 
on the size of the deal, the number and nationality of banks involved and some other basic deal 
characteristics. We restrict the sample to loan deals that involve borrower and lenders from 
different countries, to capture cross-border flows. Finally, in line with existing studies (e.g., Nini, 
2004), we exclude loans to sovereigns, as they are likely driven by different factors compared 
to loans to non-sovereign entities (private sector and public sector firms). For each loan, the 
database offers detailed information on contractual characteristics: lender and borrower 
identity, location, industry, loan type (credit line vs. term loan), size, maturity, interest rate, and 
currency. After cleaning the raw data, we are left with 16,847 syndicated loans to 7,589 
borrowers headquartered in 107 emerging and developing countries from 1994 to 2015. When 
looking at pricing, the sample is smaller because of data availability, as we have information on 
at most 7,571 deals (and 3,703 borrowers). Table 5.A1 in the appendix presents the number 
of loan deals per country. The sample is dominated by the large emerging markets (China, 
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Brazil, India, Mexico, Indonesia, and Turkey), but borrowers from low-income and lower 
middle-income countries represent more than 30 percent of the sample.4 
Our baseline measure of loan pricing is the all-in interest rate spread, which includes the 
contract spread over LIBOR plus any annual fee and any upfront fee. This choice allows us to 
approximate the true economic value of the syndicated loan, as spread and fees capture 
different features of the lender-borrower relationship (Altunbaş and Gadanecz, 2004, Carey 
and Nini, 2007; Ivashina, 2009; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Berg et al. 2016). However, we also 
report results for spread and fees separately to test whether the MDBs' participation affect 
separate components of loan pricing differently. The average all-in interest rate spread is 351 
bps, but there is a significant variability, with the interquantile range going from 180 to 475 
bps. Loan maturity is measured in months: the median loan has a 3-year maturity, while 27 
percent of loans have a maturity of one year or shorter, and only 10 percent of loans are longer 
than 10 years.  Loan size is measured in 2011 constant USD and includes only the cross-country 
components of the deal, i.e., excluding the amount financed by banks headquartered in the same 
country as the borrower. The median loan is of about USD 65 million, with a quarter of deals 
being smaller than USD 21 million and another quarter larger than USD 170 million (Table 5.1). 
5.2.1. MDBs' participation in syndicated loans: stylized facts 
MDBs often participate in syndicated loans when the market could not provide funding because 
of high (perceived or actual) borrower's riskiness. MDBs' participation in a syndicated loan 
takes two forms: A/B loans and parallel loans. In the former, the MDB is the lender of record 
and holds a portion of the loan for its own account (the “A Loan”'), and invites external 
participants to cover the remaining portion (the “B Loan”). In case of a parallel loan, the MDB 
and the external source each conclude separate loan agreements with the borrower, on a 
project designed and administered by the MDB. With the A/B arrangement, MDBs can extend 
their preferred creditor status to the participants in the syndicate and the reduced risk and 
transaction costs could translate into lower spreads (Chelsky et al. 2013; Humphrey, 2015).5 In 
                                                 
4 Our results do not depend on one specific large country, nor on the presence of many countries with few loans, 
see Section 4.2. 
5 MDBs' loans—including A/B loans—are often excluded in debt restructuring even in crisis times. This is mainly 
because the IMF, the lender of last resort, has a non-tolerance policy on arrears to multilateral creditors (see IMF, 
2013). 
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our sample, about 10 percent of the loan deals (1,694) have at least one MDB in the syndicate. 
On average, 63 percent of those loans have MDBs operating as lead arranger and the remaining 
of the loans have MDBs acting as another lender (participant) in the syndicate.6 MDBs' 
participation is quite widespread across industries—with a concentration in agriculture and a 
lower presence in manufacturing and natural resources—and it is more common in lending to 
low and lower middle-income countries than in lending to borrowers located in emerging 
markets. In our sample, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
International Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank group) together make 56 percent of 
the sample, with the European Investment Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
Asian Development Bank being other key players.7  
Table 5.2 compares syndicated loan characteristics with and without MDBs' participation. 
Loan deals with MDBs' participation are more expensive, have longer maturities and are 
smaller than those formed only by private banks. Figure 5.1, which plots the distribution of the 
all-in spread for loans with and without MDBs' participation, clearly shows that deals that 
involve MDBs have higher all-in spreads. On average, syndicated loans with MDBs' participation 
cost 96 bps more than loan syndicates formed solely by private institutions. This premium 
reflects an almost equal difference in the interest rate spread and in fees. The price difference 
is partly the reflection of significant differences in maturity, which is 32 months longer for loan 
deals that involve MDBs, and loan size, as deals with MDBs' participation are, on average, 
smaller by about USD 28 million.  As these differences could reflect a number of differences in 
loan and borrower characteristics across the sample of deals, in the following analysis we  look 
at these relationships in a multivariate setting and with a matching approach, to compare deals 
as similar as possible but that differ only in the presence of MDBs. 
 
                                                 
6 This implies that (on average) in 37 percent of the loans in our sample the MDB asked a private lender to arrange 
the syndicate given its expertise in the market (i.e. investment banks) or it can be also the case that the MDB bought 
shares in those syndicates via the secondary syndicated loan market.  
7 Other MDBs’ alternatives to provide finance include: i) co-financing with other international financial institutions; 
ii) guarantee facilities; iii) private placements of equity; and vii) debt co-financing with institutional investors, but 
they are not part of the cross-border syndicated loan market. 
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5.2.2. Macro Trends 
The value of cross-border syndicated loans shows a cyclical trend with increasing flows in early 
1990s followed by a fall in early 2000s (Figure 5.2).8 Then, a rapid surge is observed until the 
onset of the global financial crisis, when inflows slightly declined, partly due to the “flight to 
home” effect (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Cerutti et al. 2015). MDBs' participation has also 
followed a similar pattern, assuming more importance, in relative terms, during the downward 
phases of the cycle—early 2000s and post-global financial crisis, consistent with a counter-
cyclical role of MDB lending (Galindo and Panizza, 2018)—when loans with MDBs' 
participation amounted to up to 15 percent of all cross-border lending. In more recent years, 
however, this share declined to below 10 percent. The regional composition of these flows 
changed over time, with an increasing importance of cross border syndicated lending to low-
income countries, especially in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, starting from 2007 (Figure 
5.A2, see also Gurara et al. (2018)). Lending to low-income countries has a strong component 
of infrastructure financing but it is still concentrated in a few recipient countries, even though, 
relative to the size of the economy, cross border syndicated bank lending has become as 
important in low-income countries as in emerging markets. 
5.3. The empirical model 
We look at the drivers of syndicated loan terms, focusing on the role of MDBs, in a model that 
controls for deal, lender, and borrower specific-characteristics (Carey and Nini, 2007; Berg et 
al. 2016). More precisely, we estimate the following equation: 
Yjt = αMDBjt + γ’Xjt + ψj(t)  + θj(t) + τt + εit                        (1) 
where the dependent variable is, alternatively, one of the pricing measures, size (in logarithm), 
or maturity (in months) of deal j originated in year t. The key explanatory variable measures 
the MDBs' participation in the syndicate with binary variable equal to one if at least one MDB 
is involved in the syndication of the loan, and zero if the syndicate includes only private banks9.  
                                                 
8 A very similar pattern emerges looking at the number of deals (see Figure 5.A1).  
9 We only know if the MDB is part of the pull of lenders and its role in the syndicate (i.e. lead arranger, bookrunner, 
facility agent, participant, etc.). Thus, we do not know whether the loan is an A/B loan or a parallel loan, as well as 
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The standard set of explanatory variables include: 1) the borrower's credit risk, measured by 
three categories—investment grade, leveraged, and highly leveraged; 2) the number of 
tranches of the loan; 3) the currency in which the loan is denominated, classified in three 
categories—USD, Euro, and other currencies; 4) a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is granted to 
public sector borrowers and 0 if the loan is to the private sector; 5) a dummy equal to 1 for term 
loans, and zero for credit facilities; and 6) a dummy equal to 1 if the loan has a guarantor, and 
0 otherwise. Other than MDBs' participation, we look at the lender side of the deal measuring 
the concentration of the loan syndicate by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), calculated 
on bank shares in the loan. A more concentrated loan syndicate, as banks retain a higher share 
of the loan—especially lead arrangers—may signal lower risk and reduce moral hazard (Sufi, 
2007; Bosch and Steffen, 2011).  
Finally, the model is saturated with industry (ψj), country (θj), and year (τt) fixed effects to 
absorb unobserved heterogeneity across industries, countries and time, as loan terms could 
depend on global conditions as well as industry and country-specific unobservable factors. In 
the most demanding specification we absorb time-varying country and industry-specific 
unobserved factors that may drive loan terms by including country*year (θjt) and industry*year 
(θjt) fixed effects. Summary statistics and definition of all the variables are presented in Table 
5.1. 
5.3.1. Main Results 
Table 5.3 shows the results of equation (1) when the dependent variable is the all-in spread. 
Column 1 to 5 incrementally add fixed effects up to our preferred specification with 
country*year and industry*year fixed effects. Finally, in column 6 we include country*industry 
fixed effects to allow for the possibility that industry-specific unobserved factors may affect 
loan pricing across countries differently (but not over time, which is absorbed by the year fixed 
                                                 
the identity of the loan guarantor, which are other forms of MDB participation (see Section 5.2.1.). In alternative 
specifications, we identify that the MDB participation as lead arranger is associated to significant higher loan prices, 
in line with our baseline results, albeit we do not observe significant effects on loan pricing for risky borrowers. This 
may suggest that what matters most is the presence of the MDBs in the pull of lenders regardless from their role in 
the syndicate. In Table 5.7, we observe that loans with guarantors have longer maturities but—because of we do 
not know the guarantor’s identity—we are unable to check the specific effect of MDBs as guarantors on loan terms. 
Using information about the type of loan (credit facility vs. term loan), we find a significant effect of the de-risking 
role of MDB participation; especially for term loans (see Section 5.4.2. and Table 5.11). 
Chapter 5: Borrowing Costs and the Role of Multilateral Development Banks:                  
Evidence from Cross-border Syndicated Bank Lending 
 
 166 
effects). The comparison of the R2 across specifications indicates that global shocks, captured 
by year fixed effects, play a key role in explaining the variation in loan prices (the R2 increases 
from 0.38 to 0.51 between column 1 and 2), while the role of country-specific factors is smaller 
(columns 2 versus 3). The inclusion of time-varying country and industry fixed effects raises 
the R2 to 0.66 (column 5), suggesting that our model is able to capture two third of the observed 
variation in loan prices across borrowers.  
Regardless of the model specification, the coefficient of the MDBs' participation dummy is 
always positive and statistically significant, raging from 82 (column 2, with country and year 
fixed effects) to 45 (in the most demanding specification of column 5 with country*year and 
industry*year fixed effects). Taking the latter as our preferred and conservative specification, 
our results imply that the price of loans with MDBs' participation is higher by 45 bps or 13 
percent (relative to the average all-in spread of 351 bps). If spreads reflect borrower risk 
(Strahan, 1999), this result would suggest that MDBs self-select into loans with higher risk—
and therefore higher spreads—that could not otherwise be financed by the private sector, in 
line with the evidence discussed by Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) on a large sample of syndicated 
loans. 
The set of coefficients on deal characteristics are broadly in line with existing evidence. We find 
that smaller loans and those with longer maturity are associated with higher prices (Carey and 
Nini, 2007; Ivashina, 2009; Berg et al. 2016). In particular, taking the results of column 5, an 
additional year of maturity is associated with a 9 bps increase in the all-in spread, reflecting the 
increasing risk premium for loans with longer maturities. A higher number of tranches in the 
deal is also associated with higher prices, consistent with an adverse effect of loan complexity 
on pricing (Lee and Mullienaux, 2004; Maskara, 2010; Lim et al. 2014). Borrower's credit risk 
has an important effect on loan pricing. Highly leveraged and leveraged borrowers pay 
significantly more than investment grade borrowers. The estimated premium is sizable and 
robust across all specifications. A highly leveraged borrower pays on average 365 bps more 
than an investment grade borrower while leveraged borrowers pay a premium of 115 bps 
(column 5). This result supports the presence of market discipline in the syndicated loan 
market and is consistent with the model developed by Diamond (1991), and with existing 
evidence from the syndicated loan market in advanced economies (Santos and Winton, 2008; 
Haselmann and Wachtel, 2011; Lim et al. 2014}. 
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Loans in Euro and in other currencies have a discount compared with loans in USD, in line with 
previous evidence from syndicated loans in emerging markets (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000). 
Interestingly, term loans are relatively more expensive than credit lines. On average a term loan 
costs 37 bps more than a credit facility (column 5), consistent with the view that firms with 
access to credit lines are generally more likely to have high cash flows and are less financially 
constrained (Sufi, 2007b; Acharya et al. 2014}. Moreover, borrowers from public sector 
companies and government pay lower prices (55 bps less) than private sector ones, suggesting 
the importance of (implicit) sovereign guarantees on loan pricing. Deals with a guarantor do 
not show any statistical difference in price from loans without guarantor. In line with existing 
evidence (Qian and Strahan, 2007), syndicated loans with higher concentration of lenders (as 
measured by the HHI) are associated with lower prices: on average, one standard deviation in 
the HHI is associated with a discount of 26 bps (column 5). This result is robust across all 
specifications and suggest that a higher concentration of banks' shares in the syndicate may 
signal a greater willingness to lend, which can be associated with a lower default risk (Sufi, 
2007; Bosch and Steffen, 2011).  
Results hold when we use spread and fees separately as alternative measures of loan pricing 
(see Table 5.4). In particular, the premium due to the presence of MDBs in the syndicate is 
almost equally split between higher fees (19 bps) and higher loan spreads (25 bps). All the other 
variables have relatively similar effect on the two components of the price structure, with the 
exception of maturity, term loans and the degree of syndicate concentration, which have larger 
effects on fees than on spreads. 
5.3.2. The effect of borrower riskiness on loan spreads 
MDBs often participate in syndicated loans when the market could not provide funding because 
of high (perceived or actual) borrower's riskiness. Simply comparing investment grade and 
risky loans (e.g., leveraged and highly leveraged loans) does not show any propensity of MDBs 
to join risky loan deals.10 However, to the extent that the all-in spread reflects credit risk 
(Strahan, 1999), Figure 5.1 and the baseline regressions (see Table 5.3) suggest that there is 
a positive correlation between (unobserved) risk and MDBs' participation.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
10 The share of loan deals with MDBs' participation which are classified as leveraged or highly leveraged is 22%; this 
share is 25% for deals without any MDB in the syndicate. 
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MDBs are also expected to reduce the cost of borrowing through their de-risking measures, 
including informational advantages, better monitoring, and the extension of their de facto 
senior creditor status. Information on the broader investment environment and the quality of 
government policy-making is a public good that may not be supplied by private agents.11 MDBs 
are better positioned to internalize the costs of such information provisioning (Rodrik, 1995). 
Through their global and regional membership as well as collective agreements, MDBs have 
access to government data that enable them to monitor government policies in several 
countries. In addition, MDBs have the right incentive to collect (and disseminate) quality 
information as they commit their own resources. Finally, MDBs' participation by itself serves 
as a guarantee given that loans with the involvement of MDBs are often excluded in debt 
restructuring even in crisis times and serviced regularly.  
To test whether MDBs’ participation can mitigate the effect of borrower riskiness on loan 
spreads, we perform two exercises by interacting the MDBs participation dummy with two 
variables that could proxy for borrower creditworthiness. First, we identify risky loan deals 
with a dummy equal to one for those classified as leveraged or highly leveraged (Risky). Second, 
we proxy borrower riskiness using the country credit risk rating—an indicator of sovereign 
creditworthiness provided by Institutional Investor country credit rating dataset.12 In 
particular, we define a dummy variable High country risk to identify borrowers which are 
located in countries in the bottom half of the distribution of the country credit risk rating 
variable.  
A simple inspection of the data seems to support the hypothesis that MDBs could mitigate the 
effect of riskiness on borrowing costs (Figure 3). While there is a strong association between 
borrower riskiness and the all-in spread for deals that do not have any MDB involved (panel a), 
the presence of an MDB in the syndicate allows risky (leveraged and highly leveraged) 
borrowers to obtain loans priced similar to those obtained by less risky (investment grade) 
                                                 
11 Hainz and Kleimeier (2012) argue that MDBs provide a so-called “political umbrella” because these banks  can 
use their leverage to influence governmental decisions and deter adverse events that would negatively affect the 
project outcome.  
12 The dataset is published by Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC, and contains ratings of sovereign 
creditworthiness for 184 countries, from September 1979 to September 2016. Ratings are based on an assessment 
on country's fiscal sustainability, debt and liquidity, economic structure and performance, monetary policy and 
financial stability, balance of payments and political environment. The ratings grade each country on a scale from 0 
to 100, with a rating of 100 given to those countries with the lowest chance of defaulting on their government debt 
obligations. 
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borrowers (panel b). To test this hypothesis more formally, Table 5.5 presents the results of 
the pricing model using our specifications with country*year and industry*year fixed effects, 
looking separately at the all-in spread, as well at spread and fees. For each price measure, in the 
first column we include the interactions between the MDB participation dummy and the 
borrower riskiness indicator (Risky), while in the second column we replace the deal-specific 
riskiness measure with the dummy for the sovereign riskiness (High country risk). 
The coefficient on the interaction term MDB*Risky is -60, indicating that the effect of borrower 
riskiness (157 bps) is reduced by 60 bps, corresponding to a drop of about 38 percent (column 
1). This result remains significant even when considering spread and fees separately, although 
it is larger and more precisely estimated for the former (columns 3 and 5). Consistent with these 
finding, and in line with existing evidence that parties could invite MDBs to participate in the 
loan syndicate to compensate for the high country risk level (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2012), we 
find that the presence of an MDB in the syndicate is associated with significantly lower 
borrowing costs (41 bps, corresponding to about 27 percent) for companies headquartered in 
riskier countries, even controlling for deal characteristics, including the borrower's 
creditworthiness.  
5.3.3. Infrastructure and public sector lending 
In this section we look at two other dimensions that could matter for the way in which MDBs 
participation in syndicated loans can affect pricing. First, given the increasing and prominent 
role of MDBs in infrastructure financing (Humphrey, 2018), we are interested in the 
implications of MDBs' participation on borrowing costs for infrastructure projects. On the one 
hand, one could expect a lower cost due to risk mitigation measures, as MDBs bring close 
supervision and credit enhancement instruments. However, it could also be the case that MDBs 
self-select into loans for long-term projects with high risks, that might not match the risk profile 
of private sector investors. We discriminate between these two hypotheses interacting the MDB 
participation dummy with the infrastructure project loans indicator. The coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive and significant, meaning that infrastructure loans with MDBs' 
participation are about 66 bps more expensive than similar loans financed entirely by 
commercial banks (Table 5.6, column 1). This result, which is mostly driven by the change in 
spread rather than in fees (columns 3 and 5), would suggest that MDBs play a key role in 
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infrastructure financing, as they tend to finance infrastructure projects with higher risks 
compared to similar projects financed by commercial banks alone. 
As a second exercise, we allow MDBs' participation to have a different effect on loan prices for 
private and public sector borrowers. We observe that MDBs' participation is associated with 
significantly lower borrowing costs for public sector firms, suggesting a key role of MDBs for 
public sector financing. This effect is economically sizable, as the presence of an MDB in the 
syndicate almost double the reduction in the all-in spread of public sector borrowers compared 
to private sector ones (Table 5.6, column 2). This effect is almost equally large across spread 
and fees, albeit in the latter case the point estimate is not statistically significant (column 6).     
5.3.4. Other loan terms 
Having focused on how MDBs' participation is associated with loan pricing, we now test in the 
same multivariate framework whether loan deals with MDBs' involvement are smaller in size 
and longer in maturity than other comparable loans, as suggested by the descriptive analysis 
(see Table 5.2). Results are presented in Table 5.7, in which the dependent variable is, 
alternatively, loan size (in million of USD) in columns 1-3 and loan maturity (in months) in 
columns 4-6. For each loan term, we report the main specifications with country, industry and 
year fixed effect, time-varying industry and country fixed effects, and country*industry and 
year fixed effects.13  
The presence of MDBs is associated with lower loan size compared to loans from syndicates 
formed only by private banks (column 1). According to the estimates in column 2, the difference 
in loan size is economically meaningful, as deals with MDBs are on average USD 70 million 
smaller than loans granted only by commercial banks—almost 40 percent smaller than the 
average loan, which amounts to about USD 180 million. This result would suggest some caution 
when discussing the scope of MDBs in directly mobilizing private sector resources, especially 
                                                 
13 Results are based on the large sample of almost 15,000 loan deals, but they remain qualitatively the same when 
restricting the sample to deals for which the information on the all-in spread is non missing; see Table 5.A4. 
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in light of the large financing needs for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals outlined 
in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.14 
Moving to other deal characteristics, we find that highly leveraged borrowers obtain smaller 
loans, confirming the importance of market discipline.  Longer and more complex loans are 
associated with larger loan size, while term loans are generally smaller than credit facilities by 
around USD 35 million. Finally, deals with a higher degree of lender concentration are also 
smaller, suggesting that risk diversification—as more lenders enter into the syndicate—
contributes to increase lending in the syndicated loan market (Dennis and Mollineaux, 2000; 
Sufi, 2007). 
MDBs' participation is associated with loans with longer maturities compared to loan 
syndicates exclusively composed of private banks. The difference is economically meaningful, 
ranging from about 25 months to 27 months (columns 4-6). Taking the specification of column 
5 with time varying fixed effects as a baseline, we observe that loans with an MDB in the 
syndicate are, on average, 27 months longer than those in which only private banks are 
involved. This result is consistent with evidence showing that MDBs have a greater capacity to 
lend at longer tenure than the private sector, and mostly provide longer maturities than the 
private sector (Chelsky et al. 2013; Ehlers, 2014; Inderst and Stewart, 2014).  
The coefficients of the other deal characteristics are consistent with the existing evidence. 
Loans with more tranches, larger amount, denominated in currencies other than the dollar, and 
term loans are associated with longer maturities. As expected, loans to leveraged and highly 
leveraged borrowers have lower maturities compared to loans to investment grade borrowers, 
which confirm our previous findings on market discipline (i.e. safer borrowers borrow at lower 
prices and longer maturities compared to riskier borrowers). Deals with a guarantor also have 
longer maturities than those without a guarantor, confirming that the presence of guarantees 
benefit loan terms. Syndicate concentration is associated with significantly longer loan 
                                                 
14 However, MDBs can also catalyze private investment on a broader scale through advice, support for policy reform, 
capacity building, and demonstration effects. See Broccolini et al. (2018) for evidence of the catalytic effects of MDBs 
in the syndicated loans market. A recent joint report by MDBs confirm that the most of the total mobilization effect 
by MDBs is indirect, while direct mobilization account for about 30 percent of all private sector resources mobilized 
in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). 
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maturities, suggesting that banks tend to keep larger shares in loans with longer maturities. 
This result, in conjunction with our findings in the price specification, may indicate that 
concentrated syndicates seem to lend at better terms (Qian and Strahan, 2007).    
5.4. Extensions and robustness 
5.4.1. Matching 
Our main analysis is conducted in a standard multivariate setting, in which we control for a 
large set of observable loan characteristics and time, industry and countries fixed effects, to 
isolate the effect of MDBs' participation on loan terms. However, unobserved heterogeneity 
could bias our results, if it is correlated with the participation of MDBs in the syndicate. In an 
ideal setting, we would like to observe two identical loan deals; with the only exception that 
one involves an MDB in the pool of lenders and the other not. One way to get closer to this 
setting is to match treated (e.g., those with MDBs' participation) and untreated (i.e., those 
without MDBs' participation) along many observable dimensions to estimate the average 
treatment effect (ATE). In particular, we use the nearest-neighbor matching estimator and we 
do: i) exact matching on loan type (i.e., we compare within credit facilities and term loans), and 
ii) nearest-neighbor matching using the set of covariates used in the baseline model, including 
year, industry and country fixed effects.  
The results—shown in Table 5.8—are consistent with what we found in the multivariate 
setting. Comparing the sample difference in the average all-in spread across loans with and 
without MDBs' participation with the ATE estimated after the matching indicates that most of 
the effect of MDBs' participation seen in the univariate setting is accounted for by observable 
deal characteristics. However, even after the matching, the ATE indicates that loan deals with 
MDBs' participation are, on average, priced at a higher all-in spread (33 bps), a result very close 
to our baseline (Table 5.3, column 5). This difference is driven exclusively by a higher spread, 
while fees are not statistically different across loan deals with and without MDBs (columns 2 
and 3). We also confirm that the involvement of an MDB in the syndicate is associated with 
longer loan maturities, and lower loan volume (columns 4 and 5).   
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Finally, in Table 5.9 we perform a slightly different exercise to look at the interaction between 
MDB´s participation and borrower riskiness. In this case, we consider the dummy for leveraged 
and high leveraged borrowers (Risky) as the treatment and we split the sample between loan 
deals with and without MDBs' participation to test whether the effect of borrower risk is indeed 
lower in the former than in the latter. The result supports our hypothesis, as risky loans pay a 
premium of 204 bps on the all-in spread when the syndicate is composed of only commercial 
banks, while this premium decreases to 130 bps when MDBs participate in the loan syndicate. 
This effect—74 bps—corresponds to a 36 percent reduction, a value very close to what 
estimated in the baseline (Table 3, column 1). 
5.4.2. MDBs’ participation before and after the GFC 
In Figure A1 and Figure A2 we observe a decline in both number of deals and amount of loans 
during 2008 and 2009, which is associated to the global financial crisis, when inflows declined, 
partly due to the flight to home effect. We document that MDBs' participation has followed a 
counter-cyclical pattern, assuming more importance, in relative terms, during the downward 
phases of the cycle—early 2000s and post-global financial crisis—when loans with MDBs' 
participation amounted to up to 15 percent of all cross-border lending, consistent with a 
counter-cyclical role of MDB lending in financial markets (Galindo and Panizza, 2018). To shed 
light on this regard, we split the sample in two periods: pre-crisis (1994-2007) and post-crisis 
(2008-2015), and then estimate our baseline models of loan pricing, loan pricing and MDB 
participation, and loan terms and MDB participation.  
Table 5.A5 presents the results of the pricing model using the most demanding specification 
with year fixed effects and country*year fixed effects. We observe that the estimated effect of 
MDB participation on loan pricing remains in similar levels than the baseline in both the pre-
crisis and post-crisis periods. Note that the estimated effects of the deal characteristics hold and 
keep similar significance levels than in the baseline model. In Table 5.A6.1 and Table 5.A6.2, 
we confirm that the involvement of an MDB in the syndicate is associated to lower borrowing 
costs for risky borrowers during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, respectively. When we 
look at the other loan terms, we observe that the effect of MDB participation on deal size is 
negative and statistically significant in the pre-crisis period (as observed in the baseline), but it 
is no longer significant in the post-crisis period (Table 5.A7.1 and Table 5.A7.2). This result 
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indicates that after 2008 the size of the loans is not statistically different for syndicates formed 
only by private banks compared to those with MDB participation. Moreover, the effect of MDB 
participation on loan maturity is almost twice in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-
crisis period. These findings can be related to the increase in the supply of loans with MDB 
participation in the post-crisis period, which reached 15% of the total cross-border lending 
(Figure 5.A2), as a result of the flight to home effect observed during 2008-10 period (Giannetti 
and Laeven, 2012; Cerutti et al. 2015). 
In Table 5.A6.1 and Table 5.A6.2 we observe that the MDB participation in the syndicate is 
associated to lower borrowing costs for risky borrowers during the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods. This result is in line with our findings in the baseline model (Table 5.5) and in the 
matching exercise (Table 5.9), implying that MDBs may have a higher propensity to participate 
in syndicated loans for risky borrowers, which can translate in lower borrowing costs for those 
firms. To test this prediction, we employ a probit model that allows to estimate the likelihood 
of a high-risk loan being originated by a syndicate with MDB participation. We define as 
dependent variable the Risky indicator, which is equal to 1 if the borrower has a credit rating of 
leveraged and highly leveraged, and 0 if it has investment grade rating, and then focus on the 
effect of the MDB participation on the probability of lending to a risky borrower. We control for 
the deal-characteristics of our baseline model and include year, and country*industry fixed 
effects. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood using the baseline sample, as well as for 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.  
The results are presented in Table 5.A8. The estimated coefficient of the MDB variable 
indicates that, for the baseline period, the probability that a risky loan will be granted for a 
syndicate including an MDB is 19% larger compared to a syndicate formed only by private 
banks. Interestingly, this probability is 16% during the pre-crisis period, and increases to 23% 
in the post-crisis period. These results suggest that MDBs tend to select loans for risky 
borrowers, confirming our hypothesis that supports the findings in Table 5.3 and Table 5.9. 
Moreover, the fact that MDB participation has a higher effect during the post-crisis period adds 
evidence on the potential counter-cyclical role of MDB lending, as risky borrowers becomes 
more credit rationed during the downward phases of the cycle (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
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We test the robustness of our main findings running a set of additional tests. First, we consider 
the fact that our sample is characterized by two features: the concentration of many deals in 
few countries (especially China, India and Mexico) and the presence of many countries (74) 
with a small number of loan deals. In Table 10 we replicate our main results—the standard 
association between MDBs' participation and the all-in spread and the de-risking effect—
dropping the borrowers headquartered in China (columns 1-2); in China, India and Mexico 
(columns 3-4); and in the 74 countries which have less than 50 deals in our sample over the 
whole period 1994-2015 (columns 5-6). In all the three cases, the main findings on the role of 
MDBs on loan pricing both for an average and a risky borrower remain intact. 
Second, we run a separate analysis for credit lines and term loans, on the ground that their 
pricing structure is likely to differ for several reasons, related to the different options included 
in the contracts (e.g., to draw on a line of credit, or terminate a loan contract) (Berg et al. 2016) 
and to the role of liquidity risk for participating banks (Gatev and Strahan, 2009). We find 
differences in how some loan characteristics, such as the syndicate concentration and maturity, 
affect all-in spread across credit lines and term loans (Table 5.11). MDBs are more often 
involved in term loans—63% of deals with MDBs' participation are term loans—. In this case, 
consistent with the hypothesis of risk mitigation through better information and the extension 
of the preferred creditor status, the involvement by an MDB in the syndicate significantly 
lowers borrowing costs for risky borrowers. On average, MDBs are not associated with higher 
borrowing costs, and the standard positive association between MDBs' participation and 
spreads is in place only for non-risky borrowers (columns 4-6). By contrast, the reduction of 
borrowing costs for risky borrowers when MDBs are involved in the loan deal is smaller and 
less robust when considering credit facilities, for which the risk mitigation via preferred credit 
status is not in place.  
Finally, we cluster standard errors at the country level, rather than at the country-year level, as 
done throughout the paper. All our findings on the role of MDBs remain statistically significant. 
The replication of Table 5.3 with the alternative clustering shows that the change of the 
standard errors is relatively limited and, in some cases, our baseline estimates are more 
conservative (Table 5.A3). 
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This paper looks at two interrelated questions. First, does the presence of an MDB in a 
syndicated loan affect loan terms, and especially the loan pricing? Second, does the involvement 
of MDBs mitigate the effect of borrower credit risk, translating into lower spreads? We examine 
loan terms of cross-border syndicated loans to address these questions. A key finding from our 
analysis is that MDBs' participation is associated with higher borrowing costs, indicating MDBs' 
greater willingness to finance high-risk projects that may not be financed by the private sector. 
Our results also show that MDBs’ participation mitigates the effect of credit risk on loan 
spreads, as the effect of borrower riskiness on loan spreads is about one third lower in 
syndicated loans with at least an MDB than in comparable loans financed only by commercial 
banks.  We find evidence confirming that MDBs tend to select loans for risky borrowers. 
Moreover, MDBs' participation is associated with longer loan maturities, implying MDBs’ 
greater capacity to lend at longer tenure than the private sector, and smaller loan size, which 
cautions about the scope for a potential direct mobilization effect of MDBs. However, we 
observe that the role of MDB participation has more relevance during the post-crisis period, 
which could alleviate the observed flight to home effects in the cross-border syndicated loan 
market. Overall, our findings suggest that risk mitigation can be a channel through which 
MDBs—thanks to better information and monitoring and the extension of their preferred 
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Notes: The figure shows the all-in spread (in bps) of cross-border syndicated loans to developing countries. The 
chart is based on a sample of 7,038 deals to 106 countries and separates between deals with at least a multilateral 
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Figure 5.2. Cross-border Syndicated Lending to Developing Countries, in USD 
 
Notes: The figure shows the value in constant 2011 USD (billion) of cross-border syndicated lending to developing 
countries. The chart is based on a sample of 16,847 deals to 106 countries and separates between deals with at least 
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Figure 5.3. The De-risking Role of MDBs’ Participation 




















Notes: The figure shows the all-in spread (in bps) of cross-border syndicated loans to developing countries. The 
chart is based on a sample of 7,038 deals to 106 countries and distinguishes between investment grade and leveraged 
and highly leveraged deals. Panel (a) presents the density for deals with only commercial banks, while panel (b) 
include deal with at least a multilateral development bank in the syndicate. Data source: Dealogic Loan Analytics.  
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Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min p25 p50 p75 Max 
All-in spread 7038 351,5 232,08 37,5 180 286,6 475 1200 
Spread 7345 168,9 116,24 17 85 135 225 625 
Fees 7228 179,87 121,52 13 90 149 250 625 
Deal value (USD million) 16847 177,03 438,64 0 21 65 170 18000 
Log of deal value 16847 17,87 1,61 7,6 16,86 17,99 18,95 24 
Maturity (months) 14915 52,6 46 1 12 36 72 360 
MDB 16847 0,1 0,3 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of tranches 16847 1,29 0,77 1 1 1 1 16 
Term loan 16847 0,55 0,5 0 0 1 1 1 
Public sector 16847 0,26 0,44 0 0 0 1 1 
Risky 16847 0,25 0,43 0 0 0 1 1 
Investment grade 16847 0,75 0,43 0 0 1 1 1 
Leveraged 16847 0,21 0,41 0 0 0 0 1 
Highly leveraged 16847 0,04 0,19 0 0 0 0 1 
USD loan 16847 0,8 0,4 0 1 1 1 1 
Euro loan 16847 0,08 0,28 0 0 0 0 1 
Other currencies loan 16847 0,12 0,32 0 0 0 0 1 
Deal with a guarantor 16847 0,23 0,42 0 0 0 0 1 
Syndicate concentration 16847 0,45 0,38 0,01 0,12 0,27 1 1 
 
Notes: The table presents the summary statistics of the variables employed in the analysis. The data is based on a 
sample of 16,847 deals to 107 countries granted during the period 1994-2015. All-in spread, spread, and fees are in 
basis points (bps). Deal value is expressed in USD million or in logarithm (log of deal value), while maturity is 
expressed in months. MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 
if the syndicate includes only private banks. Term loan is a dummy equal to 1 for term loans, and 0 for credit facilities. 
Public is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is granted to public sector borrowers and 0 if the loan is to the private sector. 
Risky is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is classified as leveraged or highly leveraged, and 0 is the loan has investment 
grade. The deal currency is classified in three categories—USD, Euro, and other currencies. Deal with a guarantor is 
a dummy equal to 1 if the loan has a guarantor, and 0 otherwise. Syndicate concentration is measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in the loan. Data source: Dealogic Loan 
Analytics. 
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Table 5.2. Syndicated loan terms and MDBs’ participation 
 
  Deals     
  Commercial banks only with MDBs' participation     
  
Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Difference t-test 
Drawn return (bbs) 345,23 6601 446,32 437 101,09 *** 
Spread (bps) 165,77 6899 217,38 446 51,61 *** 
Fees (bps) 176,99 6776 223,08 452 46,09 *** 
Deal value (USD million) 179,36 15153 156,18 1694 -23,18 *** 
Maturity (month) 50,63 13967 81,62 948 30,99 *** 
 
Notes: The table shows the average values of loan terms for deals with only private banks and for those with at least 
one MDB involved in the syndication of the loan. The last columns show the difference and the results of a t-test for 
the equality of the means across the two samples. The sample period is 1994-2015. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5.3. Loan pricing—All-in Spread 
 
Dep. Var.: All-in spread (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
MDB  64.3813*** 82.6265*** 63.0023*** 47.0927*** 45.4043*** 60.4875*** 
  (12.878) (12.067) (12.268) (12.747) (13.484) (12.896) 
Log of deal value -3.1679 -20.1222** -14.0197** -17.4242*** -19.4645*** -13.9254** 
  (9.384) (7.834) (5.124) (4.770) (4.844) (5.491) 
Number of tranches 21.2247*** 15.1710** 11.8910** 13.9997*** 13.8604*** 11.0556* 
  (6.220) (5.604) (5.100) (4.329) (3.967) (5.810) 
Maturity (in months) 0.4245* 0.7051*** 0.7194*** 0.7929*** 0.7700*** 0.6750*** 
  (0.245) (0.144) (0.196) (0.208) (0.192) (0.195) 
Leveraged 171.4569*** 159.1101*** 130.6725*** 119.2904*** 115.4159*** 128.8962*** 
  (26.835) (13.532) (12.953) (14.553) (14.725) (13.155) 
Highly leveraged 426.2991*** 465.8138*** 388.7043*** 368.8614*** 364.6687*** 381.8506*** 
  (26.631) (22.611) (20.519) (19.645) (20.382) (20.362) 
Term loan 28.6088** 38.1940*** 40.2687*** 35.3235*** 36.6469*** 44.2661*** 
  (10.880) (11.120) (9.874) (9.830) (9.288) (10.116) 
Public -37.1885** -49.7177*** -55.1404*** -61.9134*** -55.4730*** -54.5258*** 
  (14.774) (15.938) (11.868) (13.996) (12.748) (11.547) 
Euro -32.9701 -10.1033 -43.8180** -41.9157** -49.6670*** -46.2936** 
  (21.615) (20.489) (18.072) (17.423) (15.200) (16.566) 
Other currency -43.7736*** -47.0924*** -22.9198* -18.6712 -20.7171* -28.8475*** 
  (13.914) (11.180) (11.222) (11.836) (11.382) (10.052) 
Deal with a guarantor -12.4037 4.2185 -5.0795 -4.3782 -4.0366* -1.2073 
  (10.450) (7.920) (4.327) (3.328) (2.284) (3.440) 
Syndicate concentration 50.9959 -100.1885*** -84.8910*** -71.3918*** -71.1034*** -89.7323*** 
  (31.714) (23.504) (19.273) (16.351) (15.537) (19.886) 
              
Observations 6,958 6,958 6,945 6,726 6,724 6,871 
R-squared 0.377 0.511 0.572 0.636 0.657 0.594 
Country FE No No Yes - - - 
Year FE No Yes Yes - - Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Country-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No 
Industry-Year FE No No No No Yes No 
Country-Industry FE No No No No No Yes 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is the all-in spread of the loan (spread 
plus fees) in basis points (bps). MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the 
loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Leveraged and highly leveraged deals are expressed with 
reference to investment grade ones (the excluded category). The excluded category for currency is deals in USD. 
Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The concentration of 
the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in 
the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period for the baseline model is 1994-2015, pre-crisis period is 
1994-2007, and post-crisis period is 2008-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.4. Loan pricing—spreads and fees 
 
Dep. Var.: Spread     Fees   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            
MDB 24.6882*** 30.4665***   19.2753** 29.0835*** 
  (7.520) (6.457)   (7.232) (6.744) 
Log of total deal value -9.1183*** -5.8878**   -7.9939*** -6.3097** 
  (2.380) (2.821)   (2.560) (2.527) 
Number of tranches 5.9769** 3.2031   5.1261** 4.6951 
  (2.320) (3.129)   (2.099) (2.877) 
Maturity (in months) 0.2970*** 0.2638**   0.4465*** 0.4080*** 
  (0.084) (0.097)   (0.081) (0.096) 
Leveraged 56.8459*** 63.9924***   59.2183*** 63.7570*** 
  (7.053) (6.075)   (7.096) (6.070) 
Highly Leveraged 191.9646*** 196.4676***   183.4410*** 187.8040*** 
  (9.031) (9.609)   (11.557) (9.873) 
Term loan 13.7201*** 17.9561***   23.2939*** 26.0868*** 
  (3.957) (4.330)   (5.402) (4.689) 
Public -24.8182*** -26.1130***   -26.9697*** -24.9886*** 
  (6.606) (5.983)   (6.558) (6.374) 
Euro -28.2780*** -23.0625**   -23.8665*** -22.8571** 
  (9.040) (8.453)   (6.759) (8.287) 
Other currency -2.4392 -5.1525   -30.7537*** -35.3515*** 
  (4.182) (3.972)   (9.409) (9.620) 
Deal with a guarantor -3.8691* -2.6657   -3.0508 -3.1794 
  (2.209) (3.098)   (3.984) (2.614) 
Syndicate concentration -17.8288* -26.5470**   -45.6909*** -52.0908*** 
  (8.609) (9.872)   (7.570) (7.341) 
            
Observations 7,015 7,163   6,904 7,058 
R-squared 0.667 0.601   0.581 0.527 
Country FE - -   - - 
Year FE - Yes   - Yes 
Industry FE - -   - - 
Country-Year FE Yes No   Yes No 
Industry-Year FE Yes No   Yes No 
Country-Industry FE No Yes   No Yes 
 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the loan spread, 
and in columns (3) and (4), the loan fees, all in basis points (bps). MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is 
involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Leveraged and highly 
leveraged deals are expressed with reference to investment grade ones (the excluded category). The excluded 
category for currency is deals in USD. Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for 
private sector ones. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
calculated on the share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period for the baseline 
model is 1994-2015, pre-crisis period is 1994-2007, and post-crisis period is 2008-2015. Standard errors clustered 
at the country and year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.5. Loan pricing, MDBs’ participation, and de-risking 
 
Dep. Var.: All-in spread     Spread     Fees   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
                  
MDB 63.2427*** 66.7475***   35.5429*** 36.9337***   23.7166** 35.5153*** 
  (16.731) (18.645)   (8.836) (9.074)   (10.456) (9.838) 
MDB x Risky -59.5944***     -34.5200***     -19.9740*   
  (15.758)     (8.760)     (9.928)   
MDB x High country risk   -41.2264*     -23.0643**     -29.9569** 
    (21.403)     (9.097)     (10.559) 
Risky 156.8479*** 153.4012***   80.2366*** 78.2758***   79.3607*** 78.1482*** 
  (14.024) (14.209)   (7.027) (7.160)   (7.081) (7.158) 
Public -60.2499*** -60.6424***   -27.8085*** -27.9600***   -29.2744*** -29.3085*** 
  (14.441) (14.444)   (7.445) (7.471)   (7.554) (7.576) 
Log of total deal value -22.4576*** -22.4311***   -10.6135*** -10.5800***   -9.3501*** -9.3042*** 
  (6.233) (6.571)   (2.960) (2.941)   (3.074) (3.044) 
Number of tranches 14.5015*** 14.4609***   6.3743** 6.3346**   5.4027* 5.3461* 
  (4.858) (4.959)   (2.776) (2.696)   (2.697) (2.694) 
Maturity (in months) 0.7942*** 0.8026***   0.3053** 0.3104***   0.4594*** 0.4611*** 
  (0.190) (0.189)   (0.120) (0.105)   (0.087) (0.086) 
Term loan 40.8039*** 40.5194***   16.0897*** 15.8766***   25.2971*** 25.2061*** 
  (9.980) (9.796)   (4.418) (4.395)   (5.557) (5.668) 
Euro -53.0404*** -54.0893***   -30.0605*** -30.6123***   -25.4270*** -25.9831*** 
  (13.638) (13.874)   (8.336) (8.698)   (5.815) (5.896) 
Other currency -17.9075* -18.1721**   -0.8808 -1.0732   -29.6287*** -29.8034*** 
  (9.012) (8.291)   (3.254) (3.534)   (8.538) (8.642) 
Deal with a guarantor -8.0794 -8.1275   -6.3980 -6.4428   -5.0483 -5.0242 
  (5.777) (5.470)   (3.867) (3.859)   (4.991) (4.936) 
Syndicate concentration -69.4635*** -69.2368***   -16.1830* -15.9940*   -44.8760*** -44.7691*** 
  (17.283) (17.458)   (8.953) (8.902)   (8.177) (8.108) 
                  
Observations 6,724 6,720   7,015 7,011   6,904 6,900 
R-squared 0.613 0.612   0.615 0.614   0.542 0.541 
Country-Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country-Industry FE No No   No No   No No 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the all-in spread, while in 
columns (3) and (4) is the loan spread, and in columns (5) and (6) the loan fees, all in basis points (bps). MDB is a dummy equal to 
1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Risky is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the loan is classified as leveraged or highly leveraged, and 0 is the loan has investment grade. High country risk is a 
dummy equal to 1 for borrowers located in countries in the bottom half of the distribution of the country credit risk rating variable. 
Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The excluded category for currency 
are deals in USD. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the 
share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the 
country and year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.6. Loan pricing—infrastructure and public sector lending 
Dep. Var.: All-in spread     Spread     Fees   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
                  
MDB 32.6194** 55.2291***   16.8229* 29.6921***   15.2647 23.4115** 
  (13.452) (15.972)   (9.400) (8.684)   (10.065) (8.938) 
MDB x Infrastructure 65.6771**     39.6436***     20.2503   
  (24.455)     (13.057)     (12.892)   
MDB x Public   -52.9012*     -26.9046**     -23.0487 
    (27.470)     (12.683)     (17.260) 
Public -55.7821*** -52.6893***   -25.0352*** -23.3909***   -27.0664 -25.7618*** 
  (14.144) (12.947)   (7.803) (6.527)   (28.233) (6.831) 
Log of total deal value -19.3857*** -19.3024***   -9.0571* -9.0305***   -7.9735*** -7.9240*** 
  (4.185) (4.990)   (4.435) (2.541)   (2.678) (2.783) 
Number of tranches 13.3279*** 13.4676***   5.6675** 5.7731**   4.9704 4.9550** 
  (3.665) (3.910)   (2.402) (2.317)   (6.395) (2.131) 
Maturity (in months) 0.7631 0.7644***   0.2929*** 0.2946***   0.4450*** 0.4444*** 
  (11.668) (0.183)   (0.102) (0.084)   (0.086) (0.080) 
Leveraged 115.7625*** 115.6864***   57.0217*** 56.9846***   59.3489*** 59.3543*** 
  (14.779) (14.859)   (7.069) (7.133)   (10.379) (7.187) 
Highly leveraged 365.7773*** 364.7117***   192.5244*** 191.9777***   183.8045*** 183.5388*** 
  (19.544) (20.378)   (10.708) (9.033)   (17.421) (11.539) 
Term loan 36.7073*** 36.7087***   13.7693*** 13.7451***   23.3062* 23.3199*** 
  (8.988) (9.282)   (3.967) (3.992)   (12.703) (5.301) 
Euro -50.7689*** -48.1262***   -28.7797*** -27.5684***   -24.1892* -23.2107*** 
  (15.265) (15.642)   (9.544) (9.070)   (11.915) (7.100) 
Other currency -20.8641* -20.8716*   -2.6496 -2.4437   -30.7971** -30.7850*** 
  (12.058) (11.455)   (5.854) (4.415)   (11.095) (9.462) 
Deal with a guarantor -3.8386 -3.6530   -3.7554 -3.6738*   -3.0041 -2.8723 
  (3.396) (2.146)   (2.317) (2.065)   (5.940) (3.850) 
Syndicate concentration -72.0942*** -71.1356***   -18.4231* -17.8447**   -45.9849*** -45.7616*** 
  (15.437) (15.541)   (9.388) (8.531)   (8.297) (7.709) 
                  
Observations 6,724 6,724   7,015 7,015   6,904 6,904 
R-squared 0.657 0.657   0.668 0.667   0.581 0.581 
Country-Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country-Industry FE No No   No No   No No 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the all-in spread, while in 
columns (3) and (4) is the loan spread, and in columns (5) and (6) the loan fees, all in basis points (bps). MDB is a dummy equal to 
1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Infrastructure is 
a dummy equal to 1 for infrastructure loans and 0 otherwise. Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 
0 for private sector ones. Leveraged and highly leveraged deals are expressed with reference to investment grade ones (the 
excluded category). The excluded category for currency are deals in USD. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample 
period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data 
sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.7. Loan terms and MDBs’ participation 
 
Dep. Var.:  Deal value       Maturity     
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
MDB participation -60.3707** -69.5282** -60.8277*   25.4464*** 26.8113*** 26.2506*** 
  (26.579) (31.783) (29.488)   (3.625) (3.611) (3.291) 
Log of total deal value         5.7569*** 5.7589*** 5.9920*** 
          (0.551) (0.736) (0.781) 
Maturity (in months) 0.8534** 0.8518** 0.8376**         
  (0.363) (0.303) (0.307)         
Number of tranches 100.4890*** 105.5598*** 104.6880***   6.8090*** 6.7785*** 6.1761*** 
  (14.899) (17.922) (15.758)   (1.173) (1.213) (1.120) 
Leveraged -7.7600 -20.4244 -9.3129   -9.3646*** -7.7714*** -9.4481*** 
  (16.529) (25.968) (18.072)   (1.661) (1.293) (1.352) 
Highly leveraged -43.4899 -53.8992** -32.3138   -12.0614*** -6.8249*** -13.2790*** 
  (26.449) (25.361) (26.371)   (2.855) (2.114) (2.526) 
Term loan -32.8837*** -34.0574** -32.2358***   9.8270*** 9.3254*** 10.2232*** 
  (11.277) (12.082) (10.433)   (1.858) (2.014) (1.735) 
Public 7.9472 16.7582 12.6007   -0.1041 0.7064 0.5409 
  (19.626) (20.775) (22.230)   (2.722) (2.650) (2.561) 
Euro -45.5481* -34.9332 -29.1191   23.9950*** 23.5877*** 22.8421*** 
  (24.019) (29.780) (25.049)   (3.478) (3.441) (3.728) 
Other currency -21.1895 -14.0574 -20.1627   6.3406** 5.2172** 6.9646*** 
  (27.149) (26.087) (26.660)   (2.661) (2.093) (2.366) 
Deal with a guarantor -26.6927* -28.2741 -24.4093   22.3603*** 21.4241*** 22.8271*** 
  (15.310) (16.450) (14.516)   (3.529) (3.643) (3.450) 
Syndicate concentration -301.4022*** -320.8541*** -295.4640*** 12.4578*** 14.7414*** 10.1476*** 
  (42.126) (47.778) (44.016)   (3.482) (3.655) (3.529) 
                
Observations 14,904 14,587 14,804   14,904 14,587 14,804 
R-squared 0.169 0.221 0.197   0.366 0.441 0.408 
Country FE Yes - -   Yes - - 
Year FE Yes - Yes   Yes - Yes 
Industry FE Yes - -   Yes - - 
Country-Year FE No Yes No   No Yes No 
Industry-Year FE No Yes No   No Yes No 
Country-Industry FE No No Yes   No No Yes 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is, alternatively, loan size (in million of USD) in columns 
1-3 and loan maturity (in months) in columns 4-6. MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of 
the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Leveraged and highly leveraged deals are expressed with reference to 
investment grade ones (the excluded category). Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private 
sector ones. The excluded category for currency are deals in USD. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample 
period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data 
sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.8. The role of MDBs in the syndicated loan market—nearest neighbor matching 
 
Dep. Var.:  All-in spread Spread Fees   Deal size Maturity 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) 
              
Matched 32.639** 30.274*** 9.660   -83.297*** 26.342*** 
  (16.516) (7.746) (9.693)   (22.771) (3.378) 
              
Unmatched 101.092*** 51.616*** 46.092***   -23.176** 30.995*** 
  (11.401) (5.647) (5.879)   (11.236) (1.523) 
              
# treated (MDB) 424 433 438   948 948 
# controls 6534 6817 6707   13967 13967 
              
Exact matching on:             
Loan type Y Y Y   Y Y 
Nearest-neighbor matching on:           
Deal size Y Y Y   N Y 
Maturity Y Y Y   Y N 
Tranches Y Y Y   Y Y 
Currency Y Y Y   Y Y 
Riskiness Y Y Y   Y Y 
Public sector Y Y Y   Y Y 
Guarantor Y Y Y   Y Y 
Concentration Y Y Y   Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y   Y Y 
Country Y Y Y   Y Y 
Year Y Y Y   Y Y 
 
Notes: This table presents results of nearest neighbor matching estimator using the set of covariates used in the 
baseline model 1. The dependent variable is, alternatively: all-in spread (column 1), spread (column 2), fees (column 
3)–all in basis points,—deal value (in USD million, column 4), and maturity (in months, column 5)). The treatment 
variable—MDB—is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the 
syndicate includes only private banks. Risky is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is classified as leveraged or highly 
leveraged, and 0 is the loan has investment grade. Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers 
and 0 for private sector ones. The excluded category for currency are deals in USD. The concentration of the 
syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in the 
loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and 
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Table 5.9. De-risking—nearest neighbor matching 
  MDB=0 MDB=1 
  (1) (2) 
      
Matched 204.300** 130.163*** 
  (13.115) (21.940) 
      
Unmatched 237.780*** 98.548*** 
  (5.100) (24.390) 
      
# treated (Risky) 2338 171 
# controls 4196 252 
      
Exact matching on:     
Loan type Y Y 
Nearest-neighbor matching on:   
Deal size Y Y 
Maturity Y Y 
Tranches Y Y 
Currency Y Y 
Public sector Y Y 
Guarantor Y Y 
Concentration Y Y 
Industry Y Y 
Country Y Y 
Year Y Y 
 
Notes: This table presents results of nearest neighbor matching estimator using the set of covariates employed in 
the baseline model 1. The dependent variable is the all-in spread, in basis points. The treatment variable—Risky—
is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is classified as leveraged or highly leveraged, and 0 is the loan has investment grade. 
MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate 
includes only private banks. Leveraged and highly leveraged deals are expressed with reference to investment grade 
ones (the excluded category). The excluded category for currency are deals in USD. Public is a dummy equal to 1 for 
deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured 
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal 
level. The sample period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in parentheses. *** 
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Table 5.10. Robustness—sub-samples 
 
Dep. Var.: All-in spread Drop China   Drop CHN, IND, MEX   Drop small countries 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
                  
MDB 28.8218** 52.0012***   33.3147** 58.2688***   38.0142** 61.4145*** 
  (12.868) (15.204)   (14.906) (16.371)   (14.833) (16.738) 
MDB x Risky   -53.3596***     -57.3307***     -59.4955*** 
    (14.986)     (14.411)     (15.377) 
Risky 148.3222*** 151.5920***   144.9960*** 148.9809***   153.5144*** 156.9028*** 
  (14.798) (14.571)   (16.457) (16.157)   (14.370) (14.101) 
Public -76.2528*** -75.6814***   -65.0072*** -64.3312***   -61.4082*** -60.7715*** 
  (14.423) (14.400)   (18.981) (18.911)   (14.318) (14.449) 
Log of total deal value -26.1543*** -26.0798***   -26.2144*** -26.1533***   -22.2080*** -22.1277*** 
  (6.880) (6.844)   (8.524) (8.526)   (6.295) (6.235) 
Number of tranches 15.0259** 14.9863**   12.0693** 12.0363**   14.7966*** 14.7134*** 
  (5.606) (5.904)   (4.721) (4.865)   (4.828) (4.859) 
Maturity (in months) 0.9237** 0.9111***   0.8082*** 0.7980**   0.7979*** 0.7873*** 
  (0.360) (0.231)   (0.236) (0.373)   (0.199) (0.192) 
Term loan 36.5035*** 36.9258***   31.9148*** 32.3683***   40.1377*** 40.5928*** 
  (9.445) (10.202)   (10.701) (11.355)   (9.586) (9.975) 
Euro -43.2781*** -42.8031***   -29.8211** -29.0196**   -53.4823*** -53.3007*** 
  (8.018) (7.535)   (13.467) (13.006)   (14.122) (13.945) 
Other currency -22.2652 -22.1934   -18.9672 -19.1542   -17.9624** -17.9396* 
  (14.380) (14.623)   (17.866) (17.982)   (8.212) (9.129) 
Deal with a guarantor -3.7658 -3.6201   -2.3705 -2.2501   -8.0018 -7.8756 
  (6.676) (7.247)   (8.615) (9.845)   (5.244) (5.705) 
Syndicate concentration -77.0229** -76.7737**   -75.7580** -75.5126**   -69.1756*** -68.8479*** 
  (29.914) (29.955)   (30.058) (30.088)   (17.411) (17.450) 
                  
Observations 5,229 5,229   3,975 3,975   6,645 6,645 
R-squared 0.616 0.617   0.633 0.633   0.604 0.605 
Country-Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country-Industry FE No No   No No   No No 
 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is the all-in spread, in basis points (bps). 
MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate 
includes only private banks. Risky is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is classified as leveraged or highly leveraged, and 
0 is the loan has investment grade. The excluded category for currency are deals in USD. Public is a dummy equal to 
1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The concentration of the syndicated loan is 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in the loan. The data are at 
the deal level. The sample period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.11. Robustness—credit facilities versus term loans 
 
Dep. Var.: All-in spread Credit  facilities   Term loans 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
MDB 106.4106** 113.4181** 206.7033***   19.5031 41.1421** 49.2923** 
  (43.423) (54.335) (64.247)   (15.899) (18.428) (18.448) 
MDB x Risky   -25.5953       -51.2906***   
    (73.249)       (16.573)   
MDB x High country 
risk     -165.2530*       -45.5461** 
      (83.826)       (18.642) 







  (20.288) (20.444) (20.131)   (15.247) (15.313) (15.114) 
Public -52.5944** -52.3783** -50.6259**   -54.6101*** -54.0227*** -54.3417*** 
  (19.769) (19.902) (20.744)   (12.700) (13.383) (12.733) 
Log of total deal value -19.8625*** -19.9180*** -19.6612***   -26.3244*** -26.2040*** -26.0855*** 
  (6.659) (5.970) (6.531)   (8.446) (8.330) (8.390) 
Number of tranches 18.7399 18.6051 19.3758   12.6993*** 12.6714*** 12.5354** 
  (16.073) (16.138) (16.066)   (4.418) (4.309) (4.686) 
Maturity (in months) 0.0813 0.0773 0.0590   1.0784*** 1.0702*** 1.0788*** 







103.1462***   -31.1473** -30.4623* -32.7674** 
  (24.253) (24.397) (24.481)   (14.538) (15.129) (14.695) 
Other currency -15.6564 -15.7240 -15.7216   -19.5721 -19.3091 -19.3440 
  (10.180) (10.574) (10.674)   (12.050) (12.221) (12.192) 
Deal with a guarantor -10.9784 -10.7800 -9.5871   -4.8177 -4.9510 -4.9550 
  (13.081) (16.239) (13.250)   (6.749) (6.877) (6.696) 
Syndicate concentration -40.2985** -40.7230** -39.7879*   -83.6439*** -82.7082*** -83.1168*** 
  (17.108) (16.979) (19.364)   (25.034) (24.672) (25.036) 
                
Observations 1,941 1,941 1,941   4,611 4,611 4,609 
R-squared 0.659 0.659 0.661   0.635 0.636 0.635 
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Industry FE No No No   No No No 
 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is the all-in spread, in basis points (bps). Columns 1-3 
refer to the sub-sample of credit facilities, while columns 4-6 to that of term loans. MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB 
is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Risky is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan 
is classified as leveraged or highly leveraged, and 0 is the loan has investment grade. High country risk is a dummy equal to 1 for 
borrowers located in countries in the bottom half of the distribution of teh country credit risk rating variable. Public is a dummy 
equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The excluded category for currency are deals in USD. 
The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each 
bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year 
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Figure 5.A1. Cross-border syndicated lending to emerging and developing Countries 
(Number of deals) 
 
Notes: The figure shows the number of cross-border syndicated loan deals to developing countries. The chart is 
based on a sample of 16,847 deals to 107 countries and separates between deals with at least a multilateral 
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Figure 5.A2. Cross-border syndicated lending to emerging and developing countries, by 
region, in USD 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the value in constant 2011 USD (billion) of cross-border syndicated lending to developing 
countries (see Table 5.A1 for the list of countries). The chart is based on a sample of 16,847 deals to 107 countries 
and separates between deals according to the region of the borrower, according to the World Bank classification. 
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Table 5.A1. Syndicated loan deals and MDBs’ participation across sectors 
 
Country # deals 
with 
MDBs 




Afghanistan 1 1 1   Lebanon 24 5 0 
Albania 14 11 0   Lesotho 1 1 1 
Algeria 57 4 0   Liberia 54 1 1 
Angola 60 7 0   Libya 4 2 0 
Armenia 39 28 0   Macedonia 22 12 0 
Azerbaijan 132 51 0   Madagascar 3 1 1 
Bangladesh 53 2 1   Malawi 3 1 1 
Belarus 65 21 0   Malaysia 624 5 0 
Belize 1 1 0   Maldives 8 3 1 
Benin 6 0 1   Mali 16 3 1 
Bhutan 2 1 1   Mauritania 4 1 1 
Bolivia 20 10 1   Mauritius 18 1 0 
Bosnia and Herzegov.. 28 27 0   Mexico 1.369 37 0 
Botswana 7 1 0   Moldova 40 38 1 
Brazil 1.865 76 0   Mongolia 33 15 1 
Bulgaria 132 70 0   Montenegro 9 7 0 
Burkina Faso 0 9 1   Morocco 60 5 0 
Cambodia 8 2 1   Mozambique 21 8 1 
Cameroon 21 5 1   Myanmar 4 0 1 
Cape Verde 1 0 1   Namibia 10 3 0 
Chad 4 2 1   Nepal 4 2 1 
China 3.140 52 0   Nicaragua 9 5 1 
Colombia 274 30 0   Niger 2 1 1 
Congo 8 1 1   Nigeria 171 32 1 
Congo, Democratic R.. 10 3 1   Pakistan 231 47 0 
Costa Rica 50 8 0   Panama 152 9 0 
Cote D'Ivoire (Ivor.. 27 8 1   Paraguay 12 1 0 
Cuba 13 0 0   Peru 258 21 0 
Djibouti 2 0 1   Philippines 436 21 0 
Ecuador 24 3 0   Romania 232 112 0 
Egypt 190 52 0   Rwanda 6 5 1 
El Salvador 43 4 0   Senegal 20 5 1 
Eritrea 2 0 1   Serbia 64 46 0 
Ethiopia 14 5 1   Sierra Leone 2 1 1 
Fiji 1 0 0   South Africa 388 39 0 
Gabon 5 2 0   Sri Lanka 35 8 0 
Georgia 39 30 0   Sudan 2 1 1 
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Ghana 88 17 1   Syria 1 0 0 
Grenada 2 0 1   Tajikistan 15 15 1 
Guatemala 30 3 0   Tanzania 23 6 1 
Guinea 7 1 1   Thailand 873 40 0 
Guyana 1 1 1   Togo 3 2 1 
Haiti 5 3 1   Tunisia 46 10 0 
Honduras 16 2 1   Turkey 1.032 150 0 
India 1.423 81 0   Turkmenistan 10 2 0 
Indonesia 1.210 38 0   Uganda 18 12 1 
Iran 110 2 0   Ukraine 349 108 0 
Iraq 7 3 0   Uzbekistan 55 17 1 
Jamaica 31 6 0   Vanuatu 1 1 1 
Jordan 41 12 0   Vietnam 243 20 1 
Kazakhstan 346 65 0   Yemen 9 2 1 
Kenya 35 13 1   Zambia 48 14 1 
Kyrgyzstan 21 19 1   Zimbabwe 14 4 1 
Laos 16 2 1           
 
Notes: The table shows, by country, the total number of loan deals, as well as only those with at least one MDB 
involved in the syndication of the loan. The “LIC” column identifies low-income countries. The sample consists of 





Table 5.A2. Syndicated loan deals and MDBs’ participation across industry 
 
Industry # deals % of which, with MDB % 
Finance 5586  0,33  657  0,39  
Government 30  0,00  3  0,00  
Oil & Gas 1413  0,08  124  0,07  
Agriculture 389  0,02  53  0,03  
Log of deal value 1290  0,08  100  0,06  
Infrastructure 3791  0,23  436  0,26  
Manufacturing 3417  0,20  237  0,14  
Mining \& Metals 462  0,03  30  0,02  
Services 469  0,03  54  0,03  
Total 16847  1,00  1.694  1,00  
 
Notes: The table shows, by sector, presents the total number of loan deals, as well as only those with at least one 
MDB involved in the syndication of the loan. The sample period is 1994-2015. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.A3. Robustness—alternative clustering 
Dep. Var.: All-in spread (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
MDB 64.3813*** 82.6265*** 63.0023*** 47.0927*** 45.4043*** 60.4875*** 
  (14.809) (12.968) (13.315) (14.929) (15.817) (13.817) 
Log of deal value -3.1679 -20.1222*** -14.0197*** -17.4242*** -19.4645*** -13.9254*** 
  (6.373) (6.348) (4.351) (4.267) (4.200) (4.687) 
Number of tranches 21.2247*** 15.1710** 11.8910** 13.9997** 13.8604*** 11.0556* 
  (5.655) (5.754) (5.473) (5.309) (4.881) (6.307) 
Maturity (in months) 0.4245** 0.7051*** 0.7194*** 0.7929*** 0.7700*** 0.6750*** 
  (0.205) (0.135) (0.166) (0.188) (0.165) (0.173) 
Leveraged 171.4569*** 159.1101*** 130.6725*** 119.2904*** 115.4159*** 128.8962*** 
  (21.482) (10.437) (9.482) (12.158) (12.683) (9.973) 
Highly leveraged 426.2991*** 465.8138*** 388.7043*** 368.8614*** 364.6687*** 381.8506*** 
  (22.863) (23.046) (20.475) (19.395) (19.486) (19.860) 
Term loan 28.6088*** 38.1940*** 40.2687*** 35.3235*** 36.6469*** 44.2661*** 
  (9.141) (8.855) (7.255) (7.774) (6.996) (6.991) 
Public -37.1885** -49.7177*** -55.1404*** -61.9134*** -55.4730*** -54.5258*** 
  (14.914) (15.098) (11.116) (13.349) (12.317) (10.814) 
Euro -32.9701 -10.1033 -43.8180*** -41.9157** -49.6670*** -46.2936*** 
  (20.680) (18.823) (15.760) (17.746) (17.249) (15.358) 
Other currency -43.7736*** -47.0924*** -22.9198* -18.6712 -20.7171 -28.8475** 
  (14.346) (12.156) (11.774) (13.016) (12.725) (10.888) 
Deal with a guarantor -12.4037 4.2185 -5.0795 -4.3782 -4.0366 -1.2073 
  (10.438) (8.822) (5.905) (5.320) (4.878) (5.135) 
Syndicate concentration 50.9959** -100.1885*** -84.8910*** -71.3918*** -71.1034*** -89.7323*** 
  (23.876) (19.155) (17.113) (13.903) (14.727) (18.300) 
              
Observations 6,958 6,958 6,945 6,726 6,724 6,871 
R-squared 0.377 0.511 0.572 0.636 0.657 0.594 
Country FE No No Yes - - - 
Year FE No Yes Yes - - Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Country-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No 
Industry-Year FE No No No No Yes No 
Country-Industry FE No No No No No Yes 
 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is the all-in spread of the loan (spread 
plus fees) in basis points (bps). MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the 
loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Leveraged and highly leveraged deals are expressed with 
reference to investment grade ones (the excluded category). The excluded category for currency are deals in USD. 
Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The concentration of 
the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in 
the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country 
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Table 5.A4. Loan terms and MDBs’ participation—sub-sample 
 
Dep. Var.:  Deal value       Maturity     
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
MDB participation -62.4624** -40.5714 -53.8281**   14.5607*** 15.3793*** 15.1415*** 
  (25.515) (24.673) (24.782)   (4.565) (4.782) (4.211) 
Log of total deal value         4.9152*** 4.9025*** 4.9171*** 
          (1.271) (1.305) (1.318) 
Maturity (in months) 0.5101 0.4325 0.4724         
  (0.795) (0.340) (0.464)         
Number of tranches 100.6972*** 106.3152*** 102.9520***   8.0647*** 8.1159*** 7.4853*** 
  (18.635) (25.339) (21.774)   (1.331) (1.432) (1.206) 
Leveraged -33.8663 -22.2072 -23.1663   -8.5443*** -6.4281*** -8.1321*** 
  (29.445) (29.830) (28.425)   (1.410) (0.829) (1.529) 
Highly leveraged -66.1767** -59.8099** -36.3564   -9.6137*** -3.9710 -9.8733*** 
  (28.490) (28.461) (25.514)   (2.774) (2.440) (2.757) 
Term loan -42.2275** -40.3435* -32.7483*   8.2726*** 8.1629*** 8.6875*** 
  (18.837) (21.351) (16.869)   (1.971) (2.119) (1.969) 
Public 20.6425 19.9621 11.9584   -1.7565 0.1067 -1.2744 
  (27.860) (26.575) (32.538)   (1.885) (1.830) (2.274) 
Euro -30.5970 -43.1866*** -14.6425   12.6409*** 9.8514*** 10.6611*** 
  (22.389) (13.880) (26.313)   (2.832) (3.072) (2.820) 
Other currency 33.8168 44.1650 38.1199   5.5948** 4.4007** 6.0950*** 
  (44.860) (44.109) (42.447)   (2.325) (1.964) (1.956) 
Deal with a guarantor 11.6142 1.5985 12.2930   6.1454** 5.9179*** 6.4195*** 
  (18.432) (19.360) (17.460)   (2.182) (1.768) (2.023) 
Syndicate concentration -389.6866*** -361.0716*** -387.4728***   17.3857*** 19.7839*** 14.5581*** 
  (69.103) (84.887) (71.003)   (3.178) (3.127) (2.807) 
                
Observations 6,945 6,724 6,871   6,945 6,724 6,871 
R-squared 0.211 0.296 0.254   0.383 0.476 0.427 
Country FE Yes - -   Yes - - 
Year FE Yes - Yes   Yes - Yes 
Industry FE Yes - -   Yes - - 
Country-Year FE No Yes No   No Yes No 
Industry-Year FE No Yes No   No Yes No 
Country-Industry FE No No Yes   No No Yes 
 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is the loan maturity (in months). MDB 
is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes 
only private banks. Leveraged and highly leveraged deals are expressed with reference to investment grade ones 
(the excluded category). In columns (7) and (8) risky is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is classified as leveraged or 
highly leveraged, and 0 is the loan has investment grade. The excluded category for currency are deals in USD. Public 
is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The concentration of the 
syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in the 
loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period is 1994-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and 
year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.A5. Loan pricing -All-in Spread- before and after the global financial crisis  
 
Dep. Var.: All-in spread Baseline pre-crisis post-crisis 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
MDB  60.4875*** 31.1891*** 59.8984** 
  (12.896) (6.976) (28.793) 
Log of deal value -13.9254** -6.0140** -12.8463*** 
  (5.491) (2.357) (4.194) 
Number of tranches 11.0556* 3.1771 2.7258 
  (5.810) (3.185) (8.288) 
Maturity (in months) 0.6750*** 0.2626*** 0.3526* 
  (0.195) (0.075) (0.198) 
Leveraged 128.8962*** 63.8751*** 176.6569*** 
  (13.155) (4.339) (13.253) 
Highly leveraged 381.8506*** 197.3579*** 285.7769*** 
  (20.362) (9.883) (43.586) 
Term loan 44.2661*** 17.4289*** 82.6459*** 
  (10.116) (3.182) (13.470) 
Public -54.5258*** -25.7066*** -62.2627*** 
  (11.547) (5.168) (13.743) 
Euro -46.2936** -24.8484*** -66.2024*** 
  (16.566) (6.015) (23.765) 
Other currency -28.8475*** -5.3933 -51.6858** 
  (10.052) (3.515) (20.752) 
Deal with a guarantor -1.2073 -2.1246 10.8933 
  (3.440) (3.466) (17.259) 
Syndicate concentration -89.7323*** -27.5409*** -101.5784*** 
  (19.886) (7.959) (24.178) 
        
Observations 6,871 3732 1,825 
R-squared 0.594 0.582 0.568 
Country FE - - - 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE - - - 
Country-Year FE No No No 
Industry-Year FE No No No 
Country-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is the all-in spread of the loan (spread 
plus fees) in basis points (bps). MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the 
loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Leveraged and highly leveraged deals are expressed with 
reference to investment grade ones (the excluded category). The excluded category for currency is deals in USD. 
Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The concentration of 
the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the share of each bank in 
the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period for the baseline model is 1994-2015, pre-crisis period is 
1994-2007, and post-crisis period is 2008-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.A61. Loan pricing, MDBs’ participation, and de-risking- Pre-crisis  
 
Dep. Var.: 
Pre-crisis period (1994-2007) 
All-in spread   Spread   Fees   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
MDB 72.3207*** 73.6157*** 32.9305*** 31.1386*** 27.4975** 36.4468*** 
  (12.486) (18.993) (6.026) (9.361) (9.721) (11.298) 
MDB x Risky -71.0625***   -34.2480***   -26.9278***   
  (13.348)   (8.092)   (8.376)   
MDB x High country risk   -42.8147*   -17.3005   -28.2166** 
    (24.013)   (11.875)   (12.153) 
Risky 148.3226***   76.8279***   74.8342***   
  (15.950)   (7.850)   (7.842)   
Public -54.2209*** -54.7302*** -24.3684*** -24.5996*** -29.3072*** -29.4288*** 
  (15.306) (15.524) (7.639) (7.769) (7.919) (8.016) 
Log of total deal value -26.2580*** -26.3264*** -13.1425*** -13.1563*** -11.0811*** -11.0815*** 
  (6.474) (6.541) (2.990) (3.148) (2.992) (2.904) 
Number of tranches 16.4501*** 16.5741*** 7.6216** 7.6646** 7.5870** 7.6410** 
  (4.836) (4.528) (2.993) (2.892) (2.610) (2.550) 
Maturity (in months) 0.8810*** 0.8948*** 0.3343* 0.3398*** 0.5444*** 0.5492*** 
  (0.190) (0.179) (0.161) (0.077) (0.102) (0.096) 
Term loan 36.2858*** 35.8767*** 13.3315*** 13.1324*** 24.0692*** 23.8976*** 
  (9.736) (9.205) (4.097) (3.976) (5.665) (5.697) 
Euro -36.2324** -37.4047** -23.8409*** -24.2886*** -18.9166* -19.5964* 
  (15.816) (15.053) (7.287) (7.055) (9.196) (9.099) 
Other currency -13.7022 -13.6699 4.6735 4.6711 -15.5494 -15.6673 
  (13.212) (12.949) (4.544) (4.641) (10.152) (10.324) 
Deal with a guarantor -10.1229 -10.0537 -8.1108 -8.0828 -3.0539 -2.9519 
  (9.161) (8.974) (4.907) (4.907) (5.349) (5.323) 
Syndicate concentration -66.1114*** -66.4738*** -12.3426 -12.4886 -42.5055*** -42.7357*** 
  (17.569) (17.553) (8.746) (8.837) (9.787) (9.550) 
              
Observations 3732 3732 4,073 4,069 3,999 3,995 
R-squared 0.593 0.591 0.598 0.596 0.522 0.520 
Country FE - - - - - - 
Year FE - - - - - - 
Industry FE - - - - - - 
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Industry FE No No No No No No 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the all-in spread, while in 
columns (3) and (4) is the loan spread, and in columns (5) and (6) the loan fees, all in basis points (bps). MDB is a dummy equal to 
1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Risky is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the loan is classified as leveraged or highly leveraged, and 0 is the loan has investment grade. High country risk is a 
dummy equal to 1 for borrowers located in countries in the bottom half of the distribution of the country credit risk rating variable. 
Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The excluded category for currency 
is deals in USD. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the 
share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period for pre-crisis is 1994-2007, and for post-crisis is 
2008-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: 
Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.A62. Loan pricing, MDBs’ participation, and de-risking- Post-crisis 
 
Dep. Var.: 
Post-crisis period (2008-2015) 
All-in spread   Spread   Fees   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
MDB 70.1350*** 63.9798** 59.8984** 53.9574*** 6.4292 50.9744** 
  (19.936) (17.697) (28.793) (9.173) (17.761) (17.957) 
MDB x Risky -60.0114**   -36.2416***   53.5643   
  (21.875)   (12.700)   (51.202)   
MDB x High country risk   -50.9632***   -51.6858**   -42.4925 
    (11.356)   (20.752)   (41.358) 
Risky 183.3353***   91.9140***   93.4410***   
  (13.134)   (6.601)   (8.333)   
Public -64.4124** -64.0938** -32.0153** -32.0360** -25.2476** -25.0078* 
  (20.014) (20.740) (10.539) (10.993) (10.301) (11.074) 
Log of total deal value -14.3513 -14.4011 -6.9920 -6.9819 -6.7969 -6.8377 
  (10.167) (8.746) (4.466) (4.175) (5.638) (6.044) 
Number of tranches 2.3306 2.7216 0.6306 0.6441 -2.1603 -1.9275 
  (11.183) (11.696) (5.745) (5.750) (6.464) (6.766) 
Maturity (in months) 0.5437 0.5490 0.2160 0.2182 0.2366 0.2384 
  (0.601) (0.585) (0.226) (0.223) (0.198) (0.219) 
Term loan 52.7565** 52.3373** 24.4828* 24.3491* 29.4992** 29.2387** 
  (16.852) (16.566) (12.149) (11.937) (10.183) (9.831) 
Euro -72.5099** -73.1034** -38.7836** -38.9933** -32.4479** -32.8721* 
  (24.337) (24.455) (15.543) (15.235) (13.058) (13.776) 
Other currency -35.2097** -34.2452** -19.2455* -19.3124* -61.2101*** -60.5618*** 
  (11.961) (12.317) (9.127) (8.866) (6.684) (7.252) 
Deal with a guarantor -2.9971 -3.3763 -2.4019 -2.4689 -13.2795 -13.5088 
  (16.937) (16.415) (5.967) (6.860) (9.222) (8.841) 
Syndicate concentration -73.7909* -72.5109* -24.8935 -24.6942 -53.6084** -52.9244** 
  (31.723) (36.176) (14.484) (16.489) (18.907) (19.215) 
              
Observations 1,810 1,810 1,939 1,939 1,890 1,890 
R-squared 0.595 0.595 0.594 0.594 0.542 0.541 
Country FE - - - - - - 
Year FE - - - - - - 
Industry FE - - - - - - 
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Industry FE No No No No No No 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the all-in spread, while in 
columns (3) and (4) is the loan spread, and in columns (5) and (6) the loan fees, all in basis points (bps). MDB is a dummy equal to 
1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Risky is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the loan is classified as leveraged or highly leveraged, and 0 is the loan has investment grade. High country risk is a 
dummy equal to 1 for borrowers located in countries in the bottom half of the distribution of the country credit risk rating variable. 
Public is a dummy equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The excluded category for currency 
is deals in USD. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated on the 
share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period for pre-crisis is 1994-2007, and for post-crisis is 
2008-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: 
Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.A7.1. Loan Terms and MDBs’ Participation-pre-crisis 
Dep. Var.:  
Pre-crisis period (1994-2007) 
Deal value   Maturity 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
MDB participation -44.2198* -54.6933** -46.2228**   18.8417*** 20.4311*** 20.1859*** 
  (22.553) (23.936) (19.992)   (4.567) (4.860) (4.639) 
Log of total deal value         5.6116*** 5.8785*** 5.7102*** 
          (0.965) (1.091) (1.224) 
Maturity (in months) 0.3941** 0.4193** 0.3985**         
  (0.173) (0.147) (0.176)         
Number of tranches 81.6171*** 85.0640*** 80.8535***   8.4741*** 8.1932*** 7.6381*** 
  (8.698) (10.600) (8.018)   (1.280) (1.329) (1.164) 
Leveraged 11.9574 9.6149 16.6214   -11.6228*** -10.2094*** -10.4188*** 
  (22.370) (23.743) (23.128)   (1.248) (1.423) (1.132) 
Highly leveraged -35.3105 -36.1859 -21.1272   -11.7508*** -8.0029*** -12.1766*** 
  (21.025) (23.491) (20.629)   (2.025) (2.276) (1.924) 
Term loan -25.9859** -24.2979** -23.7925**   6.9855*** 6.5301*** 7.6713*** 
  (9.348) (10.657) (10.089)   (1.891) (1.787) (1.785) 
Public -10.4422 -11.6926 -18.9467   2.1326 2.2438 3.1511 
  (16.154) (18.474) (21.132)   (2.371) (2.287) (2.254) 
Euro -16.3508 -20.1163 -6.0453   22.3234*** 21.7739*** 21.5119*** 
  (11.342) (13.689) (13.913)   (4.633) (5.479) (4.959) 
Other currency -3.4635 -2.4300 -0.6835   8.4980** 7.9648*** 8.7936*** 
  (17.927) (20.111) (16.501)   (3.108) (2.594) (2.720) 
Deal with a guarantor -5.1623 -10.7112 -2.8780   18.3784*** 17.8946*** 18.2862*** 
  (15.546) (18.086) (13.375)   (4.293) (4.291) (3.988) 
Syndicate concentration -246.7451*** -251.3750*** -247.3754***   13.1254*** 13.5986** 11.6906** 
  (54.362) (55.926) (56.191)   (4.158) (4.639) (4.439) 
                
Observations 8,720 8,534 8,644   8,720 8,534 8,644 
R-squared 0.144 0.179 0.178   0.346 0.416 0.398 
Country FE Yes - -   Yes - - 
Year FE Yes - Yes   Yes - Yes 
Industry FE Yes - -   Yes - - 
Country-Year FE No Yes No   No Yes No 
Industry-Year FE No Yes No   No Yes No 
Country-Industry FE No No Yes   No No Yes 
 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is, alternatively, loan size (in million of 
USD) in columns 1-3 and loan maturity (in months) in columns 4-6. MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB 
is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Leveraged and highly 
leveraged deals are expressed with reference to investment grade ones (the excluded category). Public is a dummy 
equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The excluded category for currency is 
deals in USD. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
calculated on the share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period for pre-crisis is 
1994-2007, and for post-crisis is 2008-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.A7.2. Loan Terms and MDBs’ Participation-post-crisis  
 
Dep. Var.:  
Post-crisis period (2008-2015) 
Deal value   Maturity 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
                
MDB participation -98.2892 -101.6901 -67.7133   36.7068*** 36.8812*** 35.0228*** 
  (74.344) (84.240) (85.949)   (5.894) (5.848) (5.900) 
Log of total deal value         5.5779*** 5.5774*** 5.9454*** 
          (1.002) (1.163) (1.020) 
Maturity (in months) 1.3925** 1.3447** 1.3899**         
  (0.434) (0.466) (0.543)         
Number of tranches 123.1051*** 131.1922*** 130.4448***   4.7255** 5.2869** 4.6878** 
  (18.644) (25.024) (19.343)   (1.501) (1.774) (1.679) 
Leveraged -56.6359 -68.3634 -72.3674   -3.8937 -3.7954 -5.6354* 
  (40.701) (51.708) (42.674)   (2.510) (2.349) (2.398) 
Highly leveraged -194.4418*** -175.3283*** -161.7918***   -4.3741 -7.1026** -7.0011* 
  (43.597) (42.772) (41.575)   (2.753) (2.497) (3.109) 
Term loan -50.9002* -55.5719** -50.1180*   13.6270*** 14.3267*** 12.9060*** 
  (23.832) (22.611) (23.327)   (3.237) (3.413) (3.165) 
Public 42.2123 54.5506* 61.9932**   -0.6244 0.1374 -1.8832 
  (27.553) (23.157) (22.726)   (3.340) (3.824) (3.369) 
Euro -83.9791 -49.2249 -51.4503   22.4096*** 24.0089*** 21.2285*** 
  (46.092) (53.551) (47.629)   (2.914) (2.905) (3.132) 
Other currency -41.3516 -29.6144 -33.0482   2.3434 2.9016 3.4248 
  (35.510) (32.811) (37.970)   (3.846) (3.517) (3.927) 
Deal with a guarantor -57.4058 -53.8007 -53.5093   27.3019*** 26.9430*** 27.7397*** 
  (34.842) (34.927) (35.379)   (3.801) (3.951) (3.888) 
Syndicate concentration -395.8791*** -412.4765*** -374.9902***   15.4836** 16.8534** 11.8001* 
  (59.373) (69.388) (66.114)   (4.970) (5.385) (4.828) 
                
Observations 6,177 6,060 6,100   6,177 6,060 6,100 
R-squared 0.193 0.242 0.237   0.437 0.478 0.483 
Country FE Yes - -   Yes - - 
Year FE Yes - Yes   Yes - Yes 
Industry FE Yes - -   Yes - - 
Country-Year FE No Yes No   No Yes No 
Industry-Year FE No Yes No   No Yes No 
Country-Industry FE No No Yes   No No Yes 
 
Notes: The table presents OLS estimates of model 1. The dependent variable is, alternatively, loan size (in million of 
USD) in columns 1-3 and loan maturity (in months) in columns 4-6. MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB 
is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if the syndicate includes only private banks. Leveraged and highly 
leveraged deals are expressed with reference to investment grade ones (the excluded category). Public is a dummy 
equal to 1 for deals to public sector borrowers and 0 for private sector ones. The excluded category for currency is 
deals in USD. The concentration of the syndicated loan is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
calculated on the share of each bank in the loan. The data are at the deal level. The sample period for pre-crisis is 
1994-2007, and for post-crisis is 2008-2015. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data sources: Dealogic Loan Analytics. 
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Table 5.A8. MDB participation and lending to risky borrowers 
 
Dep. Var.: Risky =1 Baseline Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
        
MDB 0,19*** 0,16*** 0,23*** 
  -0,034 0,026 0,041 
        
Observations 6,871 3,732 1,825 
Observations=1 1,717 921 495 
Wald Chi2 (Prob >chi2) 54.72  41.32  39.51  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Deal-characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE - - - 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE - - - 
Country-Year FE No No No 
Industry-Year FE No No No 
Country-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: This table depicts results of a Probit model estimated by maximum likelihood. The dependent variable is equal 
to 1 if the borrower has a credit rating of leveraged and highly leveraged, and 0 if it has investment grade rating 
(Risky indicator). MDB is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one MDB is involved in the syndication of the loan, and 0 if 
the syndicate includes only private banks. We control for the deal-characteristics of our baseline model of Table 3, 
including: Risky, Public, Log of total deal value, Number of tranches, Maturity (in months), Term loan, Euro, Other 
currency, Deal with a guarantor, and Syndicate concentration. All specifications also include year, and 
country*industry fixed effects. The model is estimated for the baseline sample (1994-2015), as well as for the pre-
crisis (1995-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2015) periods. Standard errors clustered at the country and year level in 
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